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Abstract 
Venture capital firms are collaborative and location specific actors. A significant 
source of specialised factor inputs (knowledge, expertise, resources, and finance) 
for investing in new high tech companies are large corporations, making them 
potentially complementary partners for independent venture capital firms in 
collaborations from which considerable value adding capacity might be derived. 
Employing a qualitative approach based on in-depth interviews with 30 London 
based technology oriented venture capital firm, this study (1) captures and explains 
the how, why, and under what circumstances do venture capital firms collaborate 
with large corporations and their corporate venturing divisions, and (2) the role 
that geographic proximity plays in facilitating this collaboration. Using a cross 
sector comparison, the core of the research inquires as to the structures employed, 
and the motivations and conditions for which this collaborative activity is pursued. 
In addition, it assesses the facilitating role that geographic proximity, and the 
opportunities and capacities of the London metropolitan region might play.  
The findings demonstrate that collaboration between venture capital firms and 
large corporations is increasingly common, but more formal collaborative 
structures are the exception. Driving this collaboration is the exchange of 
complementary knowledge for purposes of better investment selection and for 
improving options for investment exit. Geographic proximity plays a facilitating 
role and is particularly important during the investment selection phase.  While the 
significance of co-location is somewhat downplayed, collaboration is indirectly 
facilitated through the innovation capacities and the opportunities for network 
interaction and international knowledge exchange which the London metropolitan 
region offers.  
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1. Collaborative Venture Capital: Corporate Partnering and 
Geographic Proximity 
Innovation is a highly uncertain process both for those who pursue innovation and 
for those that finance them. A pervasive belief is that new high tech companies 
(NHTCs) engaged in the development and commercialisation of new technology 
based products generally will require the specially structured finance of venture 
capital investment.  Studies point to a positive correlation between venture capital 
investment and innovation (e.g. Kortum & Lerner, 2000)1 and the subsequent 
development of technologically innovative industries,  with the likes of Microsoft, 
Apple, Oracle, Intel, Genentech, and Google all being former venture capital 
backed companies (Audretsch & Lehmann, 2004; Florida & Kenny, 1988; Mann 
& Sager, 2007).  Defined here as ‘independent, professionally managed, dedicated 
pools of capital that focus on equity or equity linked investments in privately held, 
high growth companies’ (Gompers & Lerner, 2001, p. 146), venture capital is 
viewed, unlike traditional banks, as particularly adept at managing the inherent 
uncertainty, related asymmetries, and agency costs associated with early stage 
technological innovation as they pertain to NHTCs (Bygrave & Timmons, 1986; 
Florida & Kenny, 1988; Gompers & Lerner, 2004). 
Seen as integral to venture capital’s effectiveness is its ability to combine a variety 
of entrepreneurial insight, industry expertise, and market knowledge toward first 
identifying potential high growth companies and then developing these into 
successful NHTCs (Zook, 2005).  
This dissertation aims to capture and understand the specific sources and processes 
through which independent venture capital firms (VC firms) obtain and then apply 
this expertise and knowledge toward the capacity building of their portfolio 
companies. In particular, the research identifies and explores expertise and 
knowledge exchange between independent VC firms and large corporations. 
                                                          
1
 An influential study by Kortum and Lerner (2000) suggests a positive correlation between venture 
capital investment and patent production (an imperfect yet commonly used measure of innovation 
output). Their study examines U.S. patent production in 20 industries over a three decade period 
characterised by increasing venture capital investment. Their findings indicate that venture capital 
investment leads to higher patenting rates, suggesting that from 1983–1992 venture capital 
investment was responsible for 8% of innovation output in the industries studied. 
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Although these potentially complementary partnerships are widely acknowledged 
in the venture capital and corporate venturing literature, little is verified or 
understood as to the extent of interaction between these two actors, the 
collaborative structures employed, the motivations for collaboration, and the 
conditions under which collaboration occurs. Therefore, the combination of these 
two threads through an interface of collaboration is an important missing piece in 
the understanding of venture capital investment behaviour. 
As such, the research presented here further illuminates the venture capital 
investment process, providing valuable insight into how independent VC firms — 
through collaboration with corporate partners — select, develop, and position 
portfolio companies for both profitable investment exits and post investment 
success.  With global venture capital activity concentrated in a limited number of 
metropolitan regions, this research focuses on collaborative venture capital 
activity in the London metropolitan region (LMR).  A leading global centre of 
venture capital activity, the LMR is home to the majority of venture capital 
investment in the United Kingdom and attracts considerable venture capital 
investment from Europe and abroad (British Venture Capital Association [BVCA], 
2010).  A secondary objective of the research is, therefore, to provide insight as to 
how this innovative region may facilitate collaboration between London based VC 
firms and large corporations operating within the LMR. 
This introductory chapter presents a brief overview of the venture capital 
investment cycle (Sect. 1.1), followed by a discussion of the value added that 
venture capital presumably provides portfolio companies and the role that 
geographic proximity plays in facilitating these value adding processes (Sect. 1.2) 
and informing public policy (Sect. 1.3). Large corporations are then introduced as 
potential collaborative partners for VC firms, positioning such collaboration as a 
source of complementary asset exchange toward the development of NHTCs (Sect. 
1.4). The primary research questions along with the main theoretical constructs are 
then introduced (Sect. 1.5). This is followed by a discussion of the main research 
parameters and context involving a focus on early stage investment in the United 
Kingdom, within key high-tech sectors, invested in NHTCs located in the LMR 
(Sect. 1.6).  Finally, hypotheses, assumptions, and the research approach are 
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briefly explained (Sect. 1.7), followed by an outline of the ensuing chapters (Sect. 
1.8). 
1.1. The Venture Capital Cycle: From Investment Selection to Exit 
Research questions regarding collaboration between VC firms and large 
corporations are grounded in the complexities of the venture capital investment 
cycle and the complementary factor inputs each phase of the cycle requires for 
successfully investing in and developing NHTCs (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). As 
shown in Figure 1, these phases are comprised of (1) fundraising and investment 
selection, (2) post selection investment monitoring, and (3) investment exit. 
Figure 1: Overview of the Venture Capital Cycle 
Investors
Limited partners
• Endowments
• Pension Funds
• Corporations
Fund-raising
Returns
VC Firm
General Partner
Portfolio
Company
Finance 
& Expertise
Equity
EARLY STAGE EXPANSION STAGE LATER STAGES 3. Exit
2. Active Investment Monitoring
1. Investment
Selection
Due Diligence
Round 1
Series 
A
Round 2
Series 
B
Round 3
Series 
C
6 to 10 years from selection to exit
Source: Own interpretation based on Gompers and Lerner (2004) 
These phases correspond broadly to the staged funding structure practiced by VC 
firms,  beginning with early stage funding, through expansion stage funding, and 
then to later and exit stage funding, respectively (Metrick & Yasuda, 2010).  
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1.1.1. Fundraising and Investment Selection 
First, VC firms raise funds from institutional investors such as public and private 
pension funds, insurance companies, university endowments, and foundations. 
They also raise funds from wealthy individuals and other sources such as mutual 
funds (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). These investors are limited partners in the fund, 
having no role in either the management of the fund or individual portfolio 
companies (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). Second, VC firms select portfolio 
companies through an intense process of screening and due diligence. This 
screening process supposedly uses deep industry-specific knowledge and 
entrepreneurial insight to identify the commercial potential of emerging ideas and 
technology and the quality (i.e. degree of leadership, expertise, and business 
acumen) of the entrepreneurs involved. From this, a very limited number of 
companies are selected with the assessed quality of the entrepreneurs and degree of 
investment uncertainty very much determining the extent to which the venture 
capital firm is involved in the management and oversight of the portfolio company 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2004). 
1.1.2. Post-selection Investment Monitoring 
Third, VC firms actively invest in their portfolio companies, thus distinguishing 
them from most other forms of investment finance. This active investment 
involving the oversight and rigorous revaluation of portfolio companies allows 
venture capitalists to manage and navigate the inherently great asymmetries 
involved and lessen potential agency costs (Sapienza, 1992). To facilitate this 
process, VC firms apply an investment structure characterised by definite funding 
lives, multiple funding rounds, and investment syndication with other VC firms. 
Venture capital funds, comprised of multiple portfolio companies (i.e. investment 
portfolio), generally have a maximum life of 10 years, with most investments in 
individual portfolio companies exiting within 5 to 7 years. Investment in individual 
companies is done in stages or rounds occurring over the life span of the 
investment (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). This structure allows investment 
performance to be evaluated and adjustments to be made (e.g. funding amount, 
duration of round, benchmarks, personnel). The real power of this structure, 
however, is that it also allows VC firms to efficiently terminate funding to 
15 
 
 
underperforming portfolio companies before serious capital losses mount and frees 
funds for better performing or new investments (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). 
Intrinsic to this staged structure is the common practice of syndicating or co-
investing with other VC firms (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001, 2008). Syndication 
usually involves a lead venture capital firm and several participating VC firms, 
these technically being general partners, but the degree to which they are actively 
involved with the portfolio company(s) vary (De Clercq & Dimov, 2004). 
Syndication is used to spread risk, increase investment opportunities (deal flow), 
and to access different knowledge and expertise (e.g. technology, commercial, 
marketing), applying it to the development of portfolio companies (Manigart et al., 
2006). Over the life of an investment syndications can be fluid, with participating 
VC firms entering and exiting the syndicate as one funding round ends and another 
begins.  Not only does syndication allow for VC firms with different levels of risk 
tolerance to achieve their expected investment returns, but, more important, it also 
allows for different expertise to be applied appropriately and in a timely manner 
over the life of the investment (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). 
1.1.3. Investment Exit 
Finally, for venture capitalists to fully profit from their investments, a successful 
investment exit must occur (Gompers & Lerner 2004). Traditionally, the most 
profitable investment exit has been an initial public offering (IPO) in which the 
portfolio company offers shares to the public via a public stock exchange (Metrick 
& Yasuda, 2010). For a successful IPO, though, timing is everything: public 
markets are fickle. Although a bull market can offer venture capitalists abundant 
opportunities for highly profitable IPOs (e.g. the tech boom of the 1990s), industry 
downturns and bear markets can prove disastrous (e.g. the recession of 2008–
2009), making successful exits via an IPO nearly impossible (BVCA, 2010). 
In such cases venture capitalists seek alternative exits, making merger and 
acquisition (i.e. allowing portfolio companies to be bought by another company) 
particularly attractive (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  Although generally not as 
lucrative as an IPO, selling an investee firm to the likes of Microsoft can be 
significantly profitable, particularly if the potential for acquisition is developed 
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very early in the investment process by adjusting funding and deal structure to 
better meet the expectations of a merger or acquisition exit. That being said, 
planning for a certain type of desired exit is very difficult given the uncertainties of 
both the development trajectories of portfolio companies and market demand, 
taking a considerable degree of strategic planning, aligned interests, and luck. 
Regardless of the expectations or plans for exit, however, setting up and executing 
a successful exit is paramount for VC firms (Gompers & Lerner, 2004).  
1.2. Venture Capital: Value Adding and Geographic Proximity            
The modern venture capital model, as shown through the cycle above, is generally 
thought to be the best possible means for developing NHTCs. This process 
involves not only finance and risk tolerance, but also ‘active monitoring’, and a 
considerable amount of knowledge, expertise, and strategic positioning (Gompers 
& Lerner, 2001). The notion of venture capital as an ‘active’ form of risk capital 
investment carries with it two related assumptions (De Clercq & Fried, 2005; 
Elango, Fried, Hisrich & Polonchek, 1995; Gompers, 1995).  The first is that 
venture capital creates value, beyond finance, toward the development of the 
companies invested in (Manigart et al., 2002). This value added, particularly a 
venture capital firm’s expertise and connections to appropriate factor inputs of 
knowledge and resources, is seen as fundamental to the venture capital process, 
playing a significant role in the initial decision to invest and in post-selection 
monitoring and development (Brander, Amit, & Antweiler, 2002; Fried & Hisrich, 
1995).  
Second, venture capital’s active investment approach and its value adding 
capacities are supposedly facilitated through geographic proximity between both 
VC firms and the companies they invest in, between VC firms themselves (i.e. 
syndication), and to a broader yet geographically concentrated venture capital 
community. As Florida and Kenny (1988) propose: 
Venture capital investing is dependent upon tremendous information 
sharing between venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, consultants, and a wide 
range of related actors who operate as networks to locate deals, organise 
companies, establish investment syndications and so on. Because of the 
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intensive nature of this information flow, these venture capital networks 
tend to be personalized, informal and local. (p. 34 emphasis added). 
As such, investing in local companies through local investment networks allows 
VC firms to better manage and evaluate the highly asymmetric and tacit 
information associated with NHTCs,  thus allowing them to more effectively 
select, monitor, and provide value added toward the development of their portfolio 
companies. That being said, questions pertaining to how this value is actually 
created and from where specifically it derives are often relegated to a black box of 
venture capital behaviour (Busenitz, Moesel, & Fiet, 2004; De Clercq & Manigart, 
2007). 
 Attempts to explain the mechanisms or sources for venture capital’s value-adding 
capacities have focused on the background of individual or teams of venture 
capitalists (e.g. Bottazi & Da Rin, 2002), on propensities for value adding when 
investing in early stage companies compared to investing in more established 
companies (e.g. Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996), and the influence of 
institutional factors such as the relative importance and regard placed on 
entrepreneurs within different countries (e.g. Bruton, Fried, & Manigart, 2005). 
Additionally, a number of studies point to investment syndication as venture 
capital’s primary mechanism for knowledge exchange toward the development of 
portfolio companies (e.g. De Clercq & Dimov, 2004; Lockett & Wright, 2001; 
Manigart et al., 2006; Wright & Lockett, 2003).  However, these studies do not 
question or explore adequately where this knowledge originates, nor do they 
question the value of other actors for whom knowledge might be obtained and 
used for investment purposes (De Clercq & Manigart, 2007).  
Similarly, studies that look at venture capital through a network perspective 
generally see syndication as a mechanism facilitated by close geographic 
proximity between syndicate VC firms, creating geographically concentrated 
syndication networks (Bygrave, 1987; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001, 2008). These 
extended networks are defined, however, as between VC firms and exclude other 
potential syndicate partners. Furthermore, the network exchange of knowledge and 
finance between VC firms is increasingly understood as occurring across regions 
and national boundaries. Again, the network exchange in this case is between 
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geographically distant VC firms (e.g. Aizenman & Kendall, 2008; Madhaven & 
Iriyama, 2009) to the exclusion of other actors. 
An informative study by Lindsey (2008) argues that VC firms, as intermediaries, 
facilitate strategic alliances between other venture backed companies, particularly 
alliances between entrepreneurial firms that share a common venture capital 
investor. Furthermore, Lindsey demonstrates that alliances are more common 
between companies within similar industries, that such alliances are associated 
more with early stage high tech companies, and that they seem to be initiated to 
accrue R&D complementarities. The importance of Lindsey’s study is that it 
solidifies the notion of alliance building as a value adding activity performed by 
independent VC firms, with alliances positively correlated to investment exits. 
However, the study does not specifically examine the processes involved in this 
alliance building nor identify alliances between companies that do not share a 
common venture capital investor. 
Further questions, therefore, are pertinent, because the assumptions that venture 
capital provides value added toward the development of NHTCs and, more 
particularly, that venture capital activity concentrates geographically often inform 
public policy regarding the promotion and development of venture capital markets. 
1.3. Venture Capital and Public Policy 
Martin, Sunley, and Turner (2002) propose that the geographic concentration 
exhibited by venture capital activity has led to two policy approaches.2 The first 
embraces venture capital activity as location specific activity that is potentially 
limited to a small number of regions where sufficient capacities for robust 
innovative activity are present. Heavily influenced by Porter’s cluster concept 
                                                          
2
 In the United States, venture capital investments in NHTCs tend to concentrate in Silicon Valley 
and the surrounding San Francisco Bay region of California and in the greater Boston region (e.g. 
Route 128) (Florida & Smith, 1991; PWC, 2008). Venture capital’s migration to Western Europe 
has followed a similar pattern of concentration, but the intensity of concentration varies from 
country to country (PWC, 2008). In France, for example, venture capital investment is highly 
concentrated in and around Paris/Ile de France, the recipient of roughly 60% of total venture capital 
investment in France (Martin, Sunley, & Turner, 2002). In Germany, however, venture capital 
investment is dispersed somewhat more evenly among four urban agglomerations: Munich, 
Dusseldorf, Stuttgart, and Hanover (Fritsch & Schilder, 2008). This pattern of either intense 
concentration (e.g. Stockholm in Sweden) or relative dispersal (e.g. regions of Lombardio, 
Piemonte, Toscana, and Emilio Ramanga in Italy) is repeated throughout Europe. 
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(1998, 2000, 2007) and high tech agglomerations such as Silicon Valley, policy 
aims to increase venture capital activity by more effectively connecting a region’s 
innovation and entrepreneurial capacities: breaking down barriers between 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists and thus spurring, in a sense, both venture 
capital supply and demand. The second view holds that venture capital is already 
too geographically concentrated, contributing to regional inequality. Related policy 
aims to develop venture capital markets in regions where such markets are 
comparably small or absent, with a focus on stimulating venture capital supply 
(Martin, Sunley, & Turner, 2002).  
The effectiveness and rationale for these public programmes, particularly those 
aimed at greater dispersal (e.g. Regional Venture Capital Funds, administered by 
Regional Development Agencies [RDAs]) has been questioned.  Harding (2002), 
Mason and Harrison (2003), and others point not to an equity gap but rather a 
knowledge gap or lack of investment readiness among potential portfolio 
companies, as well as insufficient institutional support at the regional level. 
Related critiques suggest region-specific venture capital programs may very well 
be excluding expertise and “specialized knowledge” that could be gained through 
linkages with better performing regions, and that, overall, more effective 
mechanisms for the “capacity building” of portfolio companies should be sought 
and employed (Nightingale et al., 2009, pp. 26–27). 
Such critiques echo earlier assessments levelled at public venture capital 
programmes (e.g. early iterations of the Small Business Innovation Research 
Program [SBIR] in the United States) where the decided cause for programme 
ineffectiveness centred on their failing to function or behave like independent 
venture capital:  they did not employ experienced venture capitalists and, partially 
as a result, they did not follow appropriate processes of due diligence and 
selection. They also seemed unable, in many respects, to provide significant post-
selection value added toward the development of portfolio companies (Armour & 
Cummings, 2006; Gilson, 2003; Lerner, 2002). 
In the history of public venture capital programmes, the issue of effective capacity 
building continually resurfaces, reiterating questions as to how, from where, and 
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from whom independent VC firms actually derive and create value for their 
portfolio companies toward their successful development. 
1.4. Corporate Venture Capital and the Potential for Collaboration 
Large corporations have engaged in corporate venture capital and external 
corporate venturing more generally since at least the 1960s, exhibiting trends that 
mirror the cyclic pattern displayed by independent venture capital activity 
(Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005). Corporate venture capital (CVC) can be defined as 
‘equity or equity linked investments in young, privately held companies, where the 
investor is a financial intermediary of a non-financial corporation’ (Maula, 2007, 
p. 371). Importantly, CVC can be grouped into a broader category of external 
corporate venturing activities, which Sharma and Chrisman (1999, p. 11) define as 
‘corporate venturing activities that result in the creation of semi-autonomous or 
autonomous organisational entities that reside outside the existing organisational 
domain.’ The past several decades have seen major corporations such as Exxon, 
GE, DuPont, Johnson & Johnson, and more recently Microsoft, Intel, and Apple 
all engaging in robust corporate venturing and CVC programs (Dushnitsky, 2006; 
Keil, 2002). Figure 2 portrays the spectrum of corporate venturing activities as 
proposed by Dushnitsky (2006) and Keil (2002). 
These corporate venturing activities include direct investment in and acquisition of 
entrepreneurial firms, developing corporate spin-offs/outs and activities involving 
strategic partnerships and alliances with other companies and with the broader 
venture capital community (Birkenshaw, van Basten Batenburg, & Murray, 2002). 
Motivations for engaging in external corporate venturing include financial gain, 
knowledge and acquisition of new technology (addressing product pipeline needs), 
access to market knowledge and new market entry, and organisational learning 
(Benson & Ziedonis, 2009; Kann, 2000; Keil, 2004; McNally, 1997; Siegel, 
Siegel, & Macmillan, 1988). Again, the common factor among these external 
corporate venturing activities is that their aims are pursued through investment and 
partnering platforms external to the firm (Miles & Covin, 2002).  
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Another common element of these corporate venturing programmes is their 
linkage to independent venture capital. Keil (2002) shows a number of corporate 
venture capital programmes that invest in dedicated funds or pooled funds through 
an independent venture capital firm as an intermediary. A large study by 
Birkenshaw and colleagues (2002) found that corporate venture capital 
programmes obtain a substantial number of new investment opportunities (i.e. deal 
flow) through interaction with independent VC firms. Likewise, a survey study by 
the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (2001) found that 
one third of corporate venture capital deals in Europe were syndicated, implying 
that these deals involved co-investing arrangements with independent VC firms. 
Figure 2: Corporate Venturing and Corporate Venture Capital 
Arrangements 
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 Source: Own interpretation based on Dushnitsky (2006) and Keil (2002) 
Similarly, a later survey by Birkinshaw and Hill (2005) identified three key factors 
as important for the success of corporate venture capital programmes: (1) 
establishing venturing divisions with considerable autonomy from the corporate 
parent, (2) structuring compensation mechanisms similar to those used by 
independent VC firms, and (3) establishing robust connections to the broader 
venture capital community. Another study by Hill, Maula, and Murray (2005) 
positively links the strategic performance of a corporate venture capital 
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programme with its overall connectedness to the venture capital community. From 
these studies the interaction between large corporations and independent VC firms 
is obvious, yet none captures their frequency nor explains either how these 
interactions are arranged or the processes involved. Also missing from the 
literature are studies that approach corporate venturing from the perspective of 
independent venture capital (see Figure 3).  
The potential that such collaboration might offer is suggested in the work of 
Maula, Autio, and Murray (2005) and Hellmann (2002). These works propose that 
entrepreneurial firms benefit most when they receive funding from both 
independent venture capital and corporate venture capital. This survey work 
suggests that independent venture capital provides entrepreneurial firms with value 
added benefits in the form of financial and management expertise, whereas 
corporate venture capital provides entrepreneurial firms with value added 
associated with commercial and technology expertise. Such investment 
complementarities (e.g. resources, knowledge, and expertise) would seem to offer 
sufficient motivation for independent VC firms and the corporate venturing 
divisions of large corporations to collaborate with one another. A survey study by 
Keil, Maula, and Wilson (2010) proposes that large corporations and their 
venturing divisions use their unique resources to gain access and strategically 
position themselves into what are fairly exclusive venture capital syndication 
networks.  
Again, although suggested anecdotally in the preceding literature, the existence of 
such collaborative activity and the related organisational structures has yet to be 
sufficiently verified or understood. For example, the extent to which syndication 
between VC firms and corporations occurs in the United Kingdom is not known; 
how might such formal collaborative activity compare to traditional syndication or 
co-investing arrangements between VC firms? If syndication is viewed as the most 
formal arrangement, what other forms of collaboration occur, and what are the 
processes and procedures involved? A claim might be advanced that informal 
collaborative arrangements precede co-investment and syndication or exist as 
independent activity. 
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Furthermore, the motivations for VC firms to collaboratively engage with large 
corporations have not been substantiated to any significant degree. Is collaboration 
used to enhance overall portfolio performance through strategic positioning, or is it 
used to gain complementary knowledge and expertise, perhaps value added that is 
utilised for developing portfolio companies into successful businesses? 
Additionally, under what conditions is collaboration between VC firms and large 
corporations optimal? A study by Ernst, Witt, and Brachtendorf (2005) suggests 
that corporate venture capital programmes place short-term financial objectives 
over long-term strategic interests, which may conflict with the 10 year investment 
timeframes of many independent venture capital investments. How are potentially 
incompatible interests aligned, and when might complementary assets be 
exchanged? 
Finally, with studies (e.g. Keil, Maula, & Wilson, 2007) suggesting that corporate 
venture capital programmes pursue engagement and entry into venture capital 
syndication networks, questions can be raised as to the degree that co-location and 
geographic proximity are required to facilitate this network entry and 
collaboration, including syndication, between independent VC firms and large 
corporations. 
1.5. Primary Research Aims 
This research starts from the proposition that large corporations are a potentially 
complementary collaborative partner for independent VC firms — partners from 
which venture capital might derive considerable value adding capacity for the 
development of NHTCs (Maula, Autio, & Murray, 2005).  It thus seeks to explore 
and capture how, why and under what circumstances do independent venture 
capital firms collaborate with large corporations and their corporate venturing 
divisions. More specifically, it inquires as to the structures employed and the 
motivations for which this collaborative activity is pursued. In addition, it 
examines the various opportunities and constraints that may shape collaborative 
behaviour between these two investment actors (see Figure 3).  
Viewing venture capital investment as a location-specific activity concentrated in a 
select number of high capacity regions, some degree of geographic proximity is 
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necessary for effective monitoring of investments and appropriate knowledge 
exchange. The secondary objective of this research, therefore, is to explore the role 
that geographic proximity might play in facilitating collaboration between venture 
capital firms and large corporations. Furthermore, with many large corporations 
being multi-national, collaboration with them might act as a primary mechanism 
through which geographically concentrated venture capital activity connects to 
global knowledge flows and markets. Understanding this collaboration, therefore, 
may provide a more dynamic picture of location-specific venture capital 
behaviour.  
Figure 3: CVC and the Venture Capital Perspective? 
Large Corporation
Corporate Venturing
CVC
Division
Venture 
Capital  
Firm
Buy or 
Merge
Spin-
Out
Invest
?
?
The Venture Capital 
Perspective ?
Structures?
Motivations?
Conditions?
Processes?
Procedures?
Opportunities?
Limitations?
Source: Own interpretation based on Dushnitsky (2006) and Keil (2002) 
Such insights might prove informative to public venture funds — including those 
operating in less dynamic regions — in identifying replicable mechanisms for 
entrepreneurial development, particularly greater corporate partnerships and more 
effective interregional networks.3 
                                                          
3
 The London Technology Fund (LTF, 2009), a public venture capital fund financed by the 
European Regional Development Fund and the London Development Agency, funds young 
technology firms in London. The LTF runs an annual competition for which potential investee 
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1.5.1. Building on a Complementary Asset Model of Firm Innovation  
The prospects for collaboration between independent VC firms and large 
corporations — with venture capital as a potential intermediary — bring together 
two distinct models of firm-based innovation: that produced within the flexible 
organisations of small entrepreneurial firms (i.e. Schumpeter I) and that produced 
within the knowledge and resource-rich organisations of large established firms 
(i.e. Schumpeter II) (Freeman & Soete, 1997). To be clear, although both small 
firms and large established firms are sources of innovation, there is a   prevailing 
assumption that small entrepreneurial firms are more likely to produce radical 
innovations, whereas innovation produced by large established firms is generally 
of an incremental form.  At first glance, the bringing together of small firms and 
large established firms might appear to run counter to notions of entrepreneurship 
and even venture capital, which is commonly seen engaged in the development 
and commercialisation of novel technologies that carry the potential for 
transforming whole industries, often resulting in the demise of established industry 
players (Bygrave & Timmons, 1986; Schumpeter, 1927). In other words, there is a 
certain level of implied incompatibility between the aims and competences of 
venture capitalists and the entrepreneurs they back, and those of large established 
firms. 
In contrast, the research presented here is grounded in the notion that the flexibility 
and idea-rich environs of the Schumpeter I model and the knowledge and resource 
capacities of the Schumpeter II model are both necessary for the development and 
commercialisation of high-tech innovation. Such a perspective is based on a 
complementary asset model of firm-based innovation first introduced by Teece 
(1986, 1992) and developed through the related work of Christensen (1995, 1996), 
Granstrand, Patel, and Pavitt (1997), Patel and Pavitt (1997), Chesbrough (2004), 
                                                                                                                                                                
firms can compete for and share upwards of £1m in investment through the LTF. Participant 
companies attend a series of workshops aimed at developing investment readiness (i.e. making 
one’s company attractive and suitable for venture capital investment) and demystifying the venture 
capital investment process (i.e. investment deal structure and expectations).  The day concludes 
with what is described as a ‘corporate speed-dating event’ where the participant companies then 
engage in face-to-face meetings with a number of ‘major technology companies.’  The purpose of 
this ‘speed-dating’ is to facilitate the building of relationships between these technology start-ups 
and large industry leaders, contributing to investment readiness and initiating potential long-term 
partnerships. 
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and Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, and West (2008). Much of this work focused on 
the asset needs of large established firms, with Christensen (2008) proposing that:  
from an innovative asset perspective, large companies will have to look out 
for external (as well as internal) innovative ideas, technologies, concepts, 
or IPs [intellectual properties] to align with and integrate into new and 
improved product architectures. And from an operational asset perspective, 
large firms will have to look out for external and internal innovations in 
search of, and sometimes in exchange for, complementary assets. (p. 48) 
Not surprisingly, this corresponds to works by Rothwell (1994), Rothwell and 
Dodgson (1991), and Dodgson and Rothwell (1994) and more recent studies (e.g. 
Narula, 2004; Lee, Park, Yoon, & Park, 2010, van de Vrande et al., 2009) 
demonstrating that small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) also regularly 
engage in external R&D and commercial alliances, so-called open innovation 
practices, both with each other and with large established firms. There is wide 
agreement that, as Lee et al. (2010) states: 
while SMEs’ flexibility and specificity can be advantages in accelerating 
innovation, few of them have sufficient capacity to manage the whole 
innovation process by themselves, and this encourages them to collaborate 
with other firms. (p. 291)  
Empirically captured in the work of Lawton Smith (2004); Lawton Smith, 
Dickson, and Lloyd Smith (1991); Saxenian (1996); Owen (1999), Rothwell and 
Dodgson (1991); and others, collaboration between NHTCs and large established 
firms is common, particularly in the sectors of life science, and information 
technology, although it is not without challenges and potential drawbacks (Lawton 
Smith, Dickson, and Lloyd Smith, 1991). Studies point to organisational and 
cultural barriers, different strategic interests and objectives, competitive 
tendencies, and differences in collaborative capacities between small and large 
firms as contributing to less than optimal, possibly detrimental, relationships. Lee 
and colleagues (2010) argue that choosing the appropriate partner for collaboration 
can be facilitated through an intermediary actor whose network position and 
expertise can effectively recognise complementarities and degrees of compatibility 
between a small firm and a large established firm. 
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Similar to the work of Lindsey (2008) discussed earlier, which views independent 
venture capital as an intermediary facilitating alliances between venture capital 
backed companies, this research positions independent VC firms as an investment 
and knowledge intermediary that identifies complementary partnerships for their 
small portfolio companies through the leveraging of their connections to a 
relatively small number of large established firms that tend to dominate their 
respective industries, thus facilitating complimentary partnerships  between 
NHTCs and large corporations (see Figure 4).    
Figure 4: Complementary Asset Model with Venture Capital as Intermediary 
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Therefore, this research suggests that that this intermediary role requires 
independent VC firms to collaborate with large established firms to build and 
maintain these valuable corporate partnerships. 
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1.6. A Focus on UK Venture Capital 
Venture capital is a global activity. Although its origins and development are 
rooted in the U.S. experience, sizable venture capital markets have emerged and 
prospered in most modern capitalistic economies. Global venture capital 
investment patterns are not uniform, exhibiting wide variation from country to 
country; this variation is thought to be driven by the varying opportunities for 
investment exit and entrepreneurial climates exhibited by different countries 
(Djankov, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002; Green, 1991; Wright, 
Prutti, & Lockett, 2005).  Metrick and Yasuda (2010) point to a causal relationship 
between highly active IPO markets and robust venture capital investment levels, 
particularly regarding venture capital invested in NHTCs. 
Therefore, this research focuses on venture capital investment in the United 
Kingdom.  With a traditionally active IPO market and a correspondingly robust 
high-tech oriented venture capital industry, the venture capital market in the 
United Kingdom is regularly considered the most robust and dynamic when 
compared to other European countries, both in terms of investment amount and 
sector breadth (Jeng & Wells, 2000; Martin, 1989; Metrick & Yasuda, 2010; 
Sapienza et al., 1996); the United Kingdom has consistently had the highest level 
of high-tech investment in Europe and is home to almost half of all high-tech 
European venture capital activity (Djankov et al., 2002; Metrick & Yasuda, 2010; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008). For an overview of venture capital’s historical 
development in the United Kingdom, see Mason and Harrison (1991).4,5,6 The 
                                                          
4
  As Mason and Harrison (1991, pp. 204–205) explain, the financing of entrepreneurial firms in the 
United Kingdom prior to the 1980s is ‘part of the British financial tradition.’ Most of these finance 
sources, however, with the possible exception of 3i, did not resemble venture capital as it is known 
today or as it emerged in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. 
5
 The subsequent expansion of ‘modern’ venture capital in the United Kingdom during the 1980s 
was a result of numerous factors — attitudinal, policy, and economic (Mason & Harrison, 1991; 
Murray, 1995). Along with growing recognition of venture capital’s supposed effectiveness in the 
development of the technology driven growth, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher introduced a 
number of initiatives and policy changes to support small business and venture capital activity 
(Mason & Harrison, 1986; Owen, 1999). Such measures included training and advice for 
entrepreneurs and changes to company law that allowed company founders to repurchase their 
shares (i.e. gain more ownership), making it more favourable for entrepreneurs to seek out external 
equity such as venture capital (Burns & Dewhurst, 1986).  
6
 The establishment in 1980 of the Unlisted Securities Market, the requirements for which were 
conducive to small and medium-sized firms, made a profitable exit by IPO an attainable and 
attractive reality for entrepreneurial firms and VC firms interested in financing them (Shilson, 
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contributing strengths of the United Kingdom are thought to be its dynamic, 
market driven  entrepreneurial culture (when compared to the more coordinated 
economies of Western Europe), its strong science base associated with Oxford and 
Cambridge, a history of corporate innovation, and the London region’s 
considerable global magnetism regarding international finance and knowledge 
flows (see Smith, 2004; Simmie et al., 2002). 
1.6.1. A Focus on Early Stage Technology Oriented Investment  
Furthermore, this research focuses — to as great an extent as possible — on U.K. 
venture capital investment in the early stage development of NHTCs, a form of 
investment generally referred to as classic venture capital (Gompers & Lerner, 
2004; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). Classic venture capital “is oriented towards the 
financing of companies at their seed, start-up and early growth stages,” leading 
through expansion stages and investment exit, and generally involves companies 
engaged in technology based endeavours (Mason & Harrison, 2002, p. 430). Of the 
various forms of venture capital, classic venture capital is the one most associated 
with the spurring of technological innovation and subsequent economic growth 
(Bygrave & Timmons, 1986). 
In focusing on classic venture capital, this study foregoes what is commonly 
referred to as merchant venture capital or what is more generally called private 
equity. These funds “invest in later stage deals and management buyouts (MBOs) 
and buy-ins (MBIs), that is, the sale by large companies of noncore subsidiaries 
and divisions to either incumbent or incoming management teams (Mason & 
Harrison, 2002, p. 430). Also absent from this study is informal venture capital, 
which flows predominately from wealthy individuals, often called angel investors, 
who provide start-ups with seed capital that generally precedes any formal venture 
                                                                                                                                                                
1984). Additionally, the promotion of a ‘pro-investment’ climate in the United Kingdom under 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher proved particularly attractive to foreign investment, including 
foreign venture capital. This occurred with a resurgent global economy that followed nearly a 
decade (1970s) of high interest rates, high inflation, and stagnant economic conditions (Owen, 
1999). 
30 
 
 
capital investment (Mason & Harrison, 1996, 2000; Wong, Bhatia, & Freeman, 
2009).7 
The focus on early stage investing is pertinent for both understanding collaborative 
venture capital activity and for venture capital investment in the United Kingdom 
more generally. First, given the lack of resources, expertise, and capital held by 
most young companies and start-ups, it is expected that early stage companies will 
require a disproportionate number of external inputs (Perez & Soete, 1988; Zook, 
2005). Such inputs are likely to involve highly tacit and/or specialised knowledge 
and resources that are shared through feedback loops and learning processes that 
extend beyond the boundaries of the firm (Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003; Freeman & 
Soete, 1997; Hirsch, 1965; Hislop, 2009). Therefore, it is expected that early stage 
venture capital investment will necessitate a considerable degree of external 
collaboration (Bottazzi & Da Rin, 2002; Sapienza, 1992; Steier & Greenwood, 
1995; Zook, 2004). 
Second, global venture capital investment levels in early stage companies rise and 
fall in accordance with global market conditions, comprising nearly 50% of 
venture capital investments in up times such as the tech boom of the 1990s and 
declining to roughly 15% during economic downturns such as the tech crash of 
2000–2001 and the recession of 2008–2010 (Pierrakis, 2010). Over the past 3 
decades trends toward decreasing levels of early stage venture capital investment 
have led to an ongoing assumption that an early stage venture capital equity gap 
exists, prompting governments to implement the various public venture capital 
programmes discussed earlier in this chapter (Lerner, 1999; Mason & Harrison, 
2003; Nightingale et al., 2009). 
This early stage equity gap is apparent when looking at U.K. venture capital 
investment over the last half decade. Total venture capital and private equity 
investment in the United Kingdom — invested by U.K. based venture capital and 
private equity firms in U.K. based companies — peaked in 2007 at £11,972 billion 
(up from £10,227 in 2006). This upsurge was due to an increase in private equity 
investment, much of which rode the global real estate and associated stock market 
                                                          
7
 For an overview of informal venture capital see Smith, Harrison, & Mason (2010). 
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bubble. As the credit crunch swiftly took hold, this amount fell to £8,556 billion in 
2008 and to £4,790 billion in 2009.  Figure 5 shows total venture capital and 
private equity investment by U.K. based venture capital and private equity firms 
invested in the United Kingdom and abroad, demonstrating both the enormous 
difference in investment amounts between private equity (total private equity 
investments peaking at roughly £31 billion in 2007) and actual venture capital 
investments (total venture capital investments in 2007 were £683 million), as well 
as the significant amount of U.K. investment that flows abroad. 
When private equity investment is removed from the picture, it is clear that true 
venture capital investment in the United Kingdom, a large part of which is invested 
in early stage technology based companies, has both declined overall and remains 
a comparatively small segment of the United Kingdom’s risk capital market. 
Figure 5: Total Global UK VC and Private Equity Investment 2006-10 (£b) 
 
Source: Own interpretation based on BVCA, 2011, 2009, 2007  
In 2007 U.K. based VC firms invested roughly £434 million in 502 U.K. based 
companies, down from roughly £960 million in 2006. Venture capital investment 
continued to decline to £359 million in 2008. After rebounding slightly in 2009, 
investment levels dropped again to £313 million in 2010, invested in 397 U.K. 
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based companies (BVCA, 2011). The available data on investment in U.K. start-up 
and early stage companies places such investment at £247 million in 2008, £289 
million in 2009, and £214 million in 2010 (BVCA, 2011). 
1.6.2. A Focus on Investments in Key Technology Sectors 
In looking at early stage venture capital investment in the United Kingdom, this 
research includes a further focus on such investments in three key technology 
sectors:(1) information and communication technology (ICT), (2) life science and 
biotech, and (3) clean tech. U.K. venture capital and private equity investments in 
technology based firms, somewhat surprisingly, remained relatively stable or even 
increased during the most recent recessionary period, going from £1,793 billion in 
2007 (£958 million of that going to clean tech companies), dipping to £727 million 
in 2009, and increasing sharply to £2,229 billion in 2010. Much of this variation 
can be attributed to continued expansion stage funding and MBOs in pre-existing 
investments rather than new investments in new companies (BVCA, 2011). 
Similar to investment patterns of the previous decade, investments in technology 
based companies during this period were concentrated in companies engaged in 
ICT, notably software, semiconductors, and the Internet; and companies engaged 
in life science, particularly medical instruments, pharmaceuticals, and biotech. In 
contrast to earlier in the decade, companies engaged in the burgeoning clean 
technology sector also received sizable investment during this period, with clean-
tech investments peaking in 2007 at £958 million and levelling off at £518 million 
in 2010 (BVCA, 2007, 2009, 2011). 
Although overall investment amounts in technology based companies remained 
steady, even increasing in some sectors, the amount of true venture capital 
investment — much of this early stage funding — in technology based companies, 
including clean tech, remained volatile and relatively low (posting at £674 million 
in 2007, £296 million in 2008, and £171 million in 2009) then increased to £296 
million in 2010 invested in 417 U.K. based technology companies (BVCA, 2007, 
2009, 2011). When looking more closely at funding in key technology sectors 
during this period, various patterns of resiliency and decline are evident.  
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Figure 6: UK Venture Capital Investment by Sector and Stage 2007-10 (£ m) 
 
Source: Own interpretation based on BVCA, 2011, 2010, 2008 
Figure 6 shows the total amounts of venture capital investment in the United 
Kingdom, by U.K. based VC firms, invested in ICT, life science, and clean tech 
companies, by investment stage, from 2007 to 2010, distinguishing between early 
stage investment and expansion stage investment. 
1.6.3. A Focus on Investment Activity in the LMR 
Nearly 70% of all U.K. venture capital investment and 68% of all early-stage 
venture capital investment regularly flows into the LMR. Furthermore, the LMR, 
including Oxford and Cambridge, is home to roughly 70% of all U.K. based VC 
firms (BVCA, 2009, 2010, 2011). Therefore, this research further focuses on early 
stage venture capital investment in NHTCs located in the LMR, including Oxford 
and Cambridge. What Miles and Daniels (2007, p. 4) calls the “Golden Triangle,” 
an area “bounded by Oxford and Cambridge and along the M4 to London,” the 
LMR constitutes the economic engine of the United Kingdom and acts as a global 
centre for high-tech innovation and related industries, the arts, and finance (Smith 
& Virah-Sawmy, 2008; Simmie et al., 2002). For a distribution of U.K. venture 
capital investment by region, see Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Total UK venture Capital Investment by region 2007-2010 (£ m) 
 
Source: Own interpretation based on BVCA 2011, 2009, 2008 
The geographic concentration of venture capital activity, as in the case of London, 
corresponds to the perspective that situates venture capital activity within the 
context of a broader entrepreneurial ecosystem (Zacharakis, Shepherd & Coombs, 
2003).  According to Metrick and Yasuda (2010), such an ecosystem implies an 
environment that makes it easier for entrepreneurs to start and grow their 
businesses. In practice, such ecosystems might include a critical mass of finance 
and legal professionals that understand the needs of entrepreneurs, regulatory 
bodies that support business development, easy access to highly skilled and mobile 
labour (scientists, engineers, managers), a propensity for corporate and university 
spin-outs, and so forth (Mathews, 1997). The explanation follows that those 
countries and regions with vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystems exhibit higher levels 
of entrepreneurial activity and thus higher levels of venture capital investment 
(Djankov et al., 2002).8  
                                                          
8
 Djankov et al. (2002) considers 85 countries and compares the overall costs of starting a business 
in each. The costs are measured by comparing the number of regulatory procedures necessary to 
start a business and calculating the average number of days it takes to start a business in each 
country. The countries exhibiting the shortest number of days to start a business – between 2 and 4 
business days – were Canada, Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. In contrast, in 
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In many ways, such ecosystems are thought to reside within broader regional 
innovation systems that characterise a select number of high capacity regions 
(Cooke, 2004). Such systems imply an institutionalisation of innovation capacities 
and a high degree of regional embeddedness concerning innovative activity, 
related interactions, and social capital (Cooke, 2004; Miles & Tully, 2007).  For 
understanding innovative activity in large metropolitan regions such as London, 
the regional innovation systems (RIS) concept is informative. First, the RIS 
concept positions entrepreneurialism and related activity, such as venture capital, 
as system catalysts: coping with uncertainty, they are the sources for new ideas and 
experimentation, ideas which, through subsequent interactions with other actors 
and functions of the RIS, lead to new innovations (Hekkert, Suurs, Negro, 
Kuhlmann, & Smits, 2007). Therefore, entrepreneurial activity is reinforced 
through positive feedback loops and the absorptive capacity of skilled labour 
markets, spurring a continual cycle of new idea creation and development (Lawton 
Smith & Waters, 2011). Furthermore, central to the RIS concept is that 
entrepreneurial activity occurs through the efforts of both incumbents and new 
entrants; offering possibilities for collaborative interactions between them. 
Second, the geographic boundaries of the RIS concept, although “fuzzy” and 
difficult to define (Doloreux & Parto, 2005; Markusen, 1999), can be understood 
as a functional region or territory: a region that extends as far as there are 
significant, purposeful linkages between actors that go beyond administrative 
boundaries — encompassing both central nodes of interaction and association (e.g. 
a major city) and peripheral sub regions (e.g. university research hubs or industrial 
clusters); or as Nuur, Gustavsson, and Laestadius (2009, p. 127) propose, “in 
practice, functional regions are normally neighbouring regions or regions 
connected by communication systems allowing daily commute.”  The LMR can be 
understood as such, with London acting as a central node by which the broader 
region that includes Oxford and Cambridge purposefully interact (see Figure 8). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                
countries such as France and Germany this study estimates is takes between 40 and 55 days to 
navigate the regulatory hurdles for starting a new business, almost 10 times as long as in the 
neighbouring United Kingdom. Such differences might indicate more vibrant entrepreneurial 
ecosystems. 
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Figure 8: Miles’ "The Golden Triangle": The LMR as a Regional Innovation 
System 
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Source: Adapted by the author from Miles & Daniels (2007) 
Thirdly, the RIS concept posits that local and intra-regional interactions and 
knowledge exchange between actors are understood as occurring through networks 
that change and evolve through repeat interaction and the varying dynamics among 
dominant network incumbents (i.e. gatekeepers) and new network entrants. More 
so, the RIS concept emphasises that regions (as similar to innovative firms 
discussed earlier) must remain open to external knowledge flows to remain 
dynamic and competitive and thus avoid lock-in (Asheim & Isaksen, 2002). This 
openness is characterised by interactions between regional and global networks — 
in many cases linking one RIS to others around the globe — whose network 
interface, as Iammarino (2005) suggests, occurs at the level of the region. London, 
as a central node for global interaction and exhibiting robust international transport 
links, epitomises this concept of global-regional interface. Therefore, a large 
portion of the collaborative activity between VC firms and large companies 
occurring in the United Kingdom is expected to have its interface within London 
itself. 
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1.7. Hypotheses, Assumptions, and Research Approach  
This study takes the view that propensities for collaboration between VC firms and 
large corporations will be premised, in part, on the differing input requirements of 
portfolio companies, differences that are likely to be sector specific. First, as 
discussed earlier, theoretical constructs regarding the innovation process place the 
highest input requirements of science and technology at the early stage of product 
development (Hirsh, 1965; Markusen, 1985; Perez & Soete, 1988). Such inputs 
will vary among high tech sectors and industries. This variance corresponds to 
different sector specific finance requirements and development timeframes, as well 
as different barriers to market, all of which inform investment decisions, including 
propensities for collaboration with external partners. From these constructs this 
study proposes that: 
(H1) the greater the science and technology inputs required by portfolio 
companies, the more important and formal collaboration between VC 
firms and large corporations becomes. 
It follows that higher input requirements will correspond to more substantive value 
adding activities, with VC firms more readily connecting portfolio companies to 
critical external sources of specialised knowledge, resources, and commercial 
capacity. In this way: 
(H2) the greater the science and technology inputs required by portfolio 
companies, the more important collaboration between VC firms and large 
corporations becomes for value adding purposes.  
Therefore, the more value added a portfolio firm requires (i.e. the more inputs 
toward development needed) the more intense and substantive the monitoring and 
evaluation of portfolio firms will likely be. Therefore:  
(H3) the greater the science and technology inputs required by portfolio 
companies, the more important collaboration between VC firms and 
large corporations becomes for investment monitoring and evaluation. 
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Second, as mentioned previously, VC firms tend to geographically concentrate 
both themselves and their investments within the environs of high capacity 
regions; this geographic proximity facilitates their management of highly 
asymmetric and tacit information and related agency costs associated with 
developing NHTCs. In this way, geographic proximity allows VC firms to 
regularly monitor their portfolio companies and regularly access the capacities of 
local investment networks, including syndicate VC firms and corporate partners. 
Therefore: 
(H4) collaboration between VC firms and large corporations will be 
facilitated through both geographic proximity and the capacities of the 
LMR.  
With geographic proximity facilitating investment monitoring, and given the 
connection between investment monitoring and value adding, this study further 
proposes:   
(H5) for collaboration between VC firms and large corporations, the 
importance of geographic proximity will be most prominent during the 
post-selection monitoring and evaluation of portfolio companies. 
In capturing the existence of organisational constructs, and for understanding the 
processes and procedures for collaboration, this study employs a mainly qualitative 
approach based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 30 technology 
oriented VC firms located in the London metropolitan region. Additional 
interviews were also conducted with corporate venturing divisions operating from 
offices in London. This represents an important triangulation of sources. For the 
core interviews questions were split into three sets or themes of inquiry 
corresponding to the structures, motivations, and conditions for collaboration.  A 
line of inquiry running through these questions regarded the extent to which co-
location and the LMR plays a role in the facilitation of this collaboration. 
1.8. Dissertation Outline  
Chapter 2 proceeds by discussing the process of innovation, examining both the 
opportunities for profit that innovation offers and the constraints that innovation, 
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as inherently uncertain, places on firms, demonstrating that firm based innovation 
generally requires the exchange of complementary assets between firms through 
various collaborative processes, often facilitated through intermediary actors. 
Furthermore, this chapter explores the connections between innovation and 
geography, looking at why geographic proximity and location factors, captured in 
the regional innovation systems model, may provide a facilitating mechanism by 
which collaboration between VC firms and large corporations is developed and 
maintained. 
Chapter 3 then examines more extensively the venture capital cycle and how each 
phase sequentially positions venture capital to effectively engage and manage the 
complexities of the innovation process as they pertain to the development of 
NHTCs. This discussion places particular emphasis on how VC firms can create 
and provide value added toward the development of their portfolio companies.  
Furthermore, the geographic tendencies of venture capital are explored more 
thoroughly, looking at how and why VC firms leverage geographic proximity at 
each phase of the venture capital cycle. This chapter concludes by discussing how 
the technology and sector focus of potential portfolio companies drives investment 
decisions regarding funding and external collaboration. 
Chapter 4 describes the qualitative methodological approach employed in this 
study, with an emphasis on the research design, the selection of objects for study, 
the interview process, and the procedure for analysing the empirical findings. 
Chapter 5, the first empirical chapter, presents and explains the findings regarding 
how VC firms collaborate with large corporations and establishes the existence of 
organisational structures and arrangements while capturing the mechanisms, 
processes, and procedures for such collaborative activity. This chapter also looks 
at how geographic proximity and the capacities of the LMR facilitate collaboration 
between VC firms and large corporations with an emphasis on face-to-face 
interaction and potential co-location dynamics. Chapter 6 then presents and 
explains empirical findings regarding the motivations for VC firms to collaborate 
with large corporations. Sector based propensities for five possible motivations 
places emphasis on the extent to which collaboration is used by the venture capital 
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firm for either enhancing its strategic position or developing and positioning 
individual portfolio companies. 
Chapter 7 presents and discusses the specific findings regarding the conditions 
under which VC firms collaborate with large corporations, deriving the when of 
collaboration, and the extent to which geographic proximity facilitates 
collaboration at different phases of the venture capital cycle. Chapter 8 concludes 
by summarising the empirical findings, clarifying the opportunities and constraints 
that collaboration between VC firms and large corporations offers toward the 
development of NHTCs, and the potential drawbacks this collaboration might have 
relative to innovation. 
Overall, the findings demonstrate that collaboration between VC firms and large 
corporations is increasingly common, but more formal collaborative structures are 
the exception. Driving this collaboration is the exchange of complementary 
knowledge for purposes of better investment selection and exit, with access and 
use of specialised expertise for the development of investee firms (i.e. value 
adding) being somewhat secondary; VC firms investing in life science and biotech 
are, however, the exception. In this way, the findings suggest that less formal 
collaboration provides a more flexible and advantageous arrangement between two 
risk capital actors and that collaboration is used more often by VC firms at the 
early and late stages of the investment cycle than during the expansion stage. The 
findings also point to significant value adding relationships between large 
corporations and portfolio companies, although these often are established and 
maintained independently of an intermediary venture capital firm. Furthermore, 
the findings suggest that this collaboration is facilitated by geographic proximity, 
as it allows regular face-to-face interaction for the exchange of specialised and 
tacit information, with the LMR’s rich social and professional networks and robust 
international transport links crucial in this regard.  
Importantly, the context of a severe economic downturn and subsequent 
diminishing IPO opportunities appears to be an additional driver for collaboration, 
as VC firms increasingly seek out large corporations to facilitate investment exits 
by corporate acquisition or merger. 
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Although limitations to this study make definitive conclusions somewhat 
premature, this research presents a substantial first step by establishing the 
existence of particular organisational structures and offering answers regarding the 
processes and procedures employed for collaboration while raising new research 
questions about collaborative venture capital activity and its regional dynamics. Its 
central claims are that (1) collaboration between VC firms and large corporations 
plays a critical and decisive role in all phases of the venture capital investment 
process, from the initial decision to invest in an NHTC, to ongoing investment 
monitoring, through to the positioning of NHTCs for investment exit; and that (2) 
geographic proximity plays some facilitating role in the development and 
maintenance of this collaboration and associated networks. These are findings on 
which future research can build. 
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2. Bringing Innovations to Market: Complementary Assets, 
Network Intermediaries and Regional Innovation Systems 
Innovation, understood as the recombination of existing ideas or the generation of 
new ideas into new processes and products (Freeman & Soete, 1997; Gordon & 
McCann, 2005; Morroni, 2009) is widely viewed as the main driver of growth in 
modern capitalistic economies (Rodriguez-Pose & Crescenzi, 2008). Innovation’s 
overarching importance coincides with a recognition that innovation, as it pertains 
to the modern economy, (a) resides in the context of technological change; (b) is 
significantly difficult to achieve and manage due to inherent uncertainties, 
particularly during the early stages of the innovation process; and (c) unleashes 
often transformative yet disruptive forces on firms, organisations, and the broader 
economy (Nelson & Winter, 1982). This Schumpeterian notion of innovation as 
both a “creative” and “destructive” phenomenon (i.e. creative destruction) implies 
that some firms will successfully innovate or adapt to new innovations and others 
will fail, leading to their demise – innovation causing repercussions across the 
wider economy that are felt unequally at the local and regional levels (Fagerberg, 
2003; Schumpeter, 1947). 
Understanding how firms and organisations effectively manage the innovation 
process is generally viewed as an organisational and resource dilemma. Firms must 
reconcile the potential contradictions between considerable organisational 
flexibility, seen as necessary for the emergence of new ideas, and the allocation 
and management of significant organisational resource and finance capacities, all 
requiring some degree of structure and systemisation (Tang, 1998). More 
important though, the process of bringing new innovations to market is 
considerably challenging, particularly for small entrepreneurial firms, because 
these finance and resource capacities must be coupled with cumulative knowledge 
regarding the commercial viability of new ideas, as well as experience and 
expertise toward developing these new ideas into new commercial processes and 
products (Ben Ari & Vonortas, 2007).  
For small entrepreneurial firms engaging in high-tech endeavours, venture capital 
is viewed as one possible solution to the finance and resource challenges faced by 
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these flexible and idea-rich companies that often lack the finance, resources, and 
expertise for bringing their new ideas to market. Venture capital seems to provide 
these small firms with not only structured finance, but also knowledge and 
expertise regarding the managing, commercialisation, and marketing of high-tech 
innovation, and offers portfolio companies valuable connections to appropriate 
external partners and resources (i.e. value added) (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). For 
large established firms, corporate venturing and corporate venture capital 
programmes are viewed as possible solutions to the organisational dilemma faced 
by these resource-rich companies that often lack the organisational flexibility to 
effectively use their resources to develop and commercialise new ideas. Corporate 
venturing and corporate venture capital programmes generally grant special 
divisions within the company’s R&D and investing apparatus greater autonomy 
coupled with directives to seek out new ideas through mechanisms and sources 
external to the firm (Keil, 2002). 
The previous chapter introduced the roles of venture capital and close geographic 
proximity in financing and developing NHTCs and the complementary potential 
that collaboration between venture capital and large corporations holds for 
NHTCs. For a more comprehensive understanding as to how, why, and under what 
circumstances VC firms will collaborate with large corporations and their 
corporate venturing divisions, it is necessary to more fully understand (a) why 
specially structured forms of finance such as venture capital are deemed important 
for innovation-led economic growth, (b) why collaboration between the two might 
offer significant complementary advantages to themselves and the companies they 
invest in, and (c) why such collaboration might be facilitated through close spatial 
proximity within the geographic boundaries of high capacity regions. 
Viewed primarily through the perspective of NHTCs, this chapter proposes that 
answers to the above questions are found in the finance and resource challenges 
associated with bringing new innovations to market (Sect. 2.1, 2.2, & 2.3); many 
of these challenges are based on the uncertainty inherent to the innovation process. 
Overcoming uncertainty requires the exchange of complementary assets between 
firms (Sect. 2.4) through collaboration that emphasises external alliance building 
and the development of related networks, all of which can be facilitated by 
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intermediary actors that can combine finance with knowledge and connections to 
commercial capacities. The connection between innovation and location is then 
explained (Sect. 2.5) through the combination of profit driven agglomeration 
theory and the positing of innovative activity within the regional innovation 
systems of large metropolitan regions.  
2.1. Innovation: Uncertainty and Schumpeterian distinctions  
To begin with, much of our understanding of innovation comes from the work of 
Schumpeter (e.g. 1942, 1947, 1927). Observing the economic transformations of 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries and building on the works of Marshall 
(1925), Schumpeter was the first to forcefully argue that innovation is the primary 
mechanism driving economic growth, causing long waves in the economy. In the 
broadest sense, Schumpeter (1927) describes innovation as 
such changes of the combinations of the factors of production as cannot be 
effected by infinitesimal steps or variations on the margin. They consist 
primarily in changes in methods of production, transportation, or in 
changes in industrial organisation, or in the production of a new article, or 
in the opening of new markets or of the new sources of material (p. 295 
emphasis added). 
Schumpeter’s emphasis here on changes not associated with “variations on the 
margin” points to a concept of innovation that involves considerable change and 
the unleashing of transformative forces. Thus, innovation, according to 
Schumpeter and others, is generally associated with the process of technological 
change, including the diffusion and adoption of new technologies (Ruttan, 2001). 
Over the course of his career Schumpeter’s views evolved regarding the 
importance of small entrepreneurial firms (i.e. Schumpeter I) as being the primary 
engines of innovation-led economic growth. He eventually recognised that large 
corporations and their R&D activities (i.e. Schumpeter II) are also a major source 
of innovations in the modern economy (Freeman & Soete, 1997). Distinctions 
between the two, however, are still relevant and are used here to illustrate both the 
challenges faced by small entrepreneurial firms in bringing new innovations to 
market and the complementarities that small and large firms offer one another 
through collaborative innovation activities. 
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2.1.1. Innovation and Uncertainty 
Innovations, as new ways of doing things, are not homogenous activities for which 
strict blueprints can be followed (Stoneman, 1983). Recognizing this, Schumpeter 
understood that innovation is inherently uncertain, requiring individuals and firms 
to engage in activities for which outcomes cannot be wholly predicted 
(Schumpeter, 1927). As explained by Knight (1965), uncertainty is a situation or 
event for which the outcome cannot be objectively calculated. This contrasts with 
the notion of risk, which implies that the probable outcome of a situation can be 
objectively calculated to some degree (Leroy & Singell, 1987). Knight recognised 
that most situations involve both incalculable and calculable probabilities; when 
the incalculable probabilities outweigh the calculable, the situation can be 
described as uncertain or uninsurable from a risk perspective.9  Of course, 
individuals and established firms with cumulative experience will have loose 
blueprints to guide new innovation projects and will employ comprehensive 
project evaluation measures, thus reducing the number of incalculable 
probabilities. However, even the most carefully laid project plans are subject to 
unforeseen events and externalities that can lead to inefficiencies and far less than 
optimal development trajectories (Arthur, 1994).10 In other words, the past can 
inform the present, but the past cannot predict the future.11 
Uncertainty is particularly rampant in high-tech innovation, where, as discussed 
later in Chapter 3, costs and incalculable probabilities multiply due to the 
                                                          
9
 Leroy and Singal (1987) write: “For Knight business decisions are uninsurable because there is no 
way to separate bad luck from bad decision making in order to insure the former. This being the 
case, it is impossible to insure the outcome of entrepreneurship without adversely affecting the 
entrepreneur's incentives” (p. 400).  
10
 The term path dependence is regularly ascribed to innovation. Introduced by David (1988) and 
Arthur (1994), path dependence is “intended to capture the way how small, historically contingent 
events can set off self reinforcing mechanisms or processes that lock-in particular structures or 
pathways of development” (Martin & Sunley, 2006, p. 5-6). As understood here, path dependence 
does not imply that innovation is a static or rigid process, but rather that the decisions made, 
particularly early on in the innovation process, can set a path trajectory that can be difficult and 
costly to deviate from even in the face of alternative paths, making innovation vulnerable to the 
effects of externalities. 
11
 The notion that innovation is path dependent is hinted at by Schumpeter (1947) when he writes 
of innovation as a creative response: “First, from the standpoint of the observer who is in full 
possession of all relevant facts, it [innovation] can be understood ex post; but it can practically 
never be understood ex ante; that is to say, it cannot be predicted by applying the ordinary rules of 
inference from the pre-existing facts. … Secondly, creative response shapes the whole course of 
subsequent events and their ‘long run’ outcome” (p. 150). 
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combination of increasing science and technological complexity, shortening 
product life cycles and, in some sectors (e.g. life science), increasingly long 
development timeframes. Affecting the path trajectory of an innovation project are 
three interrelated uncertainties: technical uncertainty, market uncertainty, and more 
general business uncertainty (Freeman & Soete, 1997).  Technical uncertainty 
refers to the degree by “which the innovation will satisfy a variety of technical 
criteria without increased cost of development, production or operation” (Freeman 
& Soete, 1997, p. 243). As such, technology may not work or it may not work as 
expected, likely increasing project costs and the possibility that customer 
expectations will not be met. A frequently cited example is computer software that 
is shipped to customers as “technically sound” but is often later found to be riddled 
with bugs and technical deficiencies, resulting in high redevelopment costs and 
erosion in customer trust. 
Market uncertainty refers more generally to the degree to which the innovation 
will satisfy market demand that is predicated on changing consumer preferences 
and the behaviour of competitors. Even if an innovation is technically sound, it 
may not meet the demand of the intended (i.e. future) market, particularly 
following years of product development. A current case in point might be the 
electric car. After years of development, market demand is far less than expected 
due to, among other things, the persistence of unexpectedly low petrol prices. 
Also, years of product development might be superseded by competitors who bring 
a similar or better innovation to market first. Business uncertainty refers to future 
economic and political events or conditions that may affect factors of production 
and market receptivity. Examples include changing tax and interest rates, changes 
to energy and material supplies due to political instability and natural disasters, 
and cyclic periods of macro growth and recession (Freeman & Soete, 1997). 
2.1.2. Uncertainty and Profit 
Even in the face of uncertainty, individuals and firms are still compelled to pursue 
innovation.  For those that do, Schumpeter (1927) wrote “there are always great 
prizes to be won” (p. 28), referring to what Knight (1965) later explained as the 
connection between uncertainty and profit. Knight proposed that situations 
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containing a high degree of uncertainty hold considerable profit potential (Knight, 
1965). According to Knight, profit is the revenue that is residual following the 
payment of contractual costs. As such, real profits will be higher for individuals 
and firms engaged in uncertain enterprises due to the uniqueness or customisation 
of their output, which allows them to charge a relatively high price in relation to 
production costs, in the absence of any significant competition (Leroy & Singell, 
1987).  Knight argues that in the pursuit of profit, probabilities or expectations 
regarding an outcome are regularly made but are heavily subjective; they are 
observations and subsequent insights that are unique to the observer and not yet 
publicly verifiable (Langlois & Cosgel, 1993).12  
For overcoming uncertainty and realising profits, Schumpeter (1927) emphasised 
the need for a rare “attitude” and “aptitude” associated “with more of character 
than of intellect” and found only in “certain people,” which he repeatedly 
identified as the “entrepreneur” (p. 28). Echoing Schumpeter, Knight places much 
weight on the motivation to bear uncertainty. Motivation here implies both 
openness to information regarding opportunities and a willingness to pursue them. 
In many ways the importance of motivation corresponds to more recent ideas of 
effectuation, in which opportunities are not just identified and pursued but also 
created; in pursuing an uncertain enterprise one aims not to predict the probable 
outcomes but to create them (Read, Song, & Smit, 2009). Also like Schumpeter, 
Knight positions the entrepreneur or the entrepreneurial firm as having the 
requisite motivation (insight and determination) and, it is assumed, both the 
information and the expertise for pursuing and realising such opportunities 
(Knight, 1965). 
The notion of uncertainty, as it is described above, raises important questions as to 
how entrepreneurs and firms, including large established firms, actually overcome 
uncertainty and realise its profit potential. In arguing that entrepreneurialism is the 
key source of innovation, Schumpeter put considerable thought (and scepticism) 
into how large established firms might overcome bureaucratic inertia through 
                                                          
12
 In explaining the connection between uncertainty and profit, Knight (1965) writes: “The presence 
of true profit, therefore, depends…on the absence of the requisite organization for combining a 
sufficient number of instances to secure certainty through consolidation” (p. 284). 
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entrepreneurial practices of their own.  Schumpeter, however, was less reflective 
when it came to how entrepreneurs, generally lacking their own finance and 
resources, actually pursue innovation based on motivation and insight alone. 
Although the importance of finance is raised by Schumpeter, he omits the process 
by which the entrepreneur obtains it. 13,14 As will be shown later, it is clear that the 
true uncertainty faced by entrepreneurial firms is whether they can convince others 
to participate — through necessary investment of finance, knowledge, and 
resources — in their uncertain enterprises. 
2.1.3. Radical and incremental innovation  
Important to Schumpeter’s thinking on innovation is the distinction he makes 
between radical and incremental innovation (Freeman & Soete, 1997).  Radical 
innovation is generally understood as the introduction and adoption of new 
products or processes that are complete departures, resulting in entirely new 
product categories (Feldman, 2000).15 Two recent examples are Apple’s iPod, 
                                                          
13
 During Schumpeter’s time, modern venture capital did not yet exist. When Schumpeter mentions 
entrepreneurial finance, he refers to credit creation, the primary mechanisms being “banks” and 
“capitalists.” Schumpeter recognised that entrepreneurial finance is vital to the development of 
innovations and subtly connects “credit” to the pursuit of profits through uncertain enterprises. 
Schumpeter (1928) writes: “innovation, being discontinuous and involving considerable change . . . 
typically involving new firms, requires large expenditure previous to the emergence of any 
revenue, credit becomes an essential element of the process. And we cannot turn to savings . . . for 
this would imply the existence of previous profits, without which there would not be anything like 
the required amount -- even as it is, savings usually lag behind requirements -- and assuming 
previous profits would mean, in an explanation of principles, circular reasoning [previous profits 
will diminish the ‘motivation’ for new profits]” (pp. 380–81).  
14
  Like Schumpeter, Knight was equally vague in explaining how entrepreneurs convince others as 
to the validity and profit potential of their uncertain enterprises. Whereas Schumpeter emphasised 
the “determination” of the entrepreneur, Knight (1965) suggests that entrepreneurs build “business” 
support through trust based relationships. As such, entrepreneurs use relations of trust “so as to 
eliminate or reduce the moral hazard and make possible the application of the insurance principle 
of consolidation to groups of ventures too broad in scope to be 'swung' by a single enterpriser" (p. 
252). 
15
 Schumpeter also proposed a now widely acknowledged distinction between product innovation 
and process innovation (Schmookler, 1966). Product innovation involves the creation of new or 
better products, which take the form of either new material goods or new services that are more 
intangible (Edquist, Hommen, & McKelvey, 2001). Process innovation involves the application of 
new technology to the methods of production. Process innovation “is usually associated with firm-
level productivity effects that lower productive costs or increase product quality” (Feldman, 2000, 
p. 374). Process innovation is also typically identified with large established firms with existing 
production processes that can be improved on. Connections, however, between product and process 
innovation can be made, because the development of a new product innovation may require or lead 
to new production processes (e.g. computer electronics applied to manufacturing processes), and a 
new process innovation may lead to the development of a new product. Also, a firm might develop 
and then licence or sell a process innovation to other firms to be used within their own production 
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which radically altered the way consumers purchase and listen to music and other 
media, and the emergence of 3D printing. Radical innovation might necessitate 
“new competencies, and render existing ideas, techniques and perhaps companies 
obsolete” (Feldman, 2000, p. 375).  In contrast, incremental innovation is viewed 
as small continuous improvements producing new products and processes similar 
to those previously existing (e.g. gradual and continuous improvements to the 
personal computer over a period of 30 years, such as increases in memory, speed, 
visual resolution, and portability) (Freeman & Soete, 1997).  In considering these 
two forms, Schumpeter (1947) viewed radical innovation as more important for 
unleashing transformative forces on the economy, leading to clusters of 
innovations that reshape industries and may create entirely new industries (e.g. the 
Internet). 
Schumpeter’s early views positioned small entrepreneurial firms as the most likely 
producers of radical innovation (Schumpeter, 1947). Schumpeter thought that 
small firms, unlike large established firms, are driven by the entrepreneurial will to 
push for new and better ways of doing things. It follows that when large 
established firms are innovative, such innovation will likely be of the incremental 
form that is based on the improvement of existing products and modes of 
production. What Schumpeter downplayed, and what is now widely recognised, is 
that most innovations are incremental; that incremental innovations can have 
profound effects on industries and economies (e.g. improvements to the personal 
computer); and that rarer, radical innovations are more often the accumulation of 
continuous incremental innovations (Lundvall et al., 1992). Furthermore, large 
established firms such as Apple can and do produce innovations that are 
considered radical (iPod), transformative (profoundly changing the music 
industry), and destructive (causing the indirect demise or decline of many 
traditional recording companies and neighbourhood record stores). In other words, 
innovation comes about through the efforts of both small entrepreneurial firms and 
large established firms, with radical innovation being the more difficult to achieve 
and with incremental innovation being the more likely outcome. 
                                                                                                                                                                
processes (e.g. a company the produces and sells manufacturing equipment). In other words, 
process innovations can be sold as products. 
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2.1.4. From Invention to Innovation: A R&D Gap 
Schumpeter also made the valuable distinction between pure invention and 
innovation.  Invention is typically thought of as the initial idea or prototype for a 
new product or process, whereas innovation is viewed as the process by which an 
idea is successfully used or commercialised as a new and improved product or 
process (Freeman & Soete, 1997). Schumpeter is known for saying that invention 
is about producing ideas (the role of the inventor), whereas innovation is about 
“getting things done” (the role of the entrepreneur). Furthermore, getting things 
done “is not a distinct process but is a process which produces consequences that 
are an essential part of capitalistic reality” (Schumpeter, 1947, p. 224). In this way, 
Schumpeter treats invention and innovation as two different perhaps loosely 
connected phenomena, placing far more importance on innovation and the 
entrepreneur and claiming that very few innovations are the result of inventions.  
In contrast, later work such as that of Usher (1954) and  his “process of cumulative 
synthesis,” Hughes (1978), and Arthur (2007) view invention as an integral 
recursive component to the process of technological change, proposing also that 
invention, like innovation, is induced by economic stimuli.  Likewise, Ruttan 
(2001) sees very little value in conceptually separating invention from innovation, 
arguing that in science intensive industries such as biotech and pharmaceuticals the 
process of invention is pursued within an R&D framework characterised by 
recursive interaction between technology and science, with the organisational line 
between basic research and development increasingly blurred. The distinction, 
therefore, between invention and innovation is rarely understood along the strict 
demarcations made by Schumpeter, and it is widely recognised that many 
inventions eventually lead to innovations (Arthur, 2007).  
That being said, Rogers (1995) points out that considerable lag time, the result of a 
research and development gap, generally exists between an initial invention and 
related innovation, often involving decades (see Figure 9). Turning inventions into 
commercial innovations normally requires significant and expensive development 
and applied research involving the repeated testing and verification of technology 
and later market testing of a proposed product.  Such research efforts generally 
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need substantial inputs of knowledge and expertise (e.g. technical, industry, 
commercial, and market), as well as finance, facilities, and access to potential 
markets and customers (Branscomb & Auerswald, 2002).  
Figure 9: From Invention to Innovation: a Research and Development Gap 
Invention Innovation
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Development 
gap
Science
Technology
Production
Markets
Knowledge and Expertise
Technology
Industry
Market
Commercial
Resources
Finance 
Facilities
Hardware
Technology testing 
Up to a decade or more
Source: Own interpretation based Rogers (1994) and Ruttan (2001) 
This supposed knowledge and resource gap between invention and commercial 
innovation places small entrepreneurial firms — generally lacking the respective 
resources, experience, and prior market position — at a distinct disadvantage 
relative to their large firm counterparts in successfully making the transition from 
initial concept to commercially viable product and process innovation (Branscomb 
& Auerswald, 2002). 
2.2. The Innovation Process: A Sequential and Recursive Model 
From an organisational perspective, Tang (1998) argues that bringing new 
innovations to market requires firms to structure the innovation process so that 
information about opportunities can be effectively communicated to motivated 
individuals and functions “who also have the necessary knowledge and skills” (pp. 
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297–298) and resources to act on that information. Therefore, the transition from 
invention to commercial innovation is better understood by conceptualising 
innovation as a sequentially staged yet interactive and recursive process. Figure 10 
shows the innovation process as interpreted from the works of Lane (1999, 2003), 
Ruttan (2001), Auerswald and Branscomb (2003), and Lundquist (2003), among 
others. According to this interpretation the innovation process involves five 
interrelated stages: (1) a basic research stage, (2) an invention and prototype stage, 
(3) an early technology development stage, (4) a product development stage, and 
(5) a final production and marketing stage.  These stages are thought to be 
interconnected through recursive feedback loops that inform decision making and 
facilitate collective learning.16, 17, 18 
To begin with, Stage 1 is where new ideas are first investigated and induced. This 
idea generation usually occurs through basic research activities at universities, 
government research laboratories, and some corporate R&D laboratories and is 
pursued by highly skilled and motivated technologists and scientists, either as 
individuals or in specialised teams of researchers. Although such research may 
have commercial objectives — such as ideas explored by individuals with 
entrepreneurial leanings, sector specific university research centres, and sometimes 
corporate directed basic research — the ideas generated at this stage will usually 
                                                          
16
 Figure 2 also identifies when during the innovation process the capabilities of small firms and 
large established firms are generally thought to be more effectively leveraged, and from which 
stages radical and incremental innovation are more likely to derive. As such — according to this 
interpretation — radical innovations are more likely to be the result of efforts by technologists and 
small entrepreneurial firms beginning in Stage 1 and up through Stage 3, whereas incremental 
innovations are more likely to result from efforts by established firms beginning in the late half of 
Stage 3 through to Stage 5. Importantly though, for radical innovations to become commercially 
viable, they must progress through Stages 4 and 5. In other words, all innovations need to be 
developed to the point at which they match the requirements or demands of a particular market, 
thus progressing through Stages 4 and 5 of the innovation process. 
17
 Feedback loops allow vital information regarding what works and what does not work as it 
pertains to the development of a new idea or technology to be relayed recursively to individuals and 
divisions working within the various stages (Senker, 1995). Although important at all stages of the 
innovation process, feedback loops are particularly critical in later stages when product 
development and production activities rely on feedback from market research and testing to refine 
or redirect their efforts. 
18
 Built on the evolutionary interpretation of economic growth and technological change by Nelson 
and Winter (1982), cumulative learning through repetition and practice produces heterogeneous 
routines and ways of doing things that firms and organisations apply to the innovation process, 
becoming part of a firm’s organisational memory (Lazonick, 2005). 
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not yet have any direct commercial application. A common output of this stage is 
additional ideas and, most notably, patents (Auerswald and Branscomb, 2003).          
At Stage 2 new ideas are developed into working technologies or prototypes. This 
stage is still the realm of the scientists or technologist, although working in more 
applied research areas, but it may also be driven by a lead technologist or 
individual entrepreneur who is emboldened by a vision for the invention’s 
practical or commercial application.  At this stage additional patents are a likely 
outcome (Auerswald and Branscomb, 2003; Ben Ari & Vonortas, 2007). 
Figure 10: Sequential Five Stage Model of the Innovation Process 
1. Research 2.Invention/
Concept
3. Early stage
Technology
development
4. Product
development
5. Production
Marketing
New Idea/ Invention /                   Business Innovation/new firm/ Viable business      
patent prototype                 validation                new product              commercial  market
Small firms (strong capabilities)
Small firms (weak  capabilities)
Recursive feedback loops
Large firms (strong capabilities)
Large firms (weak capabilities)
Radical innovation
Incremental 
innovation
Source: Adapted by the author from Auerswald and Branscomb (2003) 
At Stage 3 an invention or prototype begins the complex and highly uncertain 
process of transitioning into a commercially viable innovation. Described by 
Auerswald and Branscomb (2003) as a phase of “early stage technology 
development,” 
this is the point at which the technology is reduced to industrial practice, a 
production process is defined from which costs can be estimated, and a 
market appropriate to the demonstrated performance specifications is 
identified and quantified. (p. 229) 
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As such, Stage 3 is characterised by increasing recursive interaction among 
technologists, production specialist, and marketers (Ruttan, 2001). It is also 
defined by more extensive technology testing and some limited market testing, 
likely previewing the technology to influential technologists at leading companies 
(Moore, 2002). For established companies, priority is placed on matching the 
technology or prototype with its current product pipeline needs and the related 
demands of its customers, coordinating its various departments and functions to 
this end (Auerswald and Branscomb, 2003). For the individual technologist or 
entrepreneur, this stage will likely coincide with the formation of a new company 
around the proposed innovation, the priority being to develop a viable business 
plan, identify partners, and seek out external funding (Ben Ari & Vonortas, 2007). 
Stage 4 is an intensification of the activities above, with an emphasis on product 
development, continued market testing, building the necessary business and 
commercial capacities, securing finance, and initial outreach to potential customers 
(Auerswald and Branscomb, 2003; Lane, 2003). At the conclusion of this stage a 
pilot product line that has strong market potential is produced: what was once an 
invention is now considered a commercially viable innovation (Ben Ari & 
Vonortas, 2007).  Stage 5 is focused on further marketing the product and fine-
tuning its production, solidifying the business and commercial strategy, raising 
additional finance, and eliciting customer feedback — leading to ongoing product 
and marketing improvements (Lane, 2003; Moore, 2002). 
2.3. Crossing the Valley of Death: From Innovation to Market 
For technologists turned entrepreneurs and the new firms they form, the 
knowledge and resource challenges of transitioning new innovations into 
commercially viable products and marketing them to a receptive market are 
immense. Facing these challenges is often referred to as either “crossing the 
chasm” (Moore, 2002), bridging “the valley of death” (Markham, 2002), or 
navigating the “Darwinian Sea” as Auerswald and Branscomb (2003) have called 
it.  As highlighted in Figure 11, it is thought that this valley is first encountered on 
reaching Stage 3 (early technology development) and into Stage 4 (product 
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development) of the innovation process (Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003).  As 
described by Ben Ari and Vonortas (2007): 
On the one side of this valley stand the innovators and their innovations. 
On the other side stand investors and potential customers who possess 
capital to fund more work and knowledge of what the market requires. (p. 
476) 
For innovators and the entrepreneurial firms they champion, successfully crossing 
this transitional valley requires them to reconcile and bridge three interrelated gaps 
concerning uncertainty and related knowledge and resources (Branscomb & 
Auerswald, 2001; Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003). These include (1) significant 
challenges in obtaining the financing necessary to fund expensive and uncertain 
early stage technology development (a finance gap), (2) related differences in 
capabilities and motivations between innovators/entrepreneurs and investors (a 
knowledge and trust gap), and (3) a lack of access to valuable sources of 
commercial capacity building and potential markets (an enabling infrastructure 
gap) (Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003). 
Figure 11: The Innovation Process and the Valley of Death 
1. Research
2.Invention/
Concept
3. Early stage
Technology
development
4. Product
development
5. Production/
Marketing
Government,
universities,
corporations
Angel Investors, 
Corporations, 
public venture
funds
Venture Capital Corporate venture capital,
private equity, debt finance
Frequent source of  funds
Occasional source of funds 
Finance, Resource, Trust, knowledge, 
and Enabling Infrastructure Gap
Source: Adapted by the author from Auerswald and Branscomb (2003) 
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As will be shown, filling these gaps and crossing the valley takes specialised 
intermediaries to provide not only finance, but also to package that finance with 
appropriate knowledge and connections to complementary assets. 
2.3.1. A Finance Gap 
Figure 11 identifies the likely sources of finance and resources that support 
activities at each stage of the innovation process as described by Auerswald & 
Branscomb (2003). For innovators and entrepreneurs, funds are generally available 
for doing basic research, testing technology, and developing product prototypes 
that correspond to Stages 1 and 2 of the innovation process. Such activities are 
readily funded by government agencies, universities, some corporate research 
funds, and more often than not through personal savings and assets (Auerswald & 
Branscomb, 2003). At these early stages, investment amounts for individual 
research projects are generally small compared to later stage funding, because 
investments, like the projects themselves, usually have no concrete commercial 
aim, and expectations are aligned to the likelihood that a large number of research 
projects will result in little to no outcomes of significance. In other words, 
uncertainty is high, but investment risk is relatively low (Branscomb & Auerswald, 
2001).  For Stages 4 and 5, funding and resources are available for entrepreneurs 
with a tested and commercially viable technology or product, a clear business plan, 
and often a demonstrated revenue stream. In most cases, a company, headed by the 
entrepreneur, will have been established around the production and marketing of 
the technology or product.  Funding at these later stages is usually provided by 
private equity firms and investment banks, venture capital funds focused on 
investing in more established companies, and corporate venturing and corporate 
venture capital funds (Ben Ari & Vonortas, 2007). 
Between initial funds (Stages 1 and 2) and later funds (Stages 4 and 5), though, 
entrepreneurial firms often struggle to secure financing to develop market-ready 
prototypes and build appropriate commercial capacities, both associated with the 
early technology and product development activities (Moore, 2002). When 
secured, such financial investment is generally provided by either a small number 
of individuals or teams of angel investors, government venture funds, or a limited 
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number of early stage venture capital funds: risk equity financers who recognise 
and understand the complexities and risks, as well as the profit potential toward 
developing early stage technology into new products (Hall & Lerner, 2009). That 
being said, such investment is highly specialised and will generally only be made 
if the investor is convinced that the proposed technology or product is likely to be 
commercially viable and, to a lesser extent, is convinced that the entrepreneur is 
capable of realising the identified commercial potential (see Chapter 3). 
Again, the primary reason for this finance gap is the uncertainty concerning the 
development trajectory of a technology or product (being subject to unknown 
technical challenges, externalities, and related costs), and its long-term market 
receptivity: early stage technology development and product development takes 
significant long-term financial investment that is committed when the technical 
and, more importantly, commercial viability of a technology or product is still 
highly uncertain (Hall & Lerner, 2009). Such uncertainty makes investment 
decision-making extremely difficult, with most investors opting for less risky 
investment opportunities. Compounding this uncertainty is the lack of tangible 
assets that many entrepreneurs and their young companies hold. Without facilities 
and, in many cases, personal savings or property as collateral, entrepreneurs often 
have difficulty in attracting investment from traditional banks or investment banks 
who tend to use a company’s more tangible assets to value the company and 
evaluate the investment risk (Ueda, 2004). Therefore, at this stage financing must 
be provided by sources with a unique ability to effectively value intangible assets. 
Such sources are limited, severely constraining the finance options for small 
entrepreneurial companies (Hall, 2002). 
2.3.2. A Knowledge and Trust Gap  
The gap between invention and commercial innovation is often widened by the 
different capabilities, expectations, and subsequent mistrust between the 
technologist/entrepreneur on one side of the valley and the investor and eventual 
customer on the other side (Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003). On one side, the 
technologist will have deep technical understanding of the invention or prototype 
and often a firm belief in what the technology might be used for, but will often 
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lack the appropriate understanding of the invention’s real commercial applications 
or market. In many cases, the technologist will not have an initial commercial or 
profit objective for the invention, making it difficult to put forward a credible 
business plan for attracting investors (Moore, 2003). On the other side, the investor 
and eventual customer do have a sound, experienced based understanding of how 
to bring a commercially viable new product to market but generally lack the 
technical knowledge and entrepreneurial insight necessary to identify the 
commercial applications of a novel technology (Ueda, 2004).  
Different expectations can also lead to a trust gap between entrepreneurs and 
investors. For example, an entrepreneur’s long-term vision may come into conflict 
with the short-term profit aims of investors (Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003). Such 
conflicts may centre on contentious issues of company control and ownership: 
entrepreneurs, as company founders, expect to have considerable control over both 
the long-term strategy of the company and personnel decisions, and expect to hold 
the majority of company shares (Gompers and Lerner, 2004). Investors often push 
or negotiate for both greater control over company decision making and a larger 
profit share, while trying to limit their overall liability should the company fail 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2004). Again, bridging this trust gap generally requires the 
involvement of specialised investors (e.g. angel investors and early-stage focused 
venture capital) who have or have access to the requisite technical knowledge and 
entrepreneurial insight to communicate effectively with the entrepreneur, and who 
practice a long-term investment strategy that is more aligned with the 
entrepreneur’s expectations. This builds credibility for the investor, allowing them 
to negotiate more control and oversight over a company’s business strategy and 
operations (Ben Ari & Vonortas, 2007).   
Much of the knowledge and trust gap discussed above is due to the tacit and 
asymmetric information that characterises the innovation process, particularly 
during its early stages. Being new, innovation tends to involve transmission of 
information that is context specific and generally tacit in form (not yet codified). 
Such information may be easily misinterpreted or lost when communicated to 
others (Howels, 2002; Zook, 2004) and often involves the capture of knowledge 
flows that are highly asymmetric, in that one party or actor generally has more or 
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better information than the other (Inkpen & Currall, 2004). The prevalence of 
asymmetric information can lead to agency costs and subsequent distrust between 
actors. For example, entrepreneurs know more about the technology and their own 
abilities than others, knowledge they may exploit in their courting of investors, 
making the investment screening and selection process difficult (see Chapter 3). 
Likewise, investors know more about the investment process and deal structure 
than the entrepreneurs they invest in, knowledge they can exploit to gain more 
favourable ownership, profit, and liquidation rights (see Chapter 3).  
From an investor standpoint, the prevalence of asymmetric information can also 
lead to situations of agency costs in which entrepreneurs make potentially 
detrimental decisions that investors are unable to observe initially (e.g. 
disregarding some early technical deficiencies or making abrupt changes to key 
personnel) (Block, 2012; Holmstrom,1989). Therefore, providing financing to 
entrepreneurial firms at the early technology and product development stages 
requires investors who know how to effectively manage asymmetric information 
during the initial investment selection process and in the post-selection monitoring 
of the investment (see Chapter 3).  
2.3.3. An Enabling Infrastructure Gap  
Technologists and entrepreneurs developing new technologies may lack not only 
tangible assets and access to necessary infrastructure (e.g. production facilities, 
laboratories, and critical transport and communication links), but also access to 
complementary assets such as producers, suppliers, distributers, and customers 
(strategic partners), which are vital for developing and positioning a new product 
for a receptive market (Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003). Such partners can provide 
an entrepreneurial firm with tremendous commercial knowledge and market 
feedback as well as complementary expertise in technology and hardware (see 
Howells, 2006 & Zook, 2008). Without prior market positioning, entrepreneurs 
and the NHTCs they champion face considerable challenges linking to such 
enabling infrastructure, thus contributing to the knowledge gap. As shown in 
Figure 12, effectively linking to sources of enabling infrastructure often requires 
an NHTC to go through an investment intermediary such as an individual or group 
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of angel investors, a venture capital firm, or a corporate venture capital division 
that has deep connections to a network of producers, suppliers and distributors, and 
other sources of complementary assets (Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003).  
Figure 12: The Valley of Death and the Role of Investment Intermediaries 
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Source: Own interpretation based on Auerswald & Branscomb (2003), Lee et al 
(2010) & Moore (2002).       
As explained more fully in Section 2.4.5 and Chapter 3, the effectiveness of such 
intermediaries is based in large part on their unique position as experienced 
investors in NHTCs: they are viewed as honest brokers capable of connecting 
NHTCs to appropriate partners by effectively translating (i.e. matching) the 
commercial aspirations of the NHTC to the commercial and strategic needs of a 
potential partner (i.e. bridging the knowledge and trust gap). Key to this 
facilitation, however, is the intermediary’s financial investment itself. The 
investment validates the NHTC, signalling its commercial potential to would-be 
partners (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). For NHTCs, therefore, successfully bringing a 
new innovation to market requires financial investment from an intermediary who 
can package that finance (filling the finance gap) with appropriate entrepreneurial 
and commercial expertise (crossing the knowledge and trust gap) while providing 
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connections to sources of additional enabling assets and capacities (bridging the 
enabling infrastructure gap). 
2.4. The Complementary Assets of Small and Large Firms 
So far this chapter has explored and discussed the innovation process in terms of 
its inherent uncertainty and the associated knowledge and resource challenges 
faced by small entrepreneurial firms in successfully bringing new innovations to a 
receptive market. It has also identified the need for investment intermediaries that 
can provide small entrepreneurial firms with not only finance and knowledge, but 
also access to external sources of knowledge, resources, and commercial capacity 
building.  In doing so, this discussion has illuminated the different strengths and 
weaknesses of small entrepreneurial firms and large established firms concerning 
technological innovation and has hinted at the complementary assets they 
potentially offer each other in this regard. Figure 13 summarises the differing asset 
strengths of small entrepreneurial firms and large established firms, indicating 
where complementarities between the two might be realised. 
The strengths of the small firm model are found in its effective coupling of 
entrepreneurial drive (motivation to pursue uncertainty’s profit potential) with a 
high degree of organisational flexibility between the different functions of the 
firm. This allows for effective communication of information regarding 
opportunities between motivated and capable individuals and the subsequent 
ability to quickly act on them (Hewitt-Dundas, 2006; Lewin & Massini, 2003). 
Additionally, for many small firms the lead managers, executives, or heads of 
research are the firm’s founder(s), that is, the entrepreneurs whose ideas and 
initiative the firm is established on and from which the firm’s objectives are 
vigorously pursued (Cassen, 1982).  Overall, it is thought that this motivation and 
flexibility promotes an environment that is more conducive to the generation and 
pursuit of new ideas (Acs & Audretsh, 1990; Arrow, 1983; Cassen, 1982). As 
previously discussed (see Section 2.3), the weaknesses of the small firm model are 
attributed to its lack of — or lack of access to — appropriate finance, experiential 
knowledge, existing markets, and resources necessary for undertaking the long and 
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expensive process of transitioning an invention or prototype into a commercial 
innovation (Rothwell & Dodgson, 1994). 
The strengths of the large firm model, in comparison, are the considerable resource 
and cumulative knowledge capacities — much of this based on their own proven 
technology and products — that large firms can employ for pursuing innovation 
(Freeman & Soete, 1997).  As mentioned previously, large firms generally have 
the appropriate facilities, experienced scientists and technologists, and the capital 
to pursue large-scale science and technology intensive innovation (Cohen & 
Klepper, 1992). Basing new innovations on their current or past products also 
allows large firms to leverage established networks to suppliers, distributors, and 
customers, facilitating a more efficient and effective production and marketing of 
new products. The assumed weaknesses of the large firm model rest on its 
perceived lack of motivation and ability to pursue uncertainty-driven profits (i.e. 
radical innovation). This notion is based on a combination of pre-existing revenue 
and high organisational barriers between the various functions of the firm, which 
first discourage and then degrade information flows between potentially motivated 
individuals (Dougherty, 1992) and raise the likelihood that radical or 
transformative innovations will neither emerge nor be pursued (Ghemawat & 
Ricart Costa, 1993; Suarez & Utterback, 1995). 
Despite the potential limitations of each model, science and technology-intensive 
industries are characterised by both small entrepreneurial firms and large 
established firms that regularly overcome their relative weaknesses to successfully 
introduce new technological innovations to their respective markets, these often 
diffusing to other industries and to the wider economy. Doing so generally requires 
small entrepreneurial firms and large established firms to partner and collaborate 
with each other through collaborative arrangements, or more broadly defined 
strategic alliances, in the exchange of complementary assets (Parkhe, 1993; 
Powell, 1990; Von Hippel, 2007). In this context, collaboration with large 
established firms provides small entrepreneurial firms a potent mechanism for 
bridging the gaps, particularly gaps in knowledge and enabling infrastructure, 
associated with bringing new innovations successfully to market. 
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Figure 13: The Complementary Assets of Small and Large Firms 
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2.4.1. A Complementary Asset Model of Firm Based Innovation 
Indeed, contrary to Schumpeter’s early views, it is now widely agreed that the 
flexibility and idea-rich environs of the Schumpeter I model (small entrepreneurial 
firm) and the knowledge and resource capacities of the Schumpeter II model (large 
established firm) are both necessary for the development and commercialisation of 
high-tech innovation. Such a perspective is found in a complementary asset model 
first introduced by Teece (1986) and developed through the related work of 
Christensen (1995, 1996), Granstrand, Patel and Pavitt (1997), and Chesbrough 
(2003, 2008) that focus on the external alliance practices of large established firms, 
and the corresponding work of Rothwell (1991), Rothwell and Dodgson (1994), 
Tether (2002), Lee et al. (2010), and others that capture similar external 
collaboration among clusters of small firms and between those small firms and 
large established firms.      
The work of Lawton Smith, Dickson, and Lloyd Smith (1991), Saxenian (1996), 
Owen (1999), and others empirically demonstrates that collaboration is common 
between NHTCs and large established firms, particularly in the sector of life 
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science, information and communication technology, and advanced materials. In 
these sectors a seemingly symbiotic and complementary relationship prevails even 
among competing firms, with large established firms residing alongside and 
interacting with small and medium-sized firms, all producing or contributing to the 
output of innovation (both incremental and radical) in these industries (Owen, 
1999). In describing the emergence of such collaboration in the life science sector, 
for example, Owen (1999) wrote: 
A division of labour began to emerge between the newcomers and the 
established pharmaceutical companies, with the former concentrating 
mainly on research and the latter taking responsibility for development, 
production and marketing. This was not a uniform pattern … But the 
typical arrangement was for the established pharmaceutical company to 
form relationships, sometimes involving a shareholding link, with one or 
more of the biotechnology firms and to use them as a source of new 
products. At the same time the pharmaceutical companies took steps to 
acquire the new biotechnology skills. They did so through a combination 
of in-house research, close links with academic science and co-operation 
with the biotechnology entrepreneurs. (pp. 380-381) 
As will be discussed later, this seemingly complementary relationship manifests 
itself in certain locational tendencies, with large established firms acting as 
anchors to geographically proximate clusters of small and medium-sized firms, all 
generally concentrated in a small number of high-capacity regions (Lawton Smith, 
2004; Lawton Smith, Dickson, & Lloyd Smith 1991). 
Inter-organisational relationships between small entrepreneurial firms and large 
established firms discussed above can be described as externally oriented, in that 
both firms recognise that achieving set goals cannot occur alone through existing 
in-house capabilities but rather must be sought through external sources. It can 
also be described as collaborative because both firms desire similar or 
complementary goals and believe that each has something to gain and share 
through their interaction (Powell, 1996). Although collaboration between firms has 
long been recognised as a component of most firms’ innovation strategy, it is only 
more recently that collaboration between firms has been identified by some as the 
key, necessary driver of innovation in science and technology intensive industries. 
Studies by Dodgson, Gann, and Salter (2006), Laursen and Salter (2006), Lee et al. 
(2010), and others characterise external collaboration in these industries as (a) 
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focused on both enhancing existing capabilities and obtaining new ideas, (b) 
complex and often challenging to execute, (c) based on a mix of informal and 
formal network interactions between partner(s), and (d) often facilitated by 
intermediaries. 
2.4.2. Inter-firm Relationships: Arrangements and Motivations 
The works of Rothwell and Dodgson (1991), Rothwell (1994), Tether (2002), 
Chesbrough and Crowther (2006), Lichtenthaler (2008), Lee et al. (2010), and 
Vrande et al. (2009) identify a variety of relationships between small 
entrepreneurial firms and larger more-established firms. Although not an 
exhaustive list, Table 1 groups these relationships into three types, ranging in 
complexity from (1) fairly straightforward subcontracting and outsourcing 
relationships to (2) a variety of spin-out arrangements and (3) more complex joint 
venturing. Any number of these relationships could lead to long-term strategic 
partnerships between small and large firms or the acquisition of the small firm by 
the large firm partner. 
These practices are often broadly characterised as being forms of knowledge and 
technology exploitation, i.e. “innovation activities to leverage existing 
technological capabilities outside the boundaries of the organization” or 
knowledge and technology exploration, i.e. “innovation activities to capture and 
benefit from external sources of knowledge to enhance current technological 
developments” (Vrande et al. 2009, p. 424). Although there is much overlap 
between the two, the former is usually associated with relationship Types 1 and 2 
for improving existing capabilities and products, with the latter more aligned with 
relationship Type 3 (in some cases Type 2) aimed at developing new capabilities 
and products and entering new markets (Chesbrough & Crowther, 2006). 
What is common among these inter-firm relationships is that that they are based in 
part on  transaction cost considerations and that they  lead (in varying degrees) to 
knowledge or technology transfer between the two parties, resulting in some 
degree of organisational learning (Rothwell, 1991). Furthermore, they can solidify 
long-term relationships between the two parties, as well as open firms to 
relationship opportunities with other complementary firms by building capacities 
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for collaboration and raising one’s position or reputation within an industry 
network, thus improving the ability to hire new talent and absorb new ideas 
(Levinthal & March, 1993). In this way, organisational learning, long-term 
strategic positioning, and expanding collaborative opportunities, what might be 
described as the value added outcomes of collaboration, are often primary 
motivations for firms to initially engage in an inter-firm relationship. 
Table 1: Modes of Substantive Collaboration between Small and Large Firms 
(1) Outsourcing Relationships: 
• Producer-customer Partnerships: Small firms produce products for large firms to 
use or sell. Some technical and market knowledge is exchanged (e.g. a small 
automobile parts manufacturer producing engine parts for a large automobile 
company). 
• Contract-out R&D:  Large firms fund R&D projects in small niche firms that have 
been identified as complementary to their existing capabilities, resulting in 
considerable science and technology exchange (e.g. a large pharmaceutical company 
funding targeted R&D in a small life science firm). 
 
(2) Spin-off/out Relationships: 
• Sponsored spin-off: A large firm supports the creation of a new company headed by 
some of its former employees to develop a promising in-house technology externally. 
The parent company provides financial, technical, and commercial support and often 
serves as the primary customer, perhaps acquiring the spin-off company outright. 
• Spin-out Support: A large firm provides technical and commercial support to a 
complementary firm established by former employees of another company, possibly 
resulting in a long-term partnership or acquisition of the spin-out by the large firm. 
 
(3) Joint Ventures: 
• Development Collaborations: A large and a small firm collaborate in the 
development and commercialisation of a new product based on the large firm's 
existing technology or product line for the large company. The relationship involves 
considerable knowledge and technology exchange (e.g. small software developers 
collaborating with large IT companies). 
• Large–Small Firm Joint Ventures: A large and a small firm collaborate in the 
development and commercialisation of a new product based on technology that is 
new to the large firm. Significant technological and market knowledge is exchanged; 
the large firm provides finance, production, and commercial support, and the small 
firm provides specialised technological expertise, creative insight, and entrepreneurial 
drive (e.g. a small life science firm and a large pharmaceutical company collaborating 
on the early research stages of a new drug). 
Source: Adapted by the author from Rothwell (1991, p. 109) 
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2.4.3. Network Based Collaboration 
The notion that initial collaboration can lead to further engagement with multiple 
firms corresponds to the view that by entering into an interfirm relationship, a firm 
also enters into a wider network of individuals, firms, and organisations that 
constitute and connect a broader industry (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1983; Lee et al., 
2010; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Such network based collaboration is 
thought to be particularly prevalent and necessary in science- and technology-
intensive industries. In such industries innovation is based on a diverse set of 
capabilities and new commercial ideas emerge quickly and often unexpectedly, 
through formal and informal interactions between actors (e.g. individual scientists, 
firms, universities and government agencies) whose competencies are as disparate 
as they are complementary (e.g. industrial design and biological systems) 
(Bougrain & Haudeville, 2002). Participating in a network not only increases 
opportunities for collaboration, but it also positions firms to better absorb ideas 
and information that are created through the collaborative activity of other firms 
within the network (Argote & Ingram, 2000) and opens a firm to more collective 
industry knowledge regarding market trends, sources of finance, and changing 
standards and regulations (Gulati, 1998; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Zaheer, Gulati & 
Nohria). 
As depicted in Figure 14, it is thought that networks of inter-firm collaboration 
produce a web of embedded formal business and professional networks and 
informal social networks, which in turn reinforce and facilitate collaboration and 
shape network development by contributing to the production of social capital 
from which the network derives new ideas and synergies (Gronum, Verreynne & 
Kastelle, 2012).  Such networks foster substantive interactions (idea and resource 
exchange) between professionally related individuals that occur outside of or 
between the actual boundaries of the firm (Pittaway, 2004). Professional networks 
might be quite formal, holding regular meetings (e.g. industry conferences) and 
based on restrictive membership criteria and dues, whereas social networks are 
highly informal, with interaction taking place in a variety of private and public 
spaces (e.g. a private home, a restaurant, or online) (Smith, Romeo & 
Virahsawmy, 2012; Waters & Smith, 2008).  
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Figure 14: Pathways to Network Entry and Positioning 
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Source: Own interpretation 
These interpersonal interactions where, for example, two technologists from two 
competing firms might discuss a new product recently launched from a rival firm, 
lead to further discussions on how to counter or improve on this new product. Such 
discussions might result in more direct talks between the competing firms about 
partnering on the development of a new product. Another possibility might be that 
the two technologists, after further discussions, decide to strike out on their own 
and form their own company.  
As shown in Figure 14, a firm’s position within the network matters. Peripheral 
firms or new network entrants are likely to have initially weaker and fewer 
collaborative ties than a large incumbent firm occupying a more central network 
position, i.e. an anchor firm whose network dominance may allow it to control 
access to not only customers but also to important network members such as key 
producers, suppliers, and distributors (see Feldman, 2005; Nosi & Zhegu, 2010). 
This incentivises most new entrants to work toward substantive interaction with 
the large incumbent, likely through relationships with other firms or intermediaries 
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that have existing network ties to the central incumbent (i.e. non-disruptive 
network entry and positioning) (see Freeman, Edwards & Schroder, 2006; Graf, 
2011). An alternative yet less common approach would be to take a more 
disruptive path: bypassing the central incumbent in forging direct relationships 
with key network members and potential customers. The former is more common, 
associated with niche type firms, whereas the latter is rare, associated with firms 
looking to introduce more radical innovations. 
As previously mentioned, studies indicate that rates of collaboration in science and 
technology intensive industries are high and collectively encouraged, with relative 
network openness allowing for new ideas to emerge, helping a network to avoid 
certain lock-in tendencies (see Gertler & Levitte, 2005; Owen-Smith & Powell, 
2004). However, the knowledge and resource requirements for new firms to 
successfully enter these networks are extremely high and present significant 
barriers to new network entrants (see Chapter 3).  
2.4.4. External Collaboration: Organisational Challenges and Costs 
Despite their perceived benefits, however, inter-firm relationships and network 
based strategic alliances are not without challenges, costs, and potential drawbacks 
(Elmuti & Kathawala, 2001). External collaboration of this kind, like all 
collaboration, involves the opening up and sharing of one’s organisation and 
knowledge (i.e. giving up some degree of control) and therefore relies on some 
level of trust between parties (Sabel, 1993). Trust, as Arrow (1974) and others 
have explained, is built through repeat interaction. Creating obstacles to trust 
building and subsequent collaboration between firms, studies point to a variety of 
organisational and cultural barriers centred on conflicting cultures and strategic 
interests, and potential costs involving resource and asset loss, as well as 
competitive tendencies that may result in the degradation of a firm’s reputation and 
subsequent industry or market position (Das & Teng, 2001). All of these factors 
may contribute to less than optimal, possibly detrimental, relationships between 
the two (Powell, 1990; Sabel, 1993). 
First, different organisational cultures can act as barriers toward collaboration 
(Rivera-Vazquez & Ortiz-Fournier, 2009). A firm’s culture can be loosely defined 
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as the way in which the firm goes about doing things, from the speed of its 
decision making, the amount of risk it is willing to assume, the mobility of its 
employees, and its attentiveness to customers, to its openness to new ideas. As 
such, a firm’s culture is often closely tied to its organisational capabilities and is 
more often attributable to firm size. For example, collaboration between a small 
firm and a large firm may uncover difficulties in that small firms are accustomed 
to building consensus and making decisions quickly, perhaps on limited 
information, whereas the large firm takes a more deliberative and conservative 
approach, particularly in decisions involving substantial risk (Prashant & Harbir, 
2009).  Also, both small and large firms might be sceptical of each other’s 
technical or business capabilities. For example, an entrepreneur might doubt the 
advice of a large firm marketing director, causing problems in settling on an 
agreed to strategy; or a large firm’s R&D division may have a “not made here” 
mentality, making the integration of an external technology or product through 
collaboration difficult (see Rivera-Vazquez & Ortiz-Fournier, 2009). 
Second, different organisational interests and objectives can act as barriers to 
collaboration. Often closely aligned with a firm’s size and market position, a 
firm’s strategic interests or objectives may differ widely from those of potential 
collaborative partners, even those with significant complementary assets (Todeva 
& Knoke, 2005). For example, in approaching joint ventures, small firms are likely 
to be focused on long-term profits, this due to expected development lag-times in 
bringing new or radical product innovations to market, whereas large established 
firms often have more short-term profit goals associated with less complex, 
incremental improvements to existing products. This may result in pressure to 
assume a less risky development approach, leading to less radical outcomes. Also, 
small entrepreneurial firms may enter into collaboration with the aim to become a 
long-term strategic partner of a large established firm (the small firm holding on to 
its operational independence and control of its IP), whereas the large established 
firm may be more interested or inclined to acquire the small firm outright as an 
outcome of the collaboration. Either of these aims may involve conflicting 
strategies. 
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Finally, collaboration carries with it potential costs regarding time, knowledge, 
and reputation. Engaging in repeat interaction for building collaborative 
partnerships necessitates that individuals and firms invest time and capital in the 
process itself, at the expense of other functions and activities. This can prove 
costly because some collaboration, even after extended periods of interaction, may 
lack benefits for either one or both parties involved (Pisano, 1989). Collaboration 
can also become a channel through which firms lose specific knowledge and 
know-how; for example, a firm might use collaboration to recruit talent from a 
partner firm, or knowledge might diffuse to competitors through employee 
mobility or a firm’s other interactions and collaborative partnerships. Pursuing 
collaboration with multiple parties may also create competitive confusion among 
the firms involved in a particular partnership as to who is a credible partner, in that 
one partner firm might believe that another partner firm is getting preferential 
treatment from or access to the lead partner, causing a breakdown in trust between 
partners, hampering collaborative efforts, and damaging reputations (Parkhe, 1993; 
Pisano, 1989). 
2.4.5. The Role of Intermediaries in Network Based Collaboration   
Lee et al. (2010), Davenport, Davies & Grimes (1999), and Luukkonen (2005) 
propose that overcoming some of the challenges associated with entering into 
collaborative networks and for choosing the appropriate partner for collaboration 
can be facilitated through an intermediary actor whose network position and 
expertise can effectively recognise complementarities and degrees of compatibility 
between a small firm and a large established firm. In high tech networks such an 
intermediary role might be played by universities, particularly their technology 
transfer offices; professional network organisations; chambers of commerce; 
groups of angel investors; public venture funds; corporate venture capital 
divisions; and most prominently, independent venture capital firms. The extent to 
which intermediaries such as venture capital are effective will vary, as will the 
degree of direct facilitation. Lee et al. (2010) suggests that intermediaries need to 
perform three interrelated functions regarding collaboration in networks.  
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First, intermediaries function as information collectors or databases for their 
respective networks. In this role, intermediaries collect information on firms, 
activities, and trends within the network and outside of it. Such information might 
include emerging technologies, new products, new markets, and the firms involved 
(Bougrain &d Haudeville, 2002). This information can then be processed and 
shared with firms within the network, as well as those attempting to enter the 
network, who are looking for appropriate partner firms to collaborate with 
(Fontana et al., 2006). The intermediary’s role here, however, is not just about 
collecting and sharing that information but also about packaging the information 
so as to identify and match firms with complementary partners. As such, the 
intermediary itself will need to employ considerable resources for research and 
data collection, hold substantive industry and commercial experience for 
interpreting and utilising that information, and have extensive connections to other 
firms and sources of information within and external to the network (Fontana et 
al., 2006). 
Secondly, an intermediary can expand on its information collection role by 
actively identifying complementary firms and then introducing them to one 
another for collaboration purposes, directly contributing to the construction or 
development of a network (Kogut et al., 1992).  By bringing specific firms 
together, the intermediary acts as an important network selection mechanism, both 
in determining, to some degree, which firms can enter and maintain a position in 
the  network and, in doing so, facilitating the technological transfer and diffusion 
of certain technologies within the network over alternative technologies 
(Rosenfeld, 1996). In this construction role the intermediary can also contribute to 
the collaborative culture and structural characteristics of the network (Rosenfeld, 
1996), encouraging certain network norms such as the frequency of collaboration 
between firms, the degree of formality normally involved in collaboration, and the 
types of arrangements or structures used for collaboration. Additionally, an 
intermediary can encourage and reinforce the degree of geographic concentration 
of a network by bringing together firms that reside in the same geographic location 
or pulling peripheral firms into a geographically concentrated cluster of firms 
(Simard & West, 2006).  
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Finally, once a collaborative relationship between firms is established, 
intermediaries can then help manage and develop that relationship, facilitating the 
collaboration process (Davenport, Davies & Grimes, 1999; Luukkonen, 2005). 
They may do this by recognising the changing collaborative needs of the parties 
and facilitating both parties in identifying and meeting those respective needs, thus 
furthering the development of the relationship. In doing so, the intermediary may 
become both the point of contact and venue for initiating and conducting meetings 
between the respective parties as collaboration becomes more direct and/or 
complex (Luukkonen, 2005). In this context the role of the intermediary becomes 
particularly critical when additional collaborative partners are deemed necessary 
for a specific collaborative project; the intermediary is then tasked with identifying 
and delicately integrating these new partners into the already established 
collaborative framework. In doing this effectively, the intermediary needs a central 
position of trust within the network and an understanding of how collaboration 
works along with the ability to identify and bring together the appropriate 
capabilities and partners. 
2.4.6. Venture Capital as a Network Based Intermediary 
This understanding of the network role that effective intermediaries play in 
information collection, network construction, and facilitation of relationship 
building corresponds with the view, discussed in Section 2.3, of independent 
venture capital firms as investment intermediaries with the capability to help 
NHTCs successfully bring innovations to market (i.e. crossing the valley of death) 
by connecting NHTCs with a network of capacity-building sources and enabling 
infrastructure, particularly with large established firms that hold central network 
positions (Gulati, Lavie & Singh, 2009). Figure 15 shows venture capital as an 
intermediary in facilitating collaboration between NHTCs and large established 
companies. 
From a network perspective, VC firms are viewed as capable, through a 
combination of their experience, information gathering, and network position, of 
recognising the asset needs of both new network entrants (e.g. NHTCs) and 
network incumbents (e.g. large established companies) and of identifying 
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complementarities and facilitating relationships between them. In this context, VC 
firms are also viewed as capable of recognising potential organisational barriers 
toward collaboration between the NHTCs they invest in and their corporate 
connections, providing possible assistance (e.g. managerial insight and trust 
building measures) in overcoming such barriers. In this way, venture capital can be 
seen as shaping the technological and commercial pathways of new innovations, 
pathways that might be considered less disruptive in that they often tend to involve 
the inputs of established network incumbents (see Cumming & MacIntosh, 2008). 
As discussed more fully in Chapter 3, it is assumed that this intermediary role 
requires independent VC firms to collaborate with large established companies 
within these industry networks to build and maintain these valuable corporate 
relationships, which they then use for investing in NHTCs. 
Figure 15: Complementary Asset Model with Venture Capital as 
Intermediary 
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2.5. Innovation and Location 
The preceding sections of this chapter have presented innovation as a process by 
which individuals and firms, driven by the profit potential of uncertain enterprises, 
overcome significant gaps in knowledge and resources, often through network 
based collaboration with complementary firms and partners. This collaboration is 
facilitated by well-positioned intermediaries such as venture capital, which can 
bring complementary firms and assets together to bring new innovations 
successfully to market. Hinted at periodically in this discussion has been the 
connection between innovation and geographic proximity. In short, it is widely 
agreed that the highly tacit (i.e. not yet codified) and asymmetric knowledge that 
characterises necessary information sharing during the early stages of the 
innovation process is difficult to communicate clearly and in a well-timed way, 
especially across distances (Audretsch, 1998). Effective communication of this 
knowledge, what Von Hippel (1994) calls “sticky information,” generally requires 
regular face-to-face interaction between individuals and functions, both within 
firms and between firms (Audretsch, 1998). It follows that the high costs 
associated with such interaction are reduced through geographic proximity, that is, 
collocation between actors, resulting in the geographic concentration of innovative 
activity (Storper, 1993, 1997). 
In looking at high-tech innovation, the question is not so much why innovation 
agglomerates, but rather why this agglomeration tends to occur in a select number 
of large metropolitan regions. In other words, why does innovation tend to 
consistently concentrate in some locations, while failing to take hold or flourish in 
others? Answering this question has preoccupied innovation studies and economic 
geography for the better part of three decades, if not longer, with a number of 
interrelated explanations and concepts proposed (see Simmie, 2005). Common 
among these concepts are the notions that large metropolitan regions such as 
London offers individuals and firms much greater opportunities for profitable 
interactions and knowledge exchange, leading to the creation/reinforcement of 
specific interdependencies within the region (see Gordon & McCann, 2000; 
Morgan, 2007). Accounts differ, however, in relation to the importance attached to 
processes through which interactions between actors are developed, and to the role 
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of institutions in structuring them in a systematic way (Boschma, 2005). In 
particular, explanations of how the interaction potential of large metropolitan 
regions (such as London's) facilitates innovation have been offered in terms of: (1) 
a purely opportunity driven agglomeration model; (2) a more coordinated network-
based clustering concept; or (3) an institutionally structured regional innovation 
systems approach. These perspectives are not mutually exclusive, however, and in 
practice some combination of all three is likely to offer the most powerful 
explanation of how processes operate in particular settings. 
2.5.1. Opportunity Driven Agglomeration 
Notions that firms will agglomerate and collocate in specific areas harkens back to 
the work of Marshall (1925) – writing in the context of pre-Fordist manufacturing 
– who argued that in addition to the internal economies of scale accruing to 
individual firms, agglomeration allows firms to benefit from external economies, 
particularly shared labour pools, specialised suppliers and knowledge spillovers 
(Krugman, 1998). According to Marshall, and later Hoover (1937), the larger these 
locational advantages, the greater the degree of industrial specialisation -- lowering 
factor costs and increasing overall productivity. Hoover (1948) expanded this 
notion by arguing that agglomeration also offers 'urbanisation' advantages that are 
not industry-specific, but involve overall density effects, with external economies 
spreading across the range of local industries, leading to greater opportunities for 
profits for all firms. More specifically, Perroux (1950) argued that innovative 
industries, due both to their rapid growth and backward/forward linkage, would 
generate and capitalise on expanded external economies in ways that reinforced 
agglomeration.  
Building off the product life cycle concept, Hirsch (1965), Vernon (1966, 1979), 
and later Markusen (1985) argue that agglomeration allows firms in technology 
based industries to more quickly access both information and external economies, 
particularly pools of skilled labour adept at producing specialised technical and 
customised products, and this access is seen as vital to (small) firms in rapidly 
changing industries. In this way, agglomeration not only facilitates a firm’s 
production capacities but also its capacities for learning. As Markusen (1985, 
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1987) argued, agglomerations of such firms and specialist suppliers offered the 
support which was necessary for individuals and firms to participate in the 
"superprofit" opportunities offered by markets for new and still-customised 
products. This corresponds directly with the understanding that uncertainty offers 
the potential for extraordinary gain or profit, for those participants appropriately 
informed and capable (e.g. Knight, 1968).  
For the agglomeration model, overall size and density matter: the larger the 
agglomeration, the greater the range of factor inputs on offer, and the higher 
potential there is for multiple opportunities for profitable interaction among firms 
(Gordon & McCann, 2000). Large, diverse metropolitan regions such as London, 
therefore, are viewed as particularly advantageous for innovative activity because 
they offer firms more chance to access different combinations of factor inputs, 
markets and collaborators (Simmie, Sennett, Wood & Hart, 2002). In this way, 
large agglomerations may have the critical mass necessary for firms to carry out 
early stage innovation without any more coordinated forms of collaboration 
(Gordon & McCann, 2000). Furthermore, activities (e.g. substantive interactions 
between firms) and factor inputs occurring in the agglomeration, particularly those 
associated with innovative activity, should not be viewed as permanent or long-
lasting, but as activities and events that change over time (Gordon & McCann, 
2000).  
According to the pure agglomeration model, the externalities offered by an 
agglomeration are available to any firm paying the price to occupy space there 
(Boschma, 2005), and this is an important aspect of the economic success of the 
largest and most diverse metropolitan regions, such as London.  But, as Boschma 
(2005) suggests, it cannot be wholly true of interactions between actors involved in 
the most highly specialised and uncertain fields. These are likely to require 
specific competencies and absorptive capacity that are not widely held, what 
Boschma (2005, 2004) and others (e.g. Antonelli, 2000) refer to as cognitive and 
organisational proximities. In other words, access to some externalities is unlikely 
to be freely available to all local firms, but require some infrastructure of 
coordination including recognition of shared or complementary competencies.  
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2.5.2. Network Based Clusters 
The notion that substantive interaction between individuals and firms is based on 
the sharing of similar or complementary capabilities and strategies speaks to an 
interaction that is coordinated through networks (see Powell, Koput & Smith-
Doerr, 1996). It is thought that networks help decrease uncertainty and facilitate 
information and knowledge exchange by linking complementary actors and 
organisational functions -- to the exclusion of others -- in a way that both promotes 
idea generation and the production and diffusion of new innovations while 
simultaneously creating norms of network interaction and behaviour (Blomquist & 
Levy, 2006). In other words, networks provide a degree of stability in the face of 
particularly uncertain markets. While networks by no means have to be 
geographically bound, it is understood that geographic proximity can facilitate 
information exchange through networks by making it easier to both communicate 
specialised and often tacit information and to build trust between network actors -- 
leading to more substantive interaction (Boschma, 2005). Examples of such 
localised networks are venture capital syndication networks that concentrate in 
locations such as London, Silicon Valley and other innovative regions, and local 
business and professional networks such as those that help coordinate interactions 
between firms, university research centres and government agencies in and around 
Oxford and Cambridge (see Lawton Smith, Romeo & Virahsawmy, 2012). 
The notion that networks play an important role in local activities of innovation 
and production was popularised by the work of Becatinni (1990) and his new 
industrial district concept (Simmie, 2005). Derived from the work of Marshall 
(1925) on early (pre-Fordist) English industrialisation, his model was based on the 
ideas of vertical disintegration in the contemporary economy, and the strategy of 
flexible specialisation described by Piore and Sabel (1984), who argue that due to 
growing demand for customised goods in certain sectors, firms break up 
production processes into smaller and more flexible units. This vertical 
disintegration and the external division of labour results in agglomeration because 
firms will use close spatial proximity between separate production functions and 
complementary actors (i.e. specialised producers) to reduce information 
degradation and transaction costs. Inspired by the revitalised textile and craft 
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industries of the “Third Italy” described by Becatinni (1990), this network based 
agglomeration results in flexibly connected communities of production, generally 
comprised of small and medium-sized firms, which allows regionally based 
conglomerates to more effectively manage the uncertainties associated with 
customisation, thus facilitating innovation (Grabher, 1993; Simmie, 2005). 
Limitations of the model, however, include an emphasis on intra-regional self-
sufficiency that is not generally found (Simmie, 2005). But the concept of social 
networks as key to productive interactions seems to have much more general 
application in relation to clusters of innovative firms (Gordon & McCann, 2000, 
2005).  
Two concepts that expanded on the industrial district were the innovative milieu 
and the related concept of the learning region. These concepts are derived from the 
work of Aydalot and Keeble (1988), Camagni (1991), Florida (1995), Simmie 
(1997), and Hassink (2005), respectively. Unlike the Marshallian examples, these 
focused on the agglomerative tendencies of high-tech industries (Simmie, 2005).  
But they also emphasised the use of formal and informal trust based networks to 
exchange highly tacit information to reduce uncertainty by connecting 
complementary actors within geographic proximity (Simmie, 2005). The 
innovative milieu concept enhances the network idea, however, by proposing that 
these networks create and facilitate collective synergies and embedded processes, 
particularly those associated with collective learning and decision making within 
and between networked firms (Lawson & Lorenz, 1999). This network concept, 
therefore, stresses collaboration and cooperation between firms as a means to 
exchange often tacit information and reduce uncertainty in rapidly changing 
industries (Hassink, 2005). In this vein, the networks between firms are highly 
flexible, allowing the mobility of management, skilled labour, and ideas and thus 
facilitating the regions’ collective learning and absorptive capacity (Florida, 1995).  
The learning region concept expands on this, arguing that these collective and 
embedded learning processes create norms of interaction and a culture of 
collaboration and cooperation between complementary firms and across sectors 
(Morgan, 2007; Simmie, 2005), and suggesting that these network interactions 
create a regional atmosphere or buzz consisting of traded and untraded 
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interdependencies and related social capital which individuals and firms can draw 
upon for the creation new ideas and the pursuit of innovations (Storper 1995, 
1997). The notion that network interaction creates and then reinforces, over time, 
an embedded culture of expectations and norms regarding collaboration suggest 
that substantive interaction toward the development of new ideas and innovations 
takes not only a degree of network coordination, but also a certain amount of 
institutional structuring, governance, and support (Morgan, 2007). 
2.5.3. Regional Innovation Systems 
A local institutional perspective informs a regional innovation system (RIS) 
concept proposed by Braczyk, Cooke, & Heidenreich (1998), Cooke, Gomez 
Uranga, & Etxebarria (1997), and Asheim & Gertler (2005), among others. 
According to the RIS concept, geographically concentrated innovative activity is 
induced and sustained, in large part, by the local presence and governance 
activities of robust institutional actors. These include institutions of higher 
learning, government research centres and agencies, industry associations, and 
financial institutions such as investment banks and venture capital, as well as 
prominent companies (e.g. MNEs) and their networks of suppliers and small firm 
partners (Cooke, 2001). All of these interact through complex webs of inter-
organisational relationships, user-producer linkages, formal business networks, and 
informal social relations in the support and carrying out of innovation (Carlsson et 
al., 2002; Cooke, 2005; Kuhlmann, 2001; Lawton Smith and Waters, 2011). Such 
concentrated institutional capacities, coupled with large pools of highly skilled and 
well-trained labour (Lawton Smith & Waters, 2011), usually are found only in a 
select number of large metropolitan regions; examples include San Francisco and 
Silicon Valley, Paris and Ile-de-France, New York City, Bangalore, Los 
Angeles/San Diego, Boston and Route 128, and the greater London metropolitan 
region (Asheim & Gertler, 2005; Saxenian, 1990). 
While emphasising a region’s institutional capacities, the RIS concept is grounded 
in (Schumpeterian) evolutionary theory which implies change and adaptation over 
time (Cooke, 2005). Central to this change are the interactions, tensions, and 
convergence between established actors and incumbent technologies and the 
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emerging ideas and technologies often forwarded by new system entrants. As such, 
Hekkert, et al. (2007) and others propose that entrepreneurial activity is an 
innovation system’s primary source of new ideas and experimentation leading to 
new innovations and technological trajectories; thus avoiding tendencies toward 
technological or regional lock-in. In this way, a RIS needs to be structured so as to 
encourage and support entrepreneurial activity even when considered potentially 
disruptive from an institutional or incumbent perspective (Hekkert, et al., 2007). 
Therefore, knowledge brokers (i.e. intermediaries) such as venture capital can be 
viewed as critical actors in bridging the potential tensions between entrepreneurs 
and system incumbents, developing and positioning new technologies as 
complementary to incumbent technologies and systems (Amin & Thrift, 1992; 
Zook, 2004). In this context, venture capital also functions within a regional 
innovation system as an important technology selection mechanism (Hekkert, et 
al., 2007). 
For the RIS, another important institutional actor participating in this interplay 
between entrants and incumbents is the large corporation, viewed as anchoring and 
linking geographically concentrated industry networks (see Feldman, 2005). It is 
suggested that these large incumbents, many of them MNEs, will locate their 
corporate and R&D headquarters, including corporate venture capital divisions, in 
core metropolitan regions to scan, and in some instances invest in or acquire, 
emerging technologies arising from other successful firms, the local 
entrepreneurial community, and university research centres -- such locations 
offering a number of competitive advantages (see Porter, 1990). Large 
corporations will also use their incumbent positions to pursue innovation related 
activities by both leveraging a region’s skilled labour (e.g. scientists and 
technologists) and its institutional capacities, particularly legal (regulation and 
patenting) and financial (investment banking), as well as engage in inter-firm 
relationships and strategic partnering within local industry networks (see 
Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, & West, 2008; Simmie, 2005). In this way, large 
corporations both contribute to the innovation capacities of the region (e.g. 
reinforcing both skilled labour pools and R&D infrastructure, and producing 
knowledge spillovers) and influence, as a system selection mechanism, the 
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emergence, trajectories and diffusion of new technologies within the system (see 
Cooke, 2005). 
Therefore, the behaviour and strategies employed by large corporations are likely 
to have consequences for both local entrepreneurial activity and innovation within 
the region. For maintaining competitive advantage, large corporations may adopt 
an innovation strategy that sees them couple internal R&D initiatives with external 
investment in and partnering with other local firms and entrepreneurs (see 
Chesborough, 2004; Cooke, 2005); thus participating in and contributing to new 
waves of innovation within the region. On the other hand, large corporations may 
engage in more oligopolistic behaviour, deciding instead to employ “market 
policing activities” such as price setting, buying out competitors and “squeezing 
out entrepreneurs (Markusen, 1987: p. 98)”; actions which can stifle the 
emergence and commercialisation of new ideas and technologies and lead to 
monopolistic conditions, regional inertia and potential lock-in. Similarly, large 
corporations can also partake in consolidation and merger activities with other 
large companies, decreasing the potential paths to market for new entrants (see 
Chapter 3). Limiting such tendencies requires RISs to be structured in a way that 
not only supports entrepreneurial activity, but that it also remain receptive to new 
ideas from outside the system (Asheim & Isaksen, 2002). 
With most RISs recognised as centres of international knowledge exchange, 
studies place considerable importance on the interactions between regional 
networks, associated knowledge flows, and global network linkages as sources of 
new knowledge. Receptivity to global knowledge flows allows large metropolitan 
regions to absorb best practices and labour from other innovative regions and, over 
the long-term, be more adaptable to technological and market change (Asheim & 
Isaksen, 2002; Pred, 1966; Simmie & Sennett, 1999). As advanced by Maskall, 
Bathelt, and Malmberg (2006), 
Firms therefore develop global pipelines not only to exchange products or 
services, but also in order to benefit from outside knowledge inputs and 
growth impulse.  Such findings imply that, in a globalizing knowledge-
based economy, each cluster’s economic prospects depend not only on its 
internal interactions, but also on its ability to identify and access external 
knowledge sources far away. (p. 998; emphasis added) 
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Rychen and Zimmermann (2007) suggest that certain actors, due to their 
prominent position in a particular regional network, may act as key entry nodes or 
intermediaries through which both extra-regional knowledge and actors may flow 
into and gain access to more formal regional innovation networks, many of these 
networks being industry or sector specific. Again, actors such as VC firms, MNEs, 
investment banks, industry associations, and universities might be viewed as 
intermediaries or knowledge brokers, part of what Amin & Thrift (1992) describe 
as knowledge communities that collect and analyse extra-regional knowledge and 
match it with complementary knowledge and assets that are more regionally bound 
(Amin & Thrift, 1992; Zook, 2008). It is thought that this knowledge brokering 
facilitates a region’s absorption of new ideas and thus helps reinforce and renew 
innovation within a particular region. 
In addition to the presence of such knowledge brokers, large metropolitan regions 
such as London are at a distinct advantage over less globally connected regions as 
crossroads for international knowledge exchanges in that they are endowed with 
rich international transport links (e.g. Heathrow Airport, St. Pancras International) 
and cosmopolitan business communities (Simmie, 2005). Not only do such 
transport links facilitate face-to-face interaction, but they also further reinforce the 
region as a destination, through meetings and international conferences, for the 
exchange of knowledge and commerce toward the development of new ideas and 
technologies (Simmie, 2005).  
In sum, a number of ideas and concepts can explain how large metropolitan 
regions such as London flourish as centres of innovation. From these, an 
explanation emerges proposing that a select number of metropolitan city regions 
offer individuals and firms a seemingly unlimited number of opportunities for 
profitable knowledge exchange. These exchanges, often between regional 
incumbents and new entrants, are coordinated through selective networks which 
promote norms of interaction and subsequent cultures of collaboration. In this way, 
these networks build and reinforce regional institutional capacities which in turn 
structure, support, and govern (i.e. systemise) the continuous development and 
diffusion of new ideas and technologies in the region. This process is facilitated 
and sustained by a region’s openness and access to global knowledge flows and 
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the presence of knowledge brokers who can capture and match new, sometimes 
external ideas with regional competencies and needs (see Figure 16). 
Figure 16: Regional Innovation System 
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Source: Own interpretation based on Cooke (2005) 
In looking at collaboration between VC firms and large corporations in the LMR, 
the research presented here views the LMR as a regional innovation system. In 
doing so, this research aims to better understand the intermediary mechanisms and 
processes associated with interactions between new and incumbent system actors 
in the selection and development of innovations. From a geography perspective, 
the research looks to understand the role that geographic proximity and the 
capacities of the LMR play in facilitating collaboration between VC firms and 
large corporations. In broader terms, this research seeks to characterise substantive 
processes of interaction within the LMR which might inform similar processes in 
other innovative regions and in those regions that are less so.  
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2.6. Conclusion 
In considering the innovation process in its entirety, collaboration (within an open 
competitive environment) can be understood as the primary agent by which 
innovation is induced and facilitated. Through collaboration, specialised and tacit 
information is communicated, complementary knowledge and resources are 
exchanged, feedback loops are formed and coordinated, and collective learning 
occurs, from which routines and conventions then develop. Collaboration, in other 
words, acts as a binding mechanism, a necessary channel through which 
individuals, firms, and institutions (collectively bound by uncertainty) participate 
in and contribute to the problem-solving and absorptive capacity of firms, 
communities, and regions (Morgan, 2007). In this context, purposeful 
collaboration toward innovation requires a degree of geographic proximity, 
coordination through networks, and institutional structuring and related actors that 
support the emergence and development of new ideas and their convergence with 
incumbent technologies and practices. 
Integral to the innovation process and the systems that support it, therefore, are 
entrepreneurs and the NHTCs they champion. This chapter has shown, however, 
that for NHTCs, lacking the experience and resources of their large firm 
counterparts, the process of bringing new ideas and technologies successfully to 
market can be particularly challenging. In pursuing uncertain endeavours, most 
NHTCs need to connect and partner with external sources of finance, knowledge, 
and enabling infrastructure, particularly the knowledge, resources, and commercial 
inputs of large corporations that tend to dominate the research, production, and 
supply networks of certain high tech industries. NHTCs, however, face substantial 
barriers to attracting and then developing these necessary industry connections and 
corporate partnerships. Overcoming them generally requires investment 
intermediaries such as VC firms that, in addition to providing critical early stage 
funding and knowledge, can match NHTCs with local complementary capacities 
and partners, facilitating collaboration and the subsequent development of new 
ideas and technologies. 
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As such, VC firms can be viewed as important network intermediaries and 
knowledge brokers in that they collect information regarding network participants 
and external knowledge flows, they facilitate network construction and behaviour, 
and they coordinate interactions between network participants. Having identified 
venture capital in this way, the proceeding chapter looks more closely at how VC 
firms leverage their local investment and industry networks to overcome 
innovation’s inherent uncertainty and help develop the NHTCs they invest in. In 
doing so, the following discussion will further build the argument that local 
collaboration between VC firms and large corporations likely plays an essential 
role in the selection and development of venture backed NHTCs. From this 
discussion, research hypotheses are then proposed regarding the structures, 
motivations, and circumstances for collaboration between VC firms and large 
corporations, as well as the role of geographic proximity in facilitating this 
collaboration.  
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3. The Venture Capital Cycle: Leveraging External Resources 
Through Geographic Proximity 
As shown in the previous chapter, innovation  often comes about through the 
complementary exchange of new ideas and specialised resources between NHTCs 
and large established firms, often facilitated by investment intermediaries, the most 
prominently being venture capital firms. Venture capital’s role as an investor and 
intermediary is largely based on its ability to identify the commercial potential of 
new ideas and match those ideas with appropriate resources to bring them 
successfully to market (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  In doing so, venture capital 
firms leverage entrepreneurial insight, industry knowledge, and management 
practice to capture and act on heavily tacit information within knowledge flows 
that are highly asymmetric in that entrepreneurs will initially know much more 
about their companies than investors. In characterising venture capital firms Zook 
(2004) explains: 
Venture capitalists are best understood as tacit information brokers who 
acquire and create tacit knowledge about industries, market conditions, 
entrepreneurs and companies through a constant process of Marshallian 
interaction and observation. This knowledge is then used to select companies 
… with the highest potential returns and assist them in their expansion. (p. 
628) 
More specifically, venture capital firms employ the insight and expertise of their 
venture capitalists (VCs), many of whom have considerable entrepreneurial 
experience as well as deep industry and sector specific knowledge; many VCs 
have held previous positions as corporate research scientists and technologists, 
corporate CEOs, and heads of R&D and marketing (Bottazzi, Rin, & Hellmann, 
2008). This experience is coupled with a venture capital firm’s related network 
based connections to other venture capital firms, investment banks, universities 
and, most notably, large corporations and their networks of producers and 
suppliers (Brander, Amit, & Antweiler, 2002). From these networks venture 
capital firms gain 
a combination of know-how on emerging technologies and business plans, 
connections to people in the midst of these changes and who are best 
equipped to evaluate risk and benefits, and direct observation of the variation 
in companies funded by other investors. (Zook, 2004, p. 628) 
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These network connections inform the venture capital investment selection process 
and are then leveraged for effectively monitoring portfolio companies during the 
post-selection investment phase, leading through to investment exit. 
This access and utilisation of what are essentially nonfinancial inputs allows 
venture capital firms to provide value added to their portfolio companies in the 
form of market, commercial, and technical advice; guidance in management and 
personnel; and valuable connections to customers, producers, suppliers, and other 
strategic partners, all of which can prove critical in the development of the 
portfolio firm and its success on investment exit (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). 
Access to such inputs, however, and the quality of those inputs — much of which 
are based on highly tacit information — will likely be determined by both the 
quality and accessibility of the networks involved,  both of which will be greatly 
enhanced and facilitated through close geographic proximity (Zook, 2004, 2005). 
For this reason venture capital firms will more often than not invest in local 
companies and partner with other venture capital firms for which they share the 
same local investment network. 
As mentioned here and previously, a likely source of value added inputs for 
venture capital firms in their selection and monitoring of portfolio companies are 
large corporations that tend to dominate industry specific networks. These 
relationships however, have not been sufficiently established empirically, with 
questions remaining as to the involved mechanisms, processes, and motivations 
and whether geographic proximity plays any facilitating role. 
To understand how and why venture capital firms may leverage local networks to 
connect to large corporations, it is first necessary to examine in detail how venture 
capital firms effectively manage tacit and asymmetric information at each phase of 
the venture capital cycle. This chapter begins by explaining the pre-investment 
selection process (3.1), the post-selection monitoring of investments (3.2), and the 
process of investment exit (3.3), focusing on the knowledge required at each 
phase, where this knowledge is obtained, and the role that close geographic 
proximity and location play. A discussion then follows of how a venture capital 
firm’s selection decisions, monitoring activities, and propensities for their 
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collaboration with corporate partners are premised on the investment requirements 
of different high tech sectors (3.4). From this discussion, assumptions and 
hypotheses regarding collaboration between venture capital firms and large 
corporations are drawn (3.5), informing the research approach to be discussed in 
the following chapter. 
3.1. The Pre-investment Selection Process 
The initial selection of investee companies is probably the most important as well 
as the most challenging part of the venture capital cycle, requiring venture capital 
firms to navigate tremendous uncertainty and highly tacit and asymmetric 
information (Gladstone & Gladstone, 2004). For this screening and due diligence 
process, venture capital firms supposedly use deep industry-specific knowledge 
and entrepreneurial insight to identify the commercial potential of emerging ideas 
and technologies and the qualities (e.g. degree of leadership, expertise, and 
business acumen) of the entrepreneurs involved (Camp, 2002).  From a large 
number of initial proposals, a very small number of companies are selected for 
investment, and the degree of initial venture capital firm involvement in the 
management and oversight of the investee company is decided (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2004). As shown in Figure 17, the pre-investment selection process 
involves a number of interrelated and crucial steps.  
These selection steps include (1) the initial screening of a large number of 
proposed business plans, (2) an intense phase of due diligence on the most 
promising new companies, including formal presentations or pitches by those 
companies, and (3) a final closing phase involving additional due diligence, final 
investment selection, and settling the terms of the deal, thus establishing the 
structure and tone of the investment relationship going forward (Gladstone & 
Gladstone, 2004).  
3.1.1. Deal Flow and Investment Screening 
The investment selection process begins with the screening of potential firms for 
investment. The screening or “sourcing” process typically involves the time-
consuming evaluation of hundreds of potential firms annually. The amount of new 
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potential investments for screening is referred to as deal flow (Manigart et al., 
2006). The quality of the deal flow is generally determined by a venture capital 
firm’s reputation, with the more well-known and reputable venture capital firms 
attracting business pitches and plans from successful repeat entrepreneurs or direct 
referrals from industry contacts (e.g. other venture capital firms) (Metrick & 
Yasuda, 2010). Reputable venture capital firms will likely also derive quality, 
often proprietary deal flow from their amassed databases of small firm and 
industry contacts (Zook, 2004), including past portfolio firms, angel investors, 
venture capital syndicate partners, university tech transfer offices, and corporate 
partners (i.e. venture capital as an intermediary) (Harrison & Mason, 2000). In 
other words, a venture capital firm’s reputation and subsequent position within 
appropriate investment and industry networks largely determine the quality of its 
deal flow. 
Figure 17: Pre-investment Selection Process 
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The initial screening process generally involves the evaluation of business plans 
provided by entrepreneurs.19, 20 A number of studies have looked at the criteria 
used by venture capital firms for evaluating business plans at the initial screening 
phase, with no one set of universal criteria identified. Early studies by Tyebjee and 
Bruno (1984) and MacMillan, Siegel, and Narasimha (1986) that involved post-
hoc interviews with VCs suggest that venture capital firms considered a 
company’s market potential, management quality, competition, and product 
viability, with the greatest emphasis placed on the quality of the management team 
and the professional attributes of the entrepreneur. In contrast, later studies by 
Sandberg et al. (1988), Hall and Hofer (1993), and Zacharakis and Meyer (1995), 
which employed verbal protocol methods (real-time experiments), found that VCs 
paid more attention and considered more important the proposed company’s 
potential market and the potential and quality of the proposed product, concluding 
that VCs may not be all that accurate in their own reflections regarding the initial 
screening process (Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998; Zacharakis, McMullen, & 
Shepherd, 2007).  That being said, from these studies two overriding criteria tend 
to emerge for initial screening purposes, what Metrick and Yasuda (2011) refer to 
as the market test and the management test (see Mason & Stark, 2004). 
The market test refers to whether a large market exists for the company’s proposed 
technology or product and whether such a market is accessible to the company. For 
VCs a large market generally corresponds to a highly profitable investment exit 
through a large IPO (e.g. Google) (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). However, large IPOs 
are generally the exception, in part because potentially large markets are often 
more collectively apparent, with advantages going toward established market 
                                                          
19
 A business plan includes a detailed overview of the proposed company’s capabilities and 
strategic objectives, current and potential competitors, and the professional background of the 
entrepreneur(s) and/or proposed management team, as well as financial projections. Metrick and 
Yasuda (2011, p. 137) noted that “for early stage companies, the projections usually focus on the 
uses of funds; for later-stage companies, the projections should be more complete financial 
statements.” 
20
 Those assigned to do the actual screening vary and may depend on the venture capital firm’s size 
and investment focus. For example, large venture capital firms with broad technology investments 
and/or those focused on more concrete later stage companies (for which information is more 
quantitatively verifiable) will likely employ a number of junior associates to do the initial 
screening, with full partners participating only later in the pitch and due diligence phases.  With 
smaller venture capital firms, many of them focused on less certain early stage companies in a 
particular sector, the initial screening of business plans often involves the participation of more 
experienced firm partners (Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). 
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incumbents who either fill the market gap first or thwart new market entrants from 
doing so (e.g. Microsoft). As such, most venture capital firms will look for a 
company’s viable market potential; where a company’s proposed technology or 
product is identified as addressing a complementary market need (i.e. opportunities 
for which  the market will be more receptive to a new entrant) (Gladstone & 
Gladstone, 2004). For venture capital firms, particularly those investing in early 
stage companies, effectively identifying the market potential of a proposed 
technology or product is challenging, even for the most experienced VCs, 
requiring them to hold or have access to considerable industry and market specific 
knowledge (Mason & Stark, 2004). 
The management test determines whether the entrepreneurs and proposed 
management team are capable of handling the unique demands of an 
entrepreneurial environment and of carrying the company’s strategic vision 
forward (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).   The management test is highly subjective, 
requiring VCs to merge the qualitative information provided in the business plan 
with their own insight and intuition. In evaluating the company’s leadership, VCs 
look favourably on a proposal headed by a successful repeat or serial entrepreneur, 
as well as entrepreneurs that have significant industry experience (e.g. a spin-out) 
and/or a degree of technical intimacy with their proposed technology or product 
(i.e. the entrepreneur as technologist or inventor) (see Zacharakis, McMullen, & 
Shepherd, 2007). In looking at the proposed management team, VCs pay particular 
attention to the experiences and skill-sets the team offers, looking for dynamic 
complementarities. In doing this, venture capital firms consult with referral sources 
(e.g. other VCs) and check references provided by the entrepreneur, possibly 
through face-to-face meetings with them (Zook, 2005). From this, VCs begin 
envisioning how the team meets the functional requirements of a working start-up, 
including R&D, marketing, and finance, and where gaps in expertise will need to 
be filled (e.g. bringing in an experienced CFO to work with the lead 
entrepreneur/CEO) (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). 
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3.1.2. Due Diligence and Deal Closing 
Based on the initial screening of business plans, venture capital firms invite a small 
number of entrepreneurs to personally present their proposals (i.e. the infamous 
pitch meeting). This meeting gives VCs added insight into the management 
capabilities of the team, and the pose, temperament, and communication skills of 
the lead entrepreneur, which answers some questions as to whether the venture 
capital firm can work with the entrepreneur and whether the entrepreneur, as CEO, 
has the personality and gravitas to articulate the company’s strategic vision (Camp, 
2002). Companies that pass the pitch meeting are then subjected to an intense 
process of due diligence, a large part of which is focused on further vetting the 
management team through extensive background checks on professional and even 
personal history and scrutinising the company’s finances and projections. The 
main emphasis here, however, is on firmly establishing the company’s market 
potential and the quality of the proposed technology or product (Hall & Hofer, 
1993; Mason & Stark, 2004).  
As shown in Table 2, this requires intensive scrutiny of, among other things, a 
company’s potential customers and competition, the quality and technical viability 
of the proposed product, and any strategic partnerships that the entrepreneur has 
either identified or already established, all requiring some degree of consultation 
with experts and trusted network contacts (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). 
It is common during this due diligence phase for the venture capital firm to offer a 
preliminary term sheet, to be finalised at closing, giving the venture capital firm 
exclusive negotiating rights with the company. During this phase the venture 
capital firm also looks particularly hard at how much financing the company will 
need to progress from initial investment to exit, thus informing the amount of 
money expected at each investment round, the number of rounds needed, and the 
length of time between rounds (Gladstone & Gladstone, 2004). 
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Table 2: Venture Capital Due Diligence: Criteria and Verification 
Potential customers: Venture capital firms need to determine who the actual customers are for a 
proposed technology or product, considering whether the customer base includes a broad range of 
individual consumers, as for a new mobile phone or related application, or if the customer base is 
narrower, as for a new drug to combat a rare disease or condition. It is very possible that the target 
customers will be other companies or organisations (e.g. a marketing analytic tool); if so, how 
many of these customers are there, and what is the level of their demand or interest?  During this 
process VCs consult a number of industry and corporate contacts, meet with potential customers, 
and pay particular attention to a company’s sales and marketing capabilities, possibly attending 
sales pitches and focus groups. 
 
Potential competition: Venture capital firms need to determine who the potential competition is 
for a company’s proposed product. Questions are asked regarding the strengths and weaknesses of 
the competition and whether a company has or can gain a competitive advantage over them. In 
asking these questions, VCs consult with their industry contacts and partners and other venture 
capital firms. 
 
Product quality: Venture capital firms need to determine the quality of the proposed product: 
how well does the product work, from a technical and functional perspective, and how receptive 
are potential customers to it — does the product meet or exceed customer expectations? In asking 
these questions, VCs may try out the product or allow preferred industry contacts to do so and 
provide feedback; may speak with potential customers; and possibly will initiate focus groups. 
 
Technology: Venture capital firms need to determine the technical viability of the proposed 
product. Questions are asked regarding the quality and function of the technology and the 
complexity and cost involved in developing the technology. In asking these questions, VCs will 
likely consult with university scientists and corporate technologists, and heads of R&D, with some 
venture capital firms having their own scientific advisory boards.  VCs also verify whether the 
technology is patented by the company or needs to be patented, or whether similar patents for 
similar technology are already held by others, which requires additional due diligence and legal 
services rendered by patent attorneys. 
 
Strategic partners: Venture capital firms need to verify the strength and quality of a company’s 
partners and/or determine which strategic partners the company needs (e.g. producers, suppliers, 
R&D partners, primary customers). For venture capital firms the existence and quality of strategic 
partners is important, because they can validate the potential of a company for investment 
selection purposes and they play a crucial role in the development of the portfolio company and in 
the investment exit process. Strategic partners help position a portfolio company within an 
industry network and provide credibility for attracting additional partners and resources. 
Source: Adapted by the author from Metrick and Yasuda (2011) 
The overall funding amount will probably be determined by the expected 
development costs, which will vary depending on the sector and product focus of 
the company (e.g. developing a new drug will take far longer and cost far more 
than developing a new Internet search engine). In addition, the venture capital firm 
will probably decide, based on a company’s market potential, on the exit strategy 
for the investment: a potentially large market requires strategising for an eventual 
IPO, whereas a more modest market might focus planning on an eventual exit by 
acquisition or merger, a strategy that might emphasise partnerships with potential 
acquirers (e.g. a large corporation). The inclusion, if deemed necessary, of external 
management and/or a CFO may also be agreed to at this stage (Metrick & Yasuda, 
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2011). If the venture capital firm is satisfied with the company’s potential and 
comfortable with the due diligence results, they negotiate and sign off on the final 
terms of the deal. These terms will include, among other things, agreements on the 
pre- and post-investment valuation of the company, the size of the investment and 
the investment payment structure, and details concerning the shares held by the 
venture capital firm. Other investors may also be chosen, along with terms for 
employee stock options. Also, terms for governing decision-making protocols, 
financial reporting, actions of the board, and potential liquidation will be agreed 
on, with the emphasis on investor rights and liability protections.  These terms 
almost always favour the venture capital firm as investor; such terms are viewed 
by managers and majority shareholders as necessary for effectively managing 
asymmetric information and potential agency costs (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). 
3.1.3. Investment Selection and the Role of Geographic Proximity 
Because investment selection decisions are based on highly tacit and asymmetric 
information, close geographic proximity plays an important and varied role, as 
both a facilitating and determining mechanism, in the selection process (Mason, 
2007).  First, venture capital firms are more likely to screen and select companies 
that are referrals from other venture capital firms, angel investors, or other trusted 
sources within their local investment network; these are sources that the venture 
capital firm knows well, both professionally (e.g. co-investing  on particular deals) 
and personally through business and social networks (Zook, 2004, 2005). 
Therefore, these direct referrals will generally be local entrepreneurs and their 
companies (Zook, 2005). Even when not based on direct referral, the tendency for 
entrepreneurial activity (including venture capital) to concentrate geographically 
drives a predominantly local deal flow: entrepreneurs approach venture capital 
firms that have solid reputations within the entrepreneur’s local network. Such a 
reputation is built through a venture capital firm’s success and the experiences of 
its investee companies, the latter made known through local business and social 
network interactions between entrepreneurs (Powell et al., 2002; Zook, 2005). 
From a due diligence perspective, evaluating local entrepreneurs and their 
companies allows venture capital firms to meet regularly with them if necessary, 
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observing their personal strengths and weaknesses “in person” (i.e. the 
management test), and to begin developing relationships with them (i.e. building 
trust, expectations, and norms of interaction). If a company is selected, these prior 
associations can facilitate a smooth and amicable negotiation of deal terms, 
fostering a degree of trust between investor and investee that can then carry over 
through the life of the investment relationship and lessen potential problems 
associated with asymmetric information and instances of expropriation (see 
Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Zook, 2004). Close geographic proximity also allows 
venture capital firms to meet regularly, face-to-face, with trusted sources of 
knowledge and expertise for purposes of verifying references and information 
given to them by potential portfolio companies and to better assess product quality 
and market potential (i.e. the market test) (see Harrison, Mason & Cooper, 2004). 
What is sought through these consultations is a mix of intuitive and informed 
opinion —or reactions, really — that are difficult to express by phone or in e-mail 
(Camp, 2002). These sources are typically other venture capital firms but also 
include various industry and corporate contacts, scientific advisors, and potential 
customers (e.g. large corporations), some of whom may be eventual partners or 
enabling infrastructure for a portfolio company (Zook, 2004, 2005). 
3.2. Post-selection Investment Monitoring and Value Adding 
Following the selection of a portfolio company and coming to terms with it, a 
venture capital firm then turns to the challenging process of investing in that 
portfolio company over a period of 5 to 10 years (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). Like 
the investment selection process, the post-selection process requires the venture 
capital firms to manage tremendous uncertainty as well as highly tacit and 
asymmetric information, requiring venture capital firms to engage in continual, 
time intensive monitoring and evaluation of portfolio companies as they progress 
from initial investment through to investment exit (see Figure 18). This monitoring 
has three related functions. First, it allows venture capital firms to periodically 
assess portfolio company performance and to promptly sell or liquidate 
underperforming companies. Second, monitoring is crucial for limiting agency 
costs, that is, situations in which the portfolio firm engages in actions that run 
counter to the interests of the venture capital firm and its investors. Third, regular 
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and substantive monitoring is necessary for determining the different funding and 
capacity needs of a portfolio company at different stages of the investment process 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2004). 
Studies by Zook (e.g. 2004, 2002) suggest that venture capital firms provide three 
types of value beyond finance to their portfolio companies. First, venture capital 
firms provide advice and guidance on how to grow the portfolio company’s 
business and commercial capacities. The majority of this advice concerns business 
strategy and marketing, but may it also involve knowledge inputs regarding 
research and development and production. The specialisation and complexity of 
the inputs provided depend largely on the stage and sector focus of the investment, 
with early stage and R&D intensive companies requiring more specialised inputs. 
Venture capital firms provide this input directly or derive it from external sources 
(e.g. other venture capital firms, industry and corporate contacts). Second, 
“venture capitalists also serve companies by setting specific goals and metrics for 
companies to meet and holding managers accountable for these goals” (Zook, 
2004, p. 636). Such directives are meant to develop the portfolio firm according to 
the expected investment timeframe and lessen potential agency costs. 
Finally, venture capital firms facilitate the development of their portfolio 
companies by introducing them to additional sources of finance and enabling 
infrastructure, helping them establish relationships with key industry players such 
as suppliers and distributors, “as well as a host of service providers such as 
executive recruiters and lawyers” (Zook, 2004, p. 367). Of possibly more 
importance, however, are a venture capital firm’s connections to potential 
customers and strategic partners, some of whom may be large corporations who 
can offer portfolio companies a range of potential partnerships involving R&D, 
production, and marketing (see Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003). 
For effective monitoring that contributes to the development of portfolio 
companies (providing value added), however, venture capital firms apply an 
investment structure characterised by (1) multiple funding stages or rounds, (2) 
active participation on the boards of their portfolio companies, and (3) investment 
syndication with other venture capital firms.  Like the investment screening 
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process, geographic proximity also plays a key facilitating role in this post-
selection monitoring process, including activities geared toward the capacity 
building of portfolio companies (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). 
Figure 18: The Post-selection Investment Monitoring Process 
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3.2.1. Managing Agency Costs through Staged Investments 
Venture capital firms frequently re-evaluate the progress of their portfolio 
companies and make subsequent investment adjustments by splitting the 
investment funds into stages or rounds rather than investing all of the funds up 
front.  Gompers and Lerner (2004, p. 171) argue that “staged capital infusions are 
the most potent control mechanism a venture capitalist can employ.”  These 
periodic capital infusions correspond to what VCs refer to as funding series, for 
example, Series A, Series B, Series C, and so forth (refer to Figure 18). At the end 
of each round, the progress of the portfolio company is assessed, informing 
funding amounts for the next round and decisions regarding business strategy, 
personnel changes, and perhaps whether to end the investment relationship 
(Sahlman, 1990). Those investments that lead to an IPO are typically longer than 
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those that exit by acquisition and thus require more funding rounds. Likewise, 
portfolio companies that are R&D intensive generally involve more funding 
rounds than less R&D intensive companies, with less time between rounds, 
particularly at the early investment stages. The higher the uncertainty, the more 
monitoring and control the venture capital firm attempts to exert over the company 
(Gompers, 1995). 
Gompers and Lerner (2004) argue that the main reason venture capital firms invest 
through stages or rounds is that it allows them to lessen the potential agency costs 
associated with investing in NHTCs. Related to asymmetric information, agency 
costs refer to situations where one party (the principle) cannot ensure that the other 
party (the agent), holding more information than the principle, will always behave 
in the principle’s best interest (Jenson, 1986). In general, the higher the potential 
agency costs, the greater the number of stages employed and the more frequent and 
substantive the monitoring. Gompers and Lerner cite two types of agency costs 
prevalent in NHTCs. The first of these situations is when NHTCs pursue business 
strategies or invest in certain R&D projects that “have high personal returns [for 
the entrepreneur] but low expected monetary payoffs to shareholders” (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2004, p. 174). For example, a scientist-turned-company founder might 
invest more into “personally satisfying” basic research projects, while failing to 
bring such research to the development phase. Another common type of agency 
cost occurs when the NHTC holds potentially detrimental information knowingly, 
but chooses not to share it with investors or make the necessary adjustments the 
information warrants.  For example, company founders might knowingly ignore 
“initial results from market trials indicating little demand for a new product,” 
choosing instead “to keep the company going because they receive significant 
private benefits from managing their own firm” (Gompers & Lerner, 2004, p. 174).  
Studies by Titman and Wessels (1988), Schleifer and Vishny (1992), and Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) suggest that for investments in which companies hold 
primarily intangible assets, agency costs are high. According to these arguments, 
the greater the intangible assets of a company, the more difficult and costly it is for 
investors to liquidate the company if it fails. Given these potential costs, therefore, 
companies whose assets are predominantly intangible require more frequent 
100 
 
 
monitoring from investors. In other words, the more intangible a company’s assets, 
the less leverage investors have in curtailing and shaping that company’s 
behaviour. Schleifer and Vishny (1992) also suggest that companies in sectors with 
high R&D intensity generally have very sector specific assets, also making 
liquidation costly and difficult for investors (i.e. specialised assets have a much 
narrower potential market). From a venture capital investment perspective, 
therefore, investing in early stage R&D intensive companies with predominantly 
intangible and sector specific assets has potentially high agency costs and requires 
frequent and substantive monitoring from investors (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). 
3.2.2. Active Monitoring Through Company Board Participation 
Closely related to the staged investment structure and key to the monitoring 
process, venture capital firms almost always have a seat on the board of directors 
of their portfolio companies (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). Having a position on the 
board of directors allows venture capital firms to directly shape a portfolio 
company’s business and marketing strategy and to enforce performance 
benchmarks from one investment round to the next (Rosenstein et al., 1993). For a 
venture capital-backed portfolio company, the board of directors generally is 
comprised of “inside” representatives from the portfolio company itself, usually 
the lead entrepreneur(s) and/or company CEO and representatives from the lead 
venture capital investor and its syndicate partners. Also on the board are “outside” 
members such as academic scientists, investment bankers, former CEOs, and 
representatives from corporations or corporate VCs who are investing in or 
funding a research project in the company (Fried, Bruton, & Hisrich, 1998). As a 
primary mechanism for reducing agency costs, a venture capital firm tries to 
negotiate as many seats as possible for itself and outside members, stressing the 
need for experience on the board, particularly at the early investment stages 
(Lerner, 1995; Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). 
Studies that look specifically at the board activities of venture capital-backed 
companies are few (e.g. Filatochev & Bishop, 2002; Lerner, 1995; Rosenstein et 
al., 1993), with Busenitz (2007) suggesting that the private, behind-closed-doors 
nature of boards makes them particularly difficult to capture empirically. What is 
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clear is that the makeup of the board changes, not only from stage to stage, but 
particularly from relative periods of stability and growth to “expected” times of 
uncertainty. For example, a study by Lerner (1995) involving venture capital-
backed biotech companies suggests that a lead venture capital firm’s representation 
on a board and that of outsiders will increase when there is a change in a portfolio 
company’s leadership (e.g. the removal of an entrepreneur-turned-CEO), with 
Busenitz (2007) commenting that “the number of outsiders on the board … serve 
as signals of power to correct moral hazard and adverse selection issues in a 
venture should they arise” (p. 221). This study by Lerner also shows that the 
number of board members increases from early investment stages to later stages, 
and that the two most prominent types of outside board members are academic 
scientists and what are described as “corporate partners” (e.g. corporate VCs). 
The inclusion of outside members on the board of directors of portfolio companies, 
members whom the lead venture capital firm plays a lead role in appointing to the 
board, is a clear example of venture capital firms using their connections to 
industry partners and other sources of external knowledge and expertise to not only 
effectively evaluate the progress of their portfolio companies, but also to support 
their subsequent development from early investment stages to expansion stages 
through to investment exit (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2008). As mentioned 
previously, NHTCs require more than just funding to bring their innovations 
successfully to market. Different stages require different amounts of funding 
coupled with different types of knowledge and resource inputs. For example, early 
investment stages, although requiring less overall funding than later stages, need 
specialised knowledge and expertise, possibly scientific and technical, for carrying 
out basic research and product testing, whereas expansion and other later 
investment stages require sizable investment amounts (scaling up the business and 
production) as well as knowledge in areas of development, production, and 
marketing (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011).   
Staging investments and shaping company boards of directors with experienced 
and diverse members, therefore, facilitates the infusion of finance and different 
types of knowledge that are appropriate to the different needs of the portfolio 
company as it grows. As such, the varying knowledge and resource capacities 
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necessary to support a portfolio company’s development are rarely held by a single 
VC or venture capital firm alone (Wright & Lockett, 2003). 
3.2.3. Adding Value through Investment Syndication 
In this context, it is the common practice of venture capital firms to syndicate or 
co-invest with other venture capital firms (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).  A venture 
capital syndication deal includes a lead venture capital firm and generally several 
participating venture capital firms. The lead firm takes responsibility for selecting 
the portfolio company (with input from syndicate partners), negotiating the terms 
of the deal, and carrying out the majority of the investment monitoring, and almost 
always has the largest equity stake (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). In contrast, non-
lead syndicate partners have smaller equity stakes in the portfolio company and 
vary in the degree to which they are actively involved in the monitoring process 
(Wright & Lockett, 2003). As shown in Figure 19, venture capital syndications are 
not static: although the lead venture capital firm generally continues to lead the 
investment through to exit (if successful), syndicate partners may enter into the 
investment at different stages and perhaps leave the syndication after only one or 
several investment rounds (Brander, Amit, & Antweiler, 2002). 
Studies indicate that for early stage investment, experienced venture capital firms 
tend to syndicate with other experienced venture capital firms, generally opening 
the syndicate to venture capital firms that are less experienced at the expansion 
stage and later stages (Lerner, 1994). Also, the total number of syndicate partners 
tends to increase through subsequent stages and rounds. These trends may indicate 
a preference for experienced syndicate partners to help manage the high 
uncertainty and asymmetric information associated with early stage investing, and 
the need for specialised knowledge (e.g. science and technology) (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2004).  A greater number of syndicate partners, some of those being less 
experienced, is probably advantageous at the expansion and later stages when 
uncertainty is less pronounced, assets become more tangible, and the emphasis is 
on scaling up commercial capacities, in part through larger capital infusions 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2004). 
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Studies have suggested and examined a number of interrelated motivations as to 
why venture capital firms enter into syndication with other venture capital firms 
(e.g. Lockett & Wright, 2001). These range from spreading risk and increasing 
deal flow to improving the investment selection process and the value adding 
activities associated with the monitoring and developing of portfolio companies 
(Manigart et al., 2006). 
Figure 19: Venture Capital Syndication with Investment Stages and Rounds 
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First, venture capital firms engage in syndication deals for purely financial 
reasons. In this way, syndication allows venture capital firms to invest in 
companies for which they are not a lead investor, thus increasing the number of 
companies they invest in and diversifying their investment portfolio, which 
decreases their portfolio’s overall risk exposure (Cumming, 2006).  Also, opening 
up an investment to syndicate partners allows a lead venture capital firm to spread 
the risk associated with a particular portfolio company and “provides more capital 
availability for current and follow-on cash needs” (Gompers & Lerner, 2004, p. 
257), particularly important during the expansion and later stages when scaling up 
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the business requires large sums of capital. It is thought that these finance motives 
for syndication are particularly important for smaller venture capital firms which, 
on their own, may lack the capital to expand their investments beyond their limited 
portfolio. Likewise, Manigart et al. (2006) suggests that diversification through 
syndication may also hold importance for venture capital firms focused on early 
stage investments. Syndication is used to invest beyond the small number of highly 
uncertain yet promising portfolio companies for which they are the lead, and for 
spreading the considerable risk that their uncertain early stage investments carry 
among multiple investors. 
Second, venture capital firms engage in syndication deals to improve the quantity 
and quality of their deal flow (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Through syndication 
venture capital firms can raise their visibility and reputation within a venture 
capital network, resulting in a greater number of high quality referrals (deal flow) 
from trusted syndicate partners. Also, by engaging in syndication, a venture capital 
firm is more likely to be invited to participate in additional syndicate deals. Not 
only does this repeat syndication enhance deal flow through reputation effects, but 
it allows the venture capital firm to participate in an increasing number of deals as 
a non-lead investor (Lerner, 1994).  In this context, Bovaird (1990) suggests that 
venture capital firms enter into syndicate deals with the expectation that syndicate 
partners will be reciprocal. For example, early stage focused venture capital firms 
may invite (as lead investors) partners to syndicate on an early stage investment, 
with the expectation that they will then be invited by these syndicate partners to 
syndicate as non-lead investors on later stage investments. In this way, syndication 
allows the expansion of a venture capital firm’s portfolio without assuming the 
risks and resource costs associated with being a lead investor (Bovaird, 1990). 
Third, venture capital firms engage in syndication with other venture capital firms 
to improve the investment selection process (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).  As 
discussed earlier, when screening companies, venture capital firms often share 
company information with trusted members of their investment and related 
industry networks — other venture capital firms being the most prominent — to 
overcome asymmetric information and accurately verify a company’s potential, 
thus reducing uncertainty (Lerner, 1994; Wright & Lockett, 2003). In doing so, 
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venture capital firms may approach one another to assess a willingness to co-invest 
(syndicate) in a particular company; a willingness to do so probably has 
considerable weight in any decision to select that company for investment (Wright 
& Lockett, 2003). Selection information sharing and syndication are reinforcing 
activities: repeat syndication between venture capital firms builds trust between 
firms (i.e. trust in one another’s capabilities, insights, and opinions), which leads to 
regular information sharing for investment selection purposes (Bygrave 1987, 
1988). This includes information regarding referrals from syndicate partners of 
promising new companies for potential investment. 
Finally, venture capital firms syndicate with other venture capital firms to gain 
access to the specialised expertise and knowledge necessary for reducing 
investment uncertainty and providing nonfinancial value added toward the 
development of portfolio companies (Bruining & Wright, 2002). As discussed 
previously, value adding inputs can range from specialised expertise in science and 
technology, industry and market knowledge, and business development to related 
access to commercial infrastructure. Different syndicate partners bring different 
types or degrees of expertise and resources (value added) to an investment. A 
study by Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) suggests that access to external 
value adding inputs is a primary driver of syndication for early stage focused 
venture capital firms; this supports a number of studies proposing that value 
adding is most important at the very early stages of a portfolio company’s 
development, because this is when technical and market uncertainty are at their 
highest (e.g. Bygrave & Timmons, 1992; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza, 
1992).  Manigart et al. (2006) also suggests that smaller, less experienced venture 
capital firms syndicate with more experienced lead partners in uncertain yet 
promising companies to partake in and gain access to value adding inputs that 
alone they could not provide.  
A syndication study by Manigart and colleagues (2006) groups motivations for 
syndication into (1) motivations for improving overall portfolio performance and 
(2) motivations for improving the performance of individual portfolio companies. 
In the first category are the finance motive and the deal flow motive; in the second 
category are the selection motive and the value-adding motive. Counter to 
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assumptions, Manigart’s work demonstrated that venture capital firms, particularly 
in Europe, pursue syndication to enhance overall portfolio performance; improving 
the performance of individual portfolio companies was a far second. Manigart 
suggests that venture capital firms engage in syndication with other venture capital 
firms to realise certain performance benefits, most notably investment 
diversification and enhanced deal flow, benefits that may or may not be felt by 
individual portfolio companies. 
Such findings might be indicative, at least in Europe, of a venture capital that does 
not provide substantial value added to portfolio companies (see Baines, 2009). On 
the other hand, such findings might suggest that venture capital firms derive value 
adding inputs either through their own capacities (e.g. the expertise and experience 
of individual VCs) or from other sources such as their connections to industry 
contacts and partners. 
3.2.4. Monitoring and Value Adding: Geographic Proximity 
Similar to the investment selection process, geographic proximity is a key 
facilitating mechanism in both the monitoring of portfolio companies and in 
supporting their growth from the early investment stages through to expansion and 
later funding rounds (Mason, 2007). For venture capital firms, active monitoring is 
absolutely essential to managing asymmetric information and lessening agency 
costs, particularly at the early investment stages (Mason, 2007). However, active 
monitoring, similar to investment selection activities, is very time-consuming. 
Being in close geographic proximity to the portfolio companies they invest in 
reduces the costs of monitoring by allowing venture capital firms to meet face-to-
face with them regularly; this regular contact contributes heavily to the on-going 
evaluation of portfolio companies, and in determining potential adjustments in 
strategy and personnel and funding amounts from one investment round to the next 
(Zook, 2004).  Furthermore, the uncertainty associated with NHTCs means that 
things can and often do change quickly. As such, close geographic proximity 
allows venture capital firms to move quickly, to personally intervene when a 
portfolio company is thought to have gone off course, and to assert a sense of 
company accountability and focus that could not be done from afar (Zook, 2004). 
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Regarding membership on a portfolio company’s board of directors, Gompers and 
Lerner (2004) argue that board members are likely to reside (have offices) within 
close geographic proximity to the portfolio companies on whose boards they sit 
on.  Lerner’s (1995) study on venture-capital backed biotech companies found that 
“more than half the firms have a venture director [venture capitalist on the board] 
with an office within sixty miles of their headquarters” and 25% “have a venture 
director within seven miles” (Gompers & Lerner, 2004, p. 250); this in an 
indication that the opportunity for regular, intimate access to a portfolio company 
is important for board members, particularly during times of change or crisis. Zook 
(2004, p. 2002) goes further, suggesting that in pushing for board members with 
appropriate experience and diverse knowledge, venture capital firms recruit 
members from their own local networks of investment and industry contacts, 
including other VCs, corporate CEOs, and academic scientists from geographically 
proximate companies (e.g. large corporations) and universities. These are actors 
who are not only familiar with the lead venture capital investor, but are also 
previously or currently engaged with, if not the portfolio firm itself, the local 
industry network or cluster in which the portfolio firm resides. 
The leaning on local actors and capacities for monitoring and value adding 
purposes is particularly apparent in venture capital syndication practices.  Studies 
by Bygrave (1987) and Sorenson and Stuart (2001, 2008) demonstrate that venture 
capital firms generally syndicate with geographically proximate venture capital 
firms, that is, venture capital firms for whom they share the same local network. In 
other words, venture capital firms co-invest with venture capital firms whose 
capabilities and personalities they know and trust. As such, repeat syndication 
between venture capital firms is common and is thought to produce locally 
concentrated venture capital syndication networks that reinforce the local emphasis 
of venture capital investment, including local deal flow and the selection of local 
portfolio companies (Sorenson and Stuart, 2008). These local syndicate partners 
are also likely to sit on the boards of companies they are investing in through 
syndication, or sit on boards as a reciprocal favour to previous syndicate partners 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2004). 
108 
 
 
3.3. Investment Exit 
Following what  will generally be 5 to 7 years of capital investment and active 
monitoring (in some sectors such as life science, up to 10 years from selection to 
exit is not unusual), venture capital firms position a portfolio company for 
investment exit. Successful exits are necessary for VCs to fully profit from their 
investments (Gompers & Lerner, 2004).  Furthermore, successful exits reinforce 
and can increase a venture capital firm’s visibility and reputation within an 
investment and industry network, improving the venture capital firm’s ability to 
raise additional funds and attract high quality deal flow and appropriate syndicate 
and strategic partners (Schwienbacker, 2010). In other words, although the exit 
phase represents the culmination of the venture capital cycle, it directly affects and 
facilitates the venture capital cycle’s early phases. That being said, not all venture 
capital investment exits are successful or optimal. According to Cumming and 
MacIntosh (2003) five primary exit methods are employed by venture capital 
firms: (1) exit by initial public offering (IPO), (2) exit by acquisition, (3) exit by 
secondary sale, (4) exit by entrepreneurial buy-back, and (5) exit by write-off (see 
Table 3).  
For venture capital firms, exit by IPO and exit by acquisition are the most optimal 
forms of exit in terms of potential profits and return on investment, with exits by 
IPO traditionally the most profitable and preferred. The other forms of investment 
exit are typically associated with smaller investment returns and/or losses. 
Furthermore, exits by IPO are also the preferred exit by most portfolio 
companies/entrepreneurs. Not only do IPOs offer potentially huge profit gain, but 
they, unlike exits by acquisition, allow the entrepreneur to maintain company 
control and ownership rights (Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003).  
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Table 3: Venture Capital Exit Options 
Exit by Initial Public Offering (IPO): The first time the portfolio company sells shares 
to the public via a public stock exchange. The venture capital firm will sell their shares 
in the portfolio company as well, but generally not for a period of several months to a 
year following the IPO. Doing so signals confidence in the quality of the portfolio firm.  
 
Exit by Acquisition: The VC firm sells the entire portfolio company, generally to a 
large established company within the same sector or industry. Acquisitions can often 
take the form of a merger between the two companies and are often based on prior 
alliances and contractual agreements between the two companies (e.g. production or 
licensing agreements). 
 
Exit by Secondary Sale: A venture capital firm will sell its shares (ownership) in a 
portfolio company to a third party, either a large established company or another venture 
capital firm -- the portfolio company and other investors hold onto their shares. 
Secondary sales to another company are often followed by an outright acquisition by 
that company. 
 
Exit by Entrepreneurial Buy-back: The venture capital firm will sell all of its shares 
in a portfolio company back to the portfolio company or respective entrepreneurs, 
ending the contractual investment relationship. 
 
Exit by write-off: The venture capital firm ends its investment involvement in an 
underperforming or failed portfolio company, with no real profitable return for the 
venture capital firm. Following a write-off, the former portfolio company generally falls 
into bankruptcy or dissolves. 
Source: Adapted by the Author from Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) 
3.3.1. Venture capital exit decision making 
Because venture capital firms will play a lead role in the decision to exit, much of 
the literature on venture capital exits looks at the timing of investment exits, 
particularly regarding IPOs, and the reasons why venture capital firms exit 
investments when they do (e.g. Cochrane, 2005; Darby & Zucker, 2002; Lerner, 
1994; Neus & Walz, 2005).  Such questions are important because while the IPO 
has traditionally been the preferred form of exit by venture capital firms and 
entrepreneurs, timing a successful IPO can be challenging, even during relatively 
stable market conditions. Furthermore, although a bull market can offer VCs 
abundant opportunities for highly profitable IPOs (e.g. the tech boom of the 
1990s), economic downturns can severely diminish IPO markets (e.g. the recession 
of 2008–2009), making successful IPO exits nearly impossible. A study by Lerner 
(1994) demonstrated that experienced venture capital firms were able to 
successfully time IPO exits to coincide with favourable market conditions, and do 
so more effectively than less experienced venture capital firms. Gompers and 
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Lerner (2004) also suggests that more seasoned venture capital firms may have 
better connections to investment banks, allowing them to move more quickly 
during recognised peak markets. 
For younger, less experienced venture capital firms, the decision to exit by IPO 
may be based less on market timing and more on building their reputations as 
capable venture capital firms – bringing a portfolio company to exit by IPO 
increases their network visibility (i.e. grandstanding) which helps them raise 
additional funds from institutional investors (Gompers and Lerner, 2004; Neus & 
Walz, 2005). Gompers & Lerner (2004) argue that young venture capital firms are 
under tremendous pressure to begin attracting institutional investors for future 
funds, and doing so much earlier than more established venture capital firms. For 
young venture capital firms, the only way to really do this is by demonstrating 
their proficiency in executing IPOs, with the amount a young VC raises for a new 
fund directly related to the number of IPOs it finances (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). 
As a result, young venture capital firms bring portfolio companies to an IPO exit 
earlier than more experienced venture capital firms (Neus & Walz, 2005). This 
grandstanding has costs, however, in that portfolio companies are generally 
brought to an IPO at lower valuations, costing the venture capital firm and 
institutional investors larger potential returns. This also has consequences for 
portfolio companies, as many of them are not yet ready to prosper as publically 
held companies (i.e. they are rushed to an IPO too early), jeopardising their post-
IPO success (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). 
While the literature on venture capital exit behaviour tends to focus on exits by 
IPO, an increasingly more common form of exit, particularly in venture capital 
markets outside the US are exits by acquisition or merger (Schwienbacher, 2008). 
Although generally not as lucrative as an IPO, selling a portfolio company to the 
likes of Microsoft can be significantly profitable, particularly if the potential for 
acquisition is developed very early in the investment process by adjusting the deal 
structure to better meet the expectations of an acquisition or merger exit (Gompers 
& Lerner, 2001; Schwienbacher, 2008). Schwienbacher (2008) suggests that the 
decision to forego the IPO exit in favour of an exit by acquisition or merger rests 
largely on how innovative or market disruptive a portfolio company’s product is 
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determined to be. According to this view, the less innovative a product, the lower 
its potential IPO valuation, and the more likely a VC will position the portfolio 
company for an exit by acquisition. Schwienbacher argues that this determination 
can create agency costs in that entrepreneurs, preferring an exit by IPO, may 
attempt to oversell the innovativeness of their products to investors, or engage in 
more risky and expensive R&D projects in an attempt to make their products more 
innovative (Schwienbacher, 2008). 
Finally, looking at venture capital investment exits more broadly, studies by 
Cumming (2008) and Cumming and MacIntosh (2001, 2003) propose that a 
venture capital firm’s decision to exit an investment, is based on the current and 
projected costs associated with monitoring and providing value added to that 
particular portfolio company, what they describe as maintenance costs. According 
to this view, when the costs of maintenance in a portfolio company exceed or are 
projected to exceed the benefits of those maintenance efforts, the venture capital 
firm will move to exit the investment (Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003). In this 
context, the decision to exit an investment is tightly connected to the ongoing 
monitoring and evaluation of portfolio companies. 
3.3.2. Investment Exit: The Role of Geographic Proximity   
Unlike the investment selection and monitoring phases, the role, if any, that 
geographic proximity plays during the investment exit phase is far less clear and, 
perhaps for that reason, is unsubstantiated in the literature. As alluded to above, it 
might be expected that VC firms will meet frequently with portfolio companies in 
the lead up to and preparation for an investment exit. This preparation may also 
involve consultation with other local VC firms and industry contacts. What is 
certain, however, is that in a lead up to an investment exit, VC firms will need to 
consult and work with a number of financial and legal actors, particularly 
investment banks, corporate law offices, and perhaps patent attorneys. Given the 
geographic concentration of finance, including, in most instances, the co-location 
of venture capital and investment banking (e.g. London), these substantive 
interactions are bound to be local (Mason, 2007). 
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3.4. Sector Specificity and Propensities for Collaboration 
So far, this chapter has explored and discussed the venture capital investment 
cycle, from investment selection and post-selection monitoring through to 
investment exit.  More specifically, this discussion has emphasised the importance 
of both external knowledge and geographic proximity — particularly during the 
selection and post-selection monitoring phases — for managing potential agency 
costs and for adding value toward the development of portfolio companies. In 
doing so, venture capital firms leverage the knowledge and resource capacities of 
their local investment networks. These networks are comprised of other venture 
capital firms; the local entrepreneurial community; universities; investment banks; 
and most prominently, large corporations with their extensive, often global 
networks of suppliers, distributors, and customers. Besides being a main source of 
technical and market knowledge, and a primary source of enabling infrastructure, 
large corporations are also integral to the investment exit strategies of most venture 
capital firms and the companies they back (i.e. exit by corporate acquisition or 
merger).  
In this way, relationships between venture capital firms and large corporations 
within local investment networks can be viewed as central to the venture capital 
investment process and probably play some determining role in each phase of the 
cycle. That being said, such relationships are likely to be complex and varied, with 
the specific structures, motivations, and conditions under which these relationships 
are established and maintained not yet sufficiently demonstrated empirically. 
For understanding such relationships, it is important to consider that most early 
stage focused venture capital firms are sector specific in their investments (Metrick 
& Yasuda, 2011). This sector specificity allows them to apply specialised industry 
insight, experience, and connections to effectively meet the capital and resource 
requirements and overcome the varying barriers to market that different sectors 
and industries place on NHTCs (Gupta & Sapienza, 1992). It follows, therefore, 
that these sector differences correspond to different propensities for collaboration 
between venture capital firms and large corporations, a main line of reasoning 
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being that more specialised input requirements and higher barriers to market 
correlate with greater propensities for collaboration.  
This dissertation considers the collaborative tendencies exhibited by venture 
capital investment in three prominent high-tech sectors, two of which have 
received the majority of technology oriented venture capital investment in the 
United Kingdom over the past two decades.  These are the sectors of (1) 
information and communication technology (ICT), and (2) life science (including 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology), along with a third sector (3) clean technology 
(i.e. clean-tech), which has received increasing amounts of venture capital over the 
last half decade (BVCA, 2011). What follows is an overview of each of these 
sectors from an investment perspective, emphasising (a) the expected capital costs 
and time to market, (b) the expected barriers to market, and (c) the expected life 
cycle of a particular technology or product. This overview is coupled with a brief 
discussion on relevant sector trends, particularly as they pertain to the United 
Kingdom, including respective corporate venturing activities.21 
3.4.1. The ICT Sector 
ICT is broadly defined as technologies and products that facilitate through the 
increasing integration of communication platforms and devices the access, storage, 
transmission, and manipulation of information (Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2010). 
As a sector, ICT is all encompassing: typically included are all forms of broadcast 
media (visual and audio), telecommunications (landline and wireless), computer 
technology (hardware, software, and semiconductors), and Internet related 
technology and applications (Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2010). The integration of 
these various forms of ICT constitutes its more recent definition, with the Internet 
quickly becoming the dominant transformative platform for ICT integration and 
the main conduit for the transmission of information and commerce. 
                                                          
21
 Modern high tech industries in the United Kingdom developed through a confluence of 
innovations in key technology areas (Owen, 1999). An early leader in aerospace and computer 
technology, the United Kingdom became a significant producer of semiconductors and 
telecommunications technology (1970s through the 1980s), later transitioning to become a 
prominent producer of mobile communications, software, and Internet related technology and 
applications (1990s to the present). Likewise, a historical strength in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries positioned the United Kingdom as a global leader in the burgeoning 
sectors of life science and biotechnology (1980s to the present) (Owen, 1999). 
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Unsurprisingly, “every year in the period 1995–2007, between 50 percent and 70 
percent of venture capital went into the funding of companies in the IT-production 
and information industries” (Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2010). 
An incredibly diverse sector, venture capital investments in ICT go to companies 
engaged in material-intensive semiconductors and hardware and to less tangible 
and more knowledge-based software and related applications. The majority of 
global venture capital investment in ICT (in terms of the numbers of companies 
invested) flows to companies engaged in the latter (Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 
2010). 
The consistently high levels of venture capital investment in new ICT companies is 
due, in part, to it being a general purpose technology in that ICT might be used in 
many different ways, with one technology or product having multiple market 
opportunities, some of them unanticipated (David & Wright, 2003). This general 
purpose nature also implies that ICTs are particularly effective when used in 
combination with other ICTs and products. As Brynjolfsson and Saunders (2010) 
explain: 
If you combine Google Maps, GPS technology, cell phone technology, and 
a restaurant review, you get the ability to find the closest Thai restaurant … 
none of these inputs is necessarily new, but combining them can result in a 
significant improvement over using them separately. (p. 95) 
Although this general-purpose designation provides investors and entrepreneurs 
with seemingly limitless opportunities, it also carries risks in that ICT and related 
products can be easily replicated and improved on by others when compared to 
other technology sectors such as life science. Furthermore, ICT is largely driven by 
tacit knowledge and the economising of intangible assets. Such intangibles can 
make ICT difficult to patent and to build a viable business model around, as well 
as present difficulties to investors in determining its value, both as a product and a 
business (Dos Santos, Patel, & D’Souza, 2011). Table 4 explains the common 
input and market requirements facing NHTCs and investors in commercialising a 
new ICT technology or product. 
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From an investor and management perspective, such factors can make building a 
successful business model around ICT difficult. Therefore, realizing returns 
through an acquisition or merger with a larger or better positioned competitor 
either during the development stage or soon after product launch may offer a more 
effective investment exit strategy. 
In the United Kingdom much of the ICT focused venture capital investment flows 
into NHTCs that cluster in around Oxford and Cambridge and more recently 
within London (e.g. London’s Silicon Roundabout) (BVCA, 2010).22 This 
geographic concentration of both NHTCs and venture capital investment is 
probably driven by ICT’s highly tacit information flows, requiring regular face-to-
face interaction, and the advantages that regions such as London hold for 
entrepreneurs and investors in this sector and in others. Specifically the 
concentration of other entrepreneurs and large pools of highly trained and creative 
workers, the active presence of venture capital, and the countless formal and 
informal social networking opportunities that connect entrepreneurs to each other, 
to investors, and to a variety of untraded interdependencies (Simmie, Sennett, & 
Wood, 2002).   
Second, some of the largest ICT companies have more recently established 
corporate venture capital and corporate venturing programmes, with several 
prominent companies setting up corporate venturing offices in London. For 
example, Intel Capital (the corporate venture capital arm of Intel Corporation) has 
invested nearly $10 billion in start-ups since 1991 and has its European offices in 
                                                          
22
 These clusters have developed over several decades, building on technology clustering activities 
that first emerged in and around Cambridge in the 1970s and 1980s (referred to as Silicon Fen), the 
origins of which coincide with the founding of the Cambridge Science Park (CSP) established in 
1970 (Hall, Breheny, McQuaid, & Hart, 1987). CSP was formed to develop university–industry 
partnerships to commercialise science and technology spin-offs coming out of the Cambridge 
science base (Keeble, Lawson, Moore, & Wilkinson, 1999). Over the past four decades CSP has 
anchored one of the most innovative centres in Europe, focusing on computer related technology in 
the 1970s and emerging in the 1980s and 1990s as a centre of excellence in biotechnology, 
advanced materials, and nanotechnology. In the 1980s the Cambridge area and its clustering of 
small high tech firms, popularly referred to as the Cambridge Phenomenon (Garnsey & Cannon-
Brookes, 1993), became increasingly viewed as a continuation to the East of a long clustering of 
high tech electronics firms “running from Hertfordshire to the north-west of London, through 
Berkshire and into Hampshire and Surrey” from the West, which Peter Hall and colleagues (1987, 
p. 5) called the “Western Crescent” (Hall, Breheny, McQuaid, & Hart, 1987). This was followed by 
a resurgence in the 1990s and more recently of high tech firms in and around Oxford (e.g. Oxford 
Science Park), particularly Internet and biotech companies (Lawton Smith, 2004). 
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London (Intel Capital, 2011). Another prominent corporate venture capital player 
is Qualcomm, whose Qualcomm Ventures has invested nearly $850 million in 
telecom and Internet start-ups since 2000, and whose European office is located in 
London (Qualcomm Ventures, 2011). Likewise, Motorola has engaged in 
corporate venture capital since 1999 through Motorola Ventures, whose European 
office is headquartered in Basingstoke outside London (Motorola Ventures, 2011). 
Although it has no official corporate venture capital programme, Microsoft has 
long engaged in corporate venturing as a means to scout and acquire promising 
new firms. More recently, Microsoft UK has based its Emerging Business division 
office in London, where it coordinates a programme called BizSpark, which 
identifies and supports U.K. based software start-ups (Global Corporate Venturing 
Report, 2010; Microsoft BizSpark, 2011). 
Table 4: ICT: Input Requirements and Market Factors 
Capital costs and time to market: Bringing an ICT product from concept to market takes 
between £20 and £60 million, with an investment timeframe of between 5 and 8 years. Although 
developing ICT technology and products involves considerable knowledge and technical know-
how, it generally does not require narrow specialised expertise, nor does it require significant 
facilities on the scale of research laboratories, which require considerable capital cost to build 
and maintain. Rather, it normally employs a small number of technicians or code writers using a 
typical office with adequate server capacity and computer technology. ICT’s general-purpose 
nature often allows developers to more cost-effectively recombine already proven technologies 
and products and make incremental improvements to existing technology involving relatively 
short development timeframes. 
 
Barriers to market: Barriers to introducing a new ICT product are relatively low. Again, the 
general-purpose nature of much ICT provides a single ICT with multiple potential markets. 
Some of these markets may well be unanticipated during the development phase, allowing for a 
degree of development flexibility unmatched in other high-tech sectors. This general purpose 
status also grants ICT developers comparably more opportunities for partnerships and mergers, 
many outside the defined boundaries of the ICT sector. Additionally, market entry is not 
conditioned on narrow supplier and distribution chains but is generally available through the 
highly open and accessible Internet. Also, because much of what drives ICT is grounded in 
intangibles, patent constraints are relatively weak, providing opportunities for new market 
entrants. 
 
Product life cycle: The general-purpose nature and high intangibles driving ICT, coupled with 
relatively weak patent constraints, can make the product life cycle of most ICT technologies and 
products relatively short. It follows that ICT products, compared to technologies and products in 
other high tech sectors, can be more easily replicated (copied) and improved on by competitors, 
resulting in shorter product life cycles.  
Source: Brynjolfsson & Saunders, (2010) & Dos Santos, Patel, & D’Souza (2011). 
By locating their corporate venturing divisions in the LMR, these large 
corporations, many of them MNEs, are probably scanning for new ideas emerging 
from these London based clusters, and participating through investments, 
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acquisitions, and partnerships in the profit opportunities these clusters generate. In 
pursuing these opportunities, these large corporations are almost sure to interact 
and build relationships with the local venture capital community (see Dushnitsky, 
2006). 
3.4.2. The Life Science Sector 
In some respects, the life science sector  is not nearly as diffuse as the ICT sector, 
but it still encompasses a highly diverse set of closely connected industries, most 
notably the pharmaceutical and biotech industries. The life science sector, although 
difficult to define “reflects a wide range of activity including the discovery, 
research, development and manufacture of therapeutics; diagnostics; medical 
devices and platform technologies as well as the specialist suppliers of products 
and services necessary for these organisations to function” (Scottish Government, 
2009, p.4). The pharmaceutical industry, a leading life science player, is primarily 
concerned with the development and sale of life-science derived medicinal drugs 
for the treatment, prevention, and cure of infection, disease, and other degenerative 
conditions, as well as a plethora of psycho-physiological disorders (Baines, 2008, 
2004). Closely connected to the pharmaceutical industry, the biotechnology 
industry “takes novel life science discoveries or technologies and turns them into 
products” (Baines, 2008, p. 5) is synonymous with advances in genetic 
engineering, and has applications that range “from pharmaceuticals and 
diagnostics, through speciality chemicals, food and agriculture, to the 
environment” (Lawton Smith, 2004, p. 2). 
The life-science sector is differentiated from most other sectors in that it is (a) 
heavily science-based, making it very much dependent on basic research; and (b) 
its products are sold primarily for human medicinal/therapeutic and diagnostic 
purposes (Robbins Ruth, 2001). Therefore, products must meet safety and 
regulatory requirements often well beyond that of other sectors, and product 
development almost always involves substantial and costly human testing (Baines, 
2008; Friedman, 2004). As a result, (c) the life science sector relies heavily on 
both collaborative university–industry links and inter-firm relationships between 
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large pharmaceutical companies and smaller biotech firms (see Owen, 1999, and 
Chapter 2). 23 
As previously noted, U.K. companies engaged in life science and biotech 
consistently receive a sizable amount of the technology oriented venture capital in 
the United Kingdom, second only to investment in ICT, and are the recipients of 
much of the early-stage venture capital invested by U.K. based venture capital 
firms. As shown in Table 5, for investing in life science focused NHTCs venture 
capital firms must consider specific input requirements and market factors. 
In sum, the high degree of specialised scientific expertise and resource capacities 
necessary for the development of life science and biotech products and the 
correspondingly narrow path to market, determined by an increasingly small 
number of large pharmaceutical elites, define much of the industry’s capital and 
market requirements. In this context, two trends in the life science sector are 
pertinent. 
First, the mid- to late 1990s saw considerable consolidation and merger activity 
occurring among global pharmaceutical companies, including those based in the 
United Kingdom. For example, in 1995 U.K. based Glaxo and Wellcome merged 
to form GlaxoWellcome, then merged again with U.K. based SmithKline Beecham 
in 2000 to form GlaxoSmithKline (GSK, 2011). In 1999, U.K.-based Zeneca and 
Swiss-based Astra merged to form AstraZeneca (Owen, 1999). One potential 
consequence of this merger activity is that it may limit the number of partnering 
opportunities for smaller biotech firms looking for collaborative synergies with  
large pharmaceutical companies and at the same time decrease competition 
(among pharmaceutical companies) for technologies and products coming out of 
                                                          
23
 Although the biotech revolution first emerged in the United States, a U.K. biotech industry also 
arose in the early 1980s, with clusters of Cambridge based biotech firms soon positioning 
Cambridge as the leading centre of biotechnology in Europe — part of what came to be known as 
the “Cambridge phenomenon” — with the likes of Cambridge Life Sciences, established in 1981, 
leading the way and becoming a leader in autoimmune and clinical chemistry diagnostics 
(Cambridge Life Sciences, 2011; Owen, 1999). U.K. venture capital, including public venture 
capital, played an important role. Prominent among these early venture backed U.K. biotech firms 
was Celltech. Headquartered in Slough, Celltech was founded in 1980 with considerable venture 
capital backing from Biotech Investment Limited and the National Enterprise Board. Through a 
number of key acquisitions, Celltech, became a leading producer of therapeutic drugs to treat 
leukaemia, ADHD, and narcolepsy, among others (Bloomberg, 2011). Following this success 
Celltech was acquired by Belgian pharmaceutical company UCB in 2004 (Timmons, 2004). 
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the smaller biotech firms. In other words, the pathways to market for biotech firms 
may become increasingly limited and more closely controlled.24 
Table 5: Life Science: Input Requirements and Market Factors 
Capital costs and time to market: Capital costs for investing in and developing life science and 
biotech products are high, generally costing a total $350 million to develop and bring to market. 
Developing a new life science or biotech product takes laboratories with advanced instrumentation 
as well as PhD scientists trained in highly specialised fields such genetic engineering, advanced 
materials, and nanotechnology. Building and maintaining such facilities and employing such talent 
involve considerable capital costs. Likewise, development timeframes are long, ranging between 10 
and 12 years for bringing an initial product concept to commercial market. Such development 
timeframes can be attributed to the overall complexity associated with the integration of science and 
technology for medical oriented products and, most significant, the related lag-time necessary to 
conduct the long and costly clinical trials. Additionally, the development and commercialisation 
process involves a lengthy and costly patent application process and later litigation period, 
employing a specialised and expensive patent team. 
 
Barriers to market: Also known as introducing a new life science or biotech product, the barriers 
to market are comparably high. Life science and biotech products are developed because of a 
potentially large market (e.g. for anticancer drugs), but these markets require highly targeted and 
specialised products. Furthermore, for smaller companies bringing a new life science or biotech 
product to market requires some form of partnering with a large pharmaceutical company, whose 
backing and role as a large-scale drug manufacturer, marketing engine, and primary node in the Big 
Pharma supply and distribution chains are essential for successfully entering a market. Also, high 
patent constraints and inevitable litigation (everything is patented and everything is contested) add 
additional and often costly barriers to market. 
 
Product life cycle: If developed and successfully introduced, a new life science or biotech product 
can have a comparably long product life cycle of a decade or more. The high capital and resource 
costs and barriers to market also make life science and biotech products difficult to replicate, 
improve on, and be sold by others. In many ways, the long development timeframes for most life 
science and biotech products reinforce long product life cycles, because it can take up to a decade 
for another company, which also must perform lengthy clinical trials, to develop a similar and 
improved product. 
Source: Baines (2008) & Friedman (2004) 
Second, although the corporate venture capital activities of Johnson and Johnson 
(The Johnson and Johnson Development Corporation) and DuPont (DuPont 
Ventures) have been active in some form since the 1970s, more recent corporate 
                                                          
24
 Greater consolidation in the pharmaceutical industry has coincided with the continued expansion 
of more specialised pharmaceutical R&D activities. What could be called more broadly corporate 
venturing activities, many of these facilities are located in a small number of globally diffuse 
university research hubs. For example, GSK has R&D facilities in Boston, MA; Research Triangle 
Park, NC; Les Ulis, France; Tres Cantos, Spain; and Shanghai, China — all life science hubs 
(GSK, 2011). GSK’s traditional R&D base continues to be the South-East United Kingdom, 
between London and Cambridge in Ware, Harlow, and Stevenage, respectively (GSK, 2011). In 
Stevenage GSK recently opened its Bioscience Catalyst research campus, which has been set up as 
an “independent” research science campus for early stage biotech firms (GSK, 2011). Another 
example is Pfizer, which has several specialised R&D centres located in La Jolla and San 
Francisco, CA; Cambridge MA; and Pfizer’s Neusentis, a recently established R&D facility in 
Cambridge, U.K., which seeks to discover and develop new antipain and regeneration medicine 
(Pfizer, 2011).  
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venture capital programmes and divisions have been formed and continue to 
operate at other leading pharmaceutical companies (Dushnitsky, 2006), several of 
these having lead offices in the London metropolitan region. For example, GSK 
operates the corporate venture capital fund SR One, which has invested nearly 
$600 million in biotech related companies since 1985, with heads of their 
European investment fund working out of offices in London (SR One, 2011). 
Others include Novartis Venture Funds (formed in 1997 with offices in Basel and 
Cambridge, UK), Pfizer Venture Investments (formed in 2004), and AstraZeneca’s 
MedImmune Ventures (formed in 2002 with U.K. headquarters in Cambridge, 
UK), among others (Novartis, 2011; Pfizer, 2011; MedImmune, 2011). 
As in other high-tech sectors, increasing corporate venture capital activities by 
leading life-science companies is generally aimed at overcoming internal R&D 
constraints, particularly growing capital costs and organisational inertia, by 
identifying and then investing in external ideas and technologies that are generally 
seen as complementary to their existing product lines, often leading to a the 
acquisition of or merger with a respective NHTC (see Chapter 1). Such activity 
might be seen as resulting in a strengthening of the already robust inter-firm 
relationships that exist in the life science sector, but they could also be viewed as 
possibly diminishing propensities for partnerships through increasing emphasis on 
acquisition and merger.  
3.4.3. The Clean-tech Sector 
According to Pernick and Wilder (2008, p. 2) clean-tech “refers to any product, 
service or process that delivers value using limited or zero non-renewable 
resources and/or creates significantly less waste than conventional offerings.” This 
sector is generally divided between large-scale clean energy production in the form 
of solar, wind power, and bio-fuels, and technologies and processes geared toward 
greater efficiencies in energy consumption, such as smart grids, hybrid or clean 
transportation, “green” building materials, and more efficient manufacturing 
techniques. The sector also includes “such emerging technologies as tidal power, 
silicon based fuel cells, distributed-hydrogen generation, and nanotechnology-
based materials” (Pernick & Wilder, 2008, p. 3).  
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Compared to the ICT and life science sectors, the clean technology sector is 
relatively new. Its origins can be found in the 1970s, when oil price shocks led to 
the development of the first commercial solar photovoltaic panels and the 
subsequent development of wind power generators in the 1980s  (Pernick & 
Wilder, 2008). However, the clean-tech sector did not become a recipient of 
substantial venture capital investment until the late 1990s following a decade of 
government support and technology maturation.25 Over the past decade venture 
capital investment in clean-tech companies has steadily increased, with the market 
for clean-tech expanding rapidly as the relative costs of producing and using the 
technology have declined coupled with increased government support for 
greenhouse gas abatement (see Mitchell & Connor, 2004; UK DOE, 2010). 
Importantly, the relative newness of the clean-tech sector renders the sector and 
market difficult to define. Although the industry appears to be characterised by a 
mix of large energy production companies (e.g. Siemens, GE, and Chevron) and 
small and to medium-sized firms, it is still rapidly evolving, probably offering 
opportunities for established players and new market entrants alike (Pernick & 
Wilder, 2008). 
Although the clean tech sector remains somewhat difficult to define due to its 
relative newness and apparent mix of large established players and venture capital 
backed companies, assumptions can be suggested regarding probable input 
requirements and market factors (see Table 6). 
Like the clean-tech market itself, identifying and then characterising the corporate 
venturing and venture capital involvement in the clean-tech sector is somewhat 
more difficult when compared to the ICT and life science sectors. However, 
indications are that large corporations, particularly those in the energy production 
                                                          
25
  Coinciding with the European Union’s Renewable directives in 2001, the United Kingdom 
pushed forward, in 2002, a revamped Renewable Obligations policy (RO) which aimed at 
producing 10% of the United Kingdom’s energy from renewable sources by 2010 and obligated 
electricity producers to provide a significant share of their output from renewable sources (Mitchell 
& Connor, 2004).  Most notable is the inclusion of a trading scheme by which obligation 
certificates are given to qualified renewable providers that they can then sell directly to electricity 
providers and traders, thus facilitating the use of renewables. Probably more important, however, 
this past decade has also seen the U.K. government substantially increase its funding of renewable 
energy. This includes significant direct financial investment in wind power and biofuels most 
prominently, with reinvigorated efforts for offshore wind power and wave power (UK DOE, 2010; 
Mitchell & Connor, 2004). 
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industry, are engaging in corporate venturing and corporate venture capital that is 
focused on clean-tech and renewable energy more generally. For example, 
Siemens, a global leader in turbine technology has a corporate venture capital 
division that has invested in 160 companies to date, engaged in wind, solar, and 
hydro power (Siemens, 2011).  General Electric operates a corporate venture 
capital division called GE Energy Financial Services that invests in established 
firms engaged in renewable energy (GE, 2011), whereas Chevron operates 
Chevron Technology Ventures, which invests in early stage companies with a 
focus on bio-fuels and other renewable sources that align with their corporate 
strategic interests (Chevron, 2011). Implications of this corporate venturing 
activity on the clean-tech sector and whether such activity will be increasingly 
prominent, are, like the clean-tech sector as whole, difficult to predict. 
Table 6: Clean Technology: Input Requirements and Market Factors 
Capital costs and time to market: Developing and introducing new clean-tech products will, in 
some areas of energy production, take considerable capital and resource inputs (some specialised 
technology and expertise, along with considerable manufacturing capacities). In other instances, 
such as energy efficiency and power conversion technologies, capital and resource costs may be 
moderate to low, with many clean-tech products integrating or recombining existing technologies 
with a focus on incremental improvements (e.g. improved solar photovoltaic cells and enhanced 
building materials). The prevalence of such incremental improvements coupled with a more open 
and forgiving market may result in comparably shorter development timeframes. 
 
Barriers to market: The potential barriers to market are not exceedingly high because the 
market itself is not yet well-defined or controlled by a small number of companies (although 
several large companies currently dominate clean-energy production in solar, wind, and bio-
fuels). The current expansion of this market is also aided by government support regarding 
climate change and the need for greenhouse gas abatement, which should create market 
opportunities for new entrants. 
 
Product life cycle: The life cycle for certain clean-tech products and processes will probably 
vary from long product life cycles in areas of energy production such as wind power where 
infrastructure costs are high, whereas in other areas such as energy efficiency (e.g. improved 
solar photovoltaics and bio-fuels), product life cycles might be shorter, perhaps ranging from 5 to 
7 years. 
Source: Pernick & Wilder (2008) 
3.5. Hypotheses and Conclusions 
This study takes the view that propensities for collaboration between venture 
capital firms and large corporations are premised, in part, on the differing input 
requirements of portfolio companies, differences that are likely to be sector 
specific. First, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, theoretical constructs regarding 
the innovation process place the highest input requirements of science and 
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technology at the early stage of research and product development (Hirsh, 1965; 
Markusen, 1985; Perez & Soete, 1988). These inputs are likely to be highly 
specialised and are often the result of cumulative knowledge and experience, of 
which no one company, particularly NHTCs, will generally hold alone. It is at the 
early stage of the innovation process, therefore, when the importance of access to 
external inputs is thought to be most important, particularly for NHTCs (Perez & 
Soete, 1988). Again, such inputs vary among high tech sectors and industries. This 
variance corresponds to different sector specific finance requirements and 
development timeframes, as well as different barriers to market and related product 
life cycles, all of which inform investment decisions and behaviour, including 
propensities for collaboration with external partners.  
From an investment perspective, it follows that technology sectors that require 
more specialised resource inputs (science and technology) generally have longer 
development timeframes and overall higher capital costs, resulting in higher 
propensities for collaboration with external partners during the research and 
development stages (e.g. life science) than sectors with more general purpose and 
less capital intensive technology and products (e.g. ICT). It is also expected that 
technology sectors that require more specialised resource inputs have relatively 
high barriers to market (e.g. life science) resulting in greater propensities for 
collaboration between new market entrants and market incumbents. Finally, 
technology sectors that require more specialised resource inputs tend to exhibit 
relatively longer product life cycles, because related technologies and products are 
not easily replicated by competitors.  Acting as a barrier to market, longer product 
life cycles may result in greater propensities for collaboration between new market 
entrants and market incumbents. That being said, increasingly shorter product life 
cycles in all three sectors may also lead to more collaboration between the two, 
aimed at facilitating the corporate acquisition and merger of NHTCs by large 
corporations. 
In this context, it is expected that venture capital firms will rely heavily on their 
relationships to industry as sources of knowledge and resource inputs for the 
selection, monitoring, and exit of the NHTCs they invest in. Such relationships are 
likely to range from less formal business and social network ties to more formal 
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strategic partnerships and co-investing arrangements. From these constructs, 
therefore, this study proposes that 
(H1) the greater the science and technology inputs required by portfolio 
companies, the more important and formal collaboration between venture 
capital firms and large corporations becomes. 
For venture capital firms and the NHTCs they invest in, the benefits of this 
collaboration are likely numerous, ranging from enhanced financial performance 
and deal flow to more effective investment selection, monitoring, and exit (see 
Manigart et al., 2006). However, it is expected that the overarching motivation for 
this collaboration is to access the non-financial value-adding capacities of large 
corporations for better developing and positioning venture capital backed NHTCs. 
It follows that higher input requirements will correspond to more substantive value 
adding activities, with venture capital firms more readily connecting portfolio 
companies to critical external sources of specialised knowledge, resources, and 
commercial capacity, particularly as it relates to inputs of science and technology. 
In this way, 
(H2) the greater the science and technology inputs required by portfolio 
companies, the more important collaboration between venture capital 
firms and large corporations becomes for value adding purposes. 
Although the benefits of this collaboration are probably felt at all phases of the 
venture capital cycle, particularly the selection, monitoring, and exit phases, the 
valued added obtained through this collaboration is more likely to be realised and 
therefore directed toward the post-selection monitoring of portfolio companies. It 
follows that the more value added a portfolio firm requires (i.e. the more 
specialised inputs for development needed) the more intense and substantive the 
monitoring and evaluation of portfolio firms will likely be. Therefore,  
(H3) the greater the science and technology inputs required by portfolio 
companies, the more important collaboration between venture capital 
firms and large corporations becomes for investment monitoring and 
evaluation. 
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As mentioned previously, venture capital firms tend to geographically concentrate 
both themselves and their investments within the environs of high capacity regions 
such as the LMR; this geographic proximity facilitates their management of highly 
asymmetric and tacit information and related agency costs associated with 
selecting and then developing NHTCs (see Zook, 2004). In this way, geographic 
proximity not only allows venture capital firms to regularly monitor their portfolio 
companies (facilitating necessary face-to-face interaction), but it also facilitates 
regular access to the capacities of their local investment networks, including 
syndicate venture capital firms, university scientists, investment banks, and 
corporate partners (e.g. corporate venture capital divisions). These actors are 
leveraged by venture capital firms to participate in the selection, monitoring, and 
exit of portfolio companies.  Therefore, 
(H4) collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations 
will be facilitated through both geographic proximity and the capacities of 
the LMR.  
Finally, for venture capital firms, the importance of geographic proximity is 
thought to be felt most prominently during the investment monitoring and 
evaluation phases of the venture capital cycle (Zook, 2004). Given the connection 
between investment monitoring and value adding, this study further proposes that 
(H5) for collaboration between venture capital firms and large 
corporations, the importance of geographic proximity will be most 
prominent during the post-selection monitoring and evaluation of portfolio 
companies. 
The overall argument proposed is that the complexity and uncertainty of high tech 
innovation drives collaboration between actors engaged in the commercialisation 
of new high tech products and processes, including venture capital firms and large 
corporations, and that this collaboration is facilitated by both geographic proximity 
and the capacities of large metropolitan regions such as London. The preceding 
constructs and hypotheses are explored and assessed through the empirical 
findings presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. Chapter 4 presents the methodological 
reasoning and approach employed, with findings derived from in-depth interviews 
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with 30 London based venture capital firms, and five corporate venturing 
divisions. Importantly, Chapter 4 expands the research context by detailing the 
criteria by which interviewee venture capital firms were selected, a process based 
in large part on early stage investing propensities, sector specificity, and the 
location of portfolio companies.  
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4. Methodological Challenges and Procedures for Understanding 
Collaborative Venture Capital 
As stated and explained in previous chapters, the main objectives of this research 
are to capture and understand how, why, and under which circumstances VC firms 
collaborate with large corporations and their corporate venturing divisions. The 
research inquires as to the structures employed and the motivations, for which this 
collaborative activity is pursued, as well as the various opportunities and 
constraints that may shape collaborative behaviour between these two investment 
actors.  Secondarily, this research is designed to establish the degree of importance 
that geographic proximity and the various location dynamics of the LMR play in 
facilitating collaboration between VC firms and large corporations.  
Although these questions are derived from related studies grounded in separate 
research threads pertaining to venture capital’s value adding capacities (e.g. Amit, 
Brander, & Zott, 1998; Fried & Hisrich, 1995; Hellman & Puri 2000, 2002; 
Sapienza, 1992),  venture capital syndication (e.g. De Clercq & Dimov, 2004; 
Wright & Lockett, 2003; Manigart et al., 2006) and associated location dynamics 
(e.g. Bygrave, 1987; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001, 2008), as well as the structures and 
motivations regarding corporate venture capital and corporate venturing activities 
(e.g. Benson & Ziedonis, 2010; Kann, 2000; Keil, 2004; McNally, 2002; Siegel, 
Siegel, & Macmillan, 1988), the combination of these threads through an interface 
of “collaboration” offers a potentially valuable contribution to the understanding of 
VC firms as both collaborative and location specific actors, and as agents of “value 
added” beyond finance, for the development and capacity building of NHTCs. 
 The studies cited above use either quantitative approaches or qualitative case 
study methods. The quantitative studies are based on available and generally large 
sets of data composed of many units of analysis. Within this data the units of 
analysis are generally identified as either VC firms or investee firms, to the 
exclusion of other actors. Although these quantitative approaches can capture the 
frequency of venture capital activity along with related motivations and outcomes 
(e.g. Manigart et al., 2006), they generally cannot inquire methodologically into 
the processes involved and the procedures for pursuing and engaging in certain 
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types of investment behaviour. Such questions are important for understanding 
how and why things occur; they are necessary for bridging theoretical constructs 
with empirical reality and for informing policy (Patton, 1990, 2005). Additionally, 
quantitative studies generally produce a very broad level of analysis, treating units 
of analysis as homogenous (Silverman, 2010) and rarely distinguishing or 
accounting for the diversity lodged within the source data (e.g. VC firms differ 
markedly in the types of investments made, the stage of investment, or the sector 
specificity of investments). Understanding and accounting for such differences is 
essential for building accurate empirical constructs of reality (Miller & Glassner, 
1997). To pursue such questions and account for empirical diversity, a qualitative 
approach using interviews and document sources, such as the case study work on 
corporate venturing practices by Keil (2004), is often more effective and 
sometimes the only approach considered appropriate (Silverman, 2010). 
4.1. A Qualitative Approach to Capturing the Processes and Location 
Dynamics of Collaboration 
This research employs a mainly qualitative approach based on in-depth semi-
structured interviews with 30 technology-oriented VC firms located in the LMR. 
The interviews were conducted from September 2008 to June 2009 at the offices 
of the VC firms with a representative partner of each firm. Each interview took an 
average of 45 minutes. The unit of analysis, therefore, is the individual venture 
capital firm. Additional interviews were conducted with corporate venturing 
divisions with offices located in London.  For the core interviews questions were 
split into three sets or themes of inquiry. The first set of questions focused on the 
structures or mechanisms employed and the arrangements that VC firms used for 
collaborating with large corporations: business networks, strategic partnerships, 
syndication or co-investment, and corporate spin-off/out arrangements. It follows 
that syndication and corporate spin-off/out arrangements will be more formal, 
involving the exchange of capital and proprietary assets, than arrangements based 
solely on business networks; strategic partnerships are thought to be both informal 
and formal depending on circumstances.  More formal arrangements, however, are 
expected to be preceded and maintained by less formal interaction such as business 
networks that lead to more formal collaborative arrangements. 
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The second set of questions focused on the motivations that VC firms attribute to 
why they pursue and engage in collaboration with large corporations. As 
demonstrated in the literature on syndication and corporate venture capital, these 
include finance, deal flow, selection, exit, and value-adding motives. The 
expectation was that motivations centred on obtaining knowledge, such as 
selection and value adding, would prove more important reasons for collaboration 
than investment opportunity or performance motivations, such as the finance and 
deal flow motives. For the value-adding motive, further questions looked at the 
types of possible knowledge pursued through collaboration: industry and market 
knowledge, business development, and science and technology. It was expected 
that the more proprietary and specialised the knowledge exchanged through 
collaboration, the more formal the collaboration would be. 
The third set of questions inquired about the conditions or circumstances for which 
collaboration with large corporations is deemed by VC firms to be either 
particularly advantageous or, conversely, as suboptimal, thus prompting the firms 
to avoid collaboration or pursue it with considerable caution. This line of 
questioning focused on which investment stage was deemed most advantageous 
for collaboration and why, coupled with questions concerning challenges or 
obstacles faced by VC firms in their collaborations with large corporations. 
Expectations were that the benefits of collaboration would be felt most strongly at 
the early stages of the investment cycle, when specialised knowledge inputs (e.g. 
science and technology) are most critical (see Chapter 3). Important objectives of 
this question set were to gauge the opportunities and constraints that collaboration 
with large corporations presents to VC firms for investing in NHTCs and offer 
insights about how this collaborative activity has evolved over time. 
Corresponding with previous expectations, it follows that repeat interaction, 
building from informal to more formal over time, will break down barriers 
associated with different cultures of operation and conflicting interests and thus 
allow complementary benefits to be realised. 
A line of enquiry running through these three question sets, particularly questions 
regarding structures for collaboration, was the relative importance of geographic 
proximity and location in the LMR in facilitating collaboration between VC firms 
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and large corporations. This line of reasoning is based on the literature that 
presents VC firms as location specific actors (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008): VC firms 
will normally invest early stage funding in investee companies that are in close 
geographic proximity to them, this investment activity occurring in a select 
number of high-capacity regions such as the LMR (Mason & Harrison, 2003). This 
corresponds to the increasing number of corporate venturing and corporate venture 
capital operations that have opened offices or research facilities in the LMR (see 
Chapter 3). The overarching question is whether this co-location drives 
collaboration between VC firms and large corporations, or whether collaboration is 
more a passive and indirect outcome of residing within a high-capacity 
agglomeration such as the LMR. 
The interviews for which the above question sets were posed form the unit of 
observation, with the LMR acting as overall research setting. In some ways the 
research setting, a variable that is held stable, is used as a selection mechanism for 
the unit of observation and informs the research question sets. A second variable 
held stable as a selection criterion for interviewee firms was an early stage 
investment focus. The idea was that those VC firms engaging in early stage 
investing will generally continue to invest in a portfolio company in subsequent 
funding rounds and stages, whereas propensities for collaboration might change 
over time. This early stage criterion, however, was not always strictly adhered to 
due to context constraints discussed later in this chapter. The third factor variable 
held stable to the strictest degree possible was the sector specificity of the VC 
firms selected and interviewed. All focused on one or a combination of the 
following high tech sectors: (1) ICT, (2) life science and biotech, and (3) clean 
technology. It was expected that different sectors would demonstrate different 
propensities for collaboration: the more science and technology intensive the 
sector, the more important the collaboration between VC firms and large 
corporations (see Chapters 1 and 3). 
Finally, the geographic setting of this research is coupled with the additional 
context of time. Time is also a stable variable, with interviews having been 
conducted with VC firms at the height of the latest recessionary period. It was 
expected that recessionary conditions would have some effect on the behaviour 
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described by interviewee firms regarding collaboration with large corporations. 
These expectations, however, were not clearly defined going into the interviews. 
As previously discussed, venture capital is cyclic, following the ups and downs of 
the global economy. Facing recessionary conditions, venture capital investment 
amounts generally decrease. Yet alternative investment arrangements might well 
be deployed. In this way the research aims to capture venture capital activity 
within a specific time period while also illuminating adaptation behaviour brought 
about by sudden and in many ways unexpected changes to the environment 
experienced by the unit of observation (see Chapter 3). 
This chapter explains the rationale and challenges associated with a qualitative 
interview-based approach to research and the procedures involved in setting up 
and conducting the interviews, with an emphasis on interview selection and access. 
The process of transcribing and coding the interviews is described, followed by an 
explanation of the procedures employed for the analysis and verification of the 
empirical findings. 
4.2. In-Depth Interviews as a Methodological Approach: Contribution and 
Challenges 
An overarching question concerning the use of qualitative methods is the degree to 
which the qualitative method employed can contribute both theoretical insights 
regarding the observed activity and insights to a larger body of related knowledge 
(Patton, 1990, 2005). Much of this question stems from the concern that qualitative 
research produces findings that are too complex and overly detailed to enable 
meaningful insight or structurally coherent understanding (Cho & Trent, 2006; 
Krefting, 1991; Pettigrew, 1990). The connection between the methods used and 
the contribution gained is, in some respects, a question of appropriateness: are the 
methods employed the most appropriate for the research question and the setting 
observed?  As previously presented, this study involves a research topic and 
associated questions that could not be adequately pursued using a quantitative 
approach; questions regarding processes require in-depth inquiry and are thus 
rarely appropriate for more surface laden quantitative approaches (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
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More important, at the time of this research no reliable data existed concerning the 
types and frequency of collaboration between VC firms and large corporations. 
The primary contribution of qualitative research lies in such cases (Eisenhardt, 
1989). In the absence of hard data, some form of qualitative research is often 
necessary for establishing the existence of an observed activity and providing 
potential yet credible explanations for how and why a particular activity occurs 
(Silverman, 2010). In turn, the explanations may later be tested using alternative 
methods of analysis, including those of a quantitative nature. In other words, 
qualitative methods are, in many cases, the most appropriate method for 
establishing new knowledge and observed relevance that additional research can 
build on (Patton, 1990, 2005). 
This research aims at producing foundational knowledge regarding the how and 
the why of certain organisational behaviour, establishing the existence and 
varieties of collaboration between VC firms and large corporations. To make this 
contribution valuable, however — presenting key insights while constructing a 
coherent contextual understanding of the observed activity — the researcher needs 
to address and limit the potential drawbacks associated with a qualitative research 
approach, both in the development of the approach used and in the process by 
which the method is applied and outcomes interpreted (Creswell & Miller, 2000). 
Problems that arise most prominently in qualitative research are centred on 
questions concerning credibility and generalisation (Patton, 1990, 2005; Schofield, 
2002).  These two aspects have much to do with the question of how qualitative 
research can make a significant contribution of insight to theoretical constructs 
(Langley, 1999; Patton, 1999). In the following discussion each of these potential 
drawbacks is briefly explained along with measures taken by the author to limit or 
correct any adverse effect on the research approach and outcomes. 
4.2.1. Qualitative Research and Credibility 
Qualitative research, like all research approaches, is rarely if ever purely objective. 
(Cho & Trent 2006; Morrow, 2005; Patton, 2005). Subjectivity is inevitable 
because the research is often built on and guided by pre-existing theoretical 
constructs that are subject to the inherent biases of the researcher and prone to the 
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subjective intent of the research subjects (Miller & Glassner, 1997; Silverman, 
2010). Conclusions are synthesised from a multiplicity of views of reality. Much 
care, therefore, must be put forth in strengthening credibility, efforts that Patton 
(1990) grounds in the application of “rigorous techniques” for method 
construction, data collection, and analysis; constant reflective awareness on the 
part of the researcher; and a “fundamental appreciation of qualitative methods, 
inductive analysis, and holistic thinking” (p. 461). A fundamental tool that can be 
applied to these related inquiry elements is the use of triangulation, particularly the 
use of multiple sources of data and multiple theories or perspectives to interpret 
the data and construct an observed reality (Creswell & Clark, 2007). Also 
necessary is a convergence of different methods for the communication of findings 
(Silverman, 2010). 
In large part, this research is hypothesis driven, giving both the research method 
and the lines of inquiry a necessary degree of research rigour (Creswell & Clark, 
2007). An important aspect of this research inquiry, however, is to explore rival 
explanations. The use of hypotheses actually allows for alternative interpretations 
to be more readily defined and evaluated as they are more effectively measured 
against the explanations posed by the hypotheses, thus increasing the degree of 
confidence in either the original hypothesis or a newly derived explanation from 
the data analysis (Cho & Trent, 2006).  In formulating the hypotheses and 
subsequent interview questions, different and often opposing explanations for how 
collaboration might be arranged (e.g. informal versus formal) and the motivations 
for doing so (e.g. knowledge motivations versus finance motivations) were derived 
from the literature and reflected in the research questions (Silverman, 2010). For 
example, one hypothesis expected that access to and use of knowledge would be 
the primary motivations for collaboration; yet an alternative explanation, derived 
from the literature, positioned finance and risk centred motivations as more likely 
causes, with interview questions touching on both as possibilities. In fact, the main 
question sets of structures, motivations, and conditions were all prompted by 
alternative explanations grounded in the literature. Another example of this 
openness to counter-explanations — in some ways, the triangulation of theory — 
employed by the research was the consideration of rival interpretations regarding 
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co-location and the spatial clustering of innovative activity, with theories ranging 
from well-defined industrial districts to more diffuse networked regions to highly 
flexible pure agglomeration, all guiding the research inquiry and data analysis 
(Patton, 2005). 
Further qualitative research rigour was achieved through quantifying the 
qualitative findings (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2008). The research 
questions were designed to lend quantifiable qualities to the answers given. The 
same sets of questions were posed to all 30 interviewee firms, with different 
degrees of propensity ascertained through the coding process, which combined 
initial answers with at-length explanations where appropriate. The research by no 
means bases its conclusions solely on the quantification of the qualitative data, but 
“it is worth using multiple methods … and convergent validity checks to enhance 
the quality and credibility of findings” (Patton, 1990, p. 467; Maanen, 1983). An 
aspect of that credibility is in the presentation of the findings. Quantification of the 
qualitative findings adds additional substance and clarity to the communication of 
qualitative findings and allows others to more easily verify or refute the research 
findings through their own observations (Kirk & Miller, 1988). 
For interview based qualitative research the generation of credible findings occurs, 
in large part, through the interface of the interviewer and the interviewee (Denzin, 
1989). The interview process must be orchestrated carefully to limit biases while 
capturing relevant data. Much of this can be accomplished through the careful 
construction of the interview questions (e.g. the embeddeness, in the question sets, 
of multiple explanations) and by conducting the interview in a manner that 
constrains the potential biases of the interviewer and the potential for 
misinterpretation (Rubin & Rubin, 2011. For the interviewer this can be a delicate 
balance to maintain (Denzin & Lincoln, 2002). The first consideration in doing so 
is awareness of the potential for biases (Patton, 2005). In conducting the interviews 
the author used question sets to keep the interviews structured and timely, but 
employed mostly open-ended questions within these sets, allowing the interviewee 
to guide the interview to a large degree (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). The author noted 
reflections following each interview regarding the attitude of the interviewee 
towards certain questions (i.e. instances in which questions provoked intense 
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seriousness, scepticism, or sarcasm) as well as self-reflection on the manner by 
which the questions were posed (i.e. instances in which questions might have been 
asked in a less than clear manner or when potentially helpful follow-up questions 
were not asked) (Denzin, 1989; Denzin & Lincoln, 2002). Such occurrences were 
ascertained during the transcribing process and necessary corrections were noted 
for subsequent interviews. The author also made particular note of contradictions 
made by interviewees within a particular interview or between interviews.  Such 
contradictions were taken as relevant and considered within the empirical context. 
In further controlling potential biases and misinterpretation, all interviews were 
conducted solely by the author with a full partner representative of the interviewee 
firm and at the firm’s offices (Temple & Young, 2004). A precondition for all of 
the interviews was a strict agreement to keep interviewees and their respective 
firms, as well as names referenced in the interviews, as entirely anonymous; this 
helped establish rapport between the interviewer and interviewees and allowed for 
a more open and substantive dialogue (Rubin & Rubin, 2011 . Another 
precondition that facilitated a more productive interview exchange was revealing 
the interview questions to the interviewee prior to the interview, generally a week 
in advance. Admittedly, doing so may have fostered some biases on behalf of the 
interviewee. But such concerns were outweighed by the expected benefits of a 
more focused and productive interview by allowing more time to conduct the 
actual interview and  less time explaining the aims of the research or the merits of 
the questions. In most cases, interviewees requested the interview questions in 
advance as a precondition for the interview; providing this information was 
instrumental in gaining access. Rapport was further strengthened by maintaining a 
neutral demeanour throughout the interview. The author gave little or no reaction 
response to particular answers, nor did the author purposefully lead the interviewee 
into discussions where hypotheses were clearly evident. 
A position adopted by the interviewer was that of a well-trained and professional 
outsider holding holistic but not specialised knowledge. The assumption portrayed 
was that the interviewer had little practical knowledge regarding the reality of the 
research topic as experienced by the interviewee while allowing the interviewee to 
assume the position of expert. This promoted additional interviewer neutrality, 
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which subsequently placed the interviewee more at ease and encouraged a more 
open and forthright attitude in imparting his or her knowledge. This aura of 
neutrality and position as a non-expert also allowed the interviewer to more easily 
ask the interviewee to restate or explain an initial answer and clarify key points 
and concepts that were not initially understood, thus limiting instances of 
misinterpretation (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). 
Finally, the credibility of the research findings was enhanced further through the 
triangulation of sources (Schofield, 2002). In addition to the 30 subject interviews, 
additional interviews were conducted with the corporate venturing divisions of five 
large corporations located in London. These interviews, each roughly 45 minutes 
in length, were not considered part of the core unit of observation, but they were 
used to verify the extent of collaboration occurring and to confirm or challenge 
overarching claims captured in the core unit of observation. These interviews were 
conducted in the same way as the core interviews, although the question format 
was less structured and more open-ended, with different question sets posed 
(emphasising the corporate perspective). Interviews were conducted by the author 
with a corporate representative and occurred at the respective corporate office in 
London. Furthermore, a significant amount of background research (most of which 
was Web-based) was conducted on the core interview subjects (e.g. firm 
characteristics and investment trends) as part of the subject selection process and 
following the interviews.  This, along with other context related documentation 
(e.g. literature and reports published by industry and sector specific associations) 
was included in the analysis, thus “reducing systematic bias in the data” (Patton, 
1990, p. 470). 
4.2.2. Qualitative Research and Deriving Generalisations  
In addition to credibility, a second issue commonly raised concerning qualitative 
approaches is the generalisability of the findings (Patton, 1990, 2005). Qualitative 
data, in contrast to quantitative data, is typically derived from a comparatively 
small sample size, leading to inevitable questions as to how wide-ranging 
generalisations can be made (Schofield, 2002). This is a legitimate concern but one 
that can be addressed through careful sample design and appropriate context-
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specific research aims (Morse et al., 2008). In selecting the initial pool of targeted 
firms to interview, the author took significant care in constructing a purposive 
sampling through the convergence of the relevant theoretical constructs and 
contextual factors.  This convergence proposed that collaboration would have 
greater resonance at the early stage of the investment cycle; thus, only firms that 
were identified as early stage investors were considered for the sample. This 
process led to the selection and contact of roughly 50 firms, 30 of which 
participated in the interviews. As previously mentioned, the research has an 
intentional geographic constraint: venture capital in the United Kingdom. The 
convergence of theory and context clearly placed the majority of early stage 
focused VC firms in the United Kingdom, either in London or within the environs 
of the LMR, which is where all 30 firms interviewed were based. In this way, the 
30 VC firms that comprise the unit of observation can be described as a 
representative sample: the unit of observation is representative of U.K. based, early 
stage focused VC firms operating from offices in the LMR. 
In short, this convergence allowed the author to sharpen the purposefulness of the 
sampling, making it possible to draw some generalisations regarding the role that 
specific contextual factors play in organisational behaviour and the existence and 
propensity of certain structural arrangements. 
Even if the generalisations made here are deemed speculative, the qualitative 
approach used for this study does convey a significant depth of context based 
knowledge through the analysis of the findings, or what Stake (1978) first called 
the particularisation of an observed activity.  For the purposes of this study, the in-
depth interviews, the triangulation of other sources, the convergence of theoretical 
and contextual constructs, and the attempt to quantify the empirics captures the 
existence, propensity, and structure of complex collaborative processes within a 
particular context. Therefore, findings can be generalised for the particular activity 
and setting observed in the study. Still, the contextual richness of the data 
analysed, matched with the representativeness of the purposeful sample observed 
in this study, leads to possibilities of insightful extrapolation (Patton, 2005). 
Although this study aims to capture and understand collaborative venture capital 
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activity in the United Kingdom, it also comments on venture capital more 
generally. 
4.3. Research Design, Procedure, and the Objects of Study 
A structured yet reiterative and reflective process, similar to that proposed by Yin 
(2008), was implemented and followed in developing and conducting this study. 
Proceeding with a thorough and rational convergence of theoretical and contextual 
constructs leading to well-defined research questions and hypotheses, a research 
setting and units of analysis were selected and in-depth semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with a purposeful sample and later transcribed and coded. 
Findings were subjected to a cross-sector comparison that provided coherent 
answers, some of them unanticipated, for the research questions posed. Although 
this process was structured intentionally around a clear set of research questions 
and corresponding interview questions, reflection and refinement occurred 
throughout the research process; from sequential interviews, feedback loops led to 
topographical refinements of the interview questions and appreciation for nuances 
in the contextual vocabulary used by the objects of study, all feeding back to 
reflections on the underlying theoretical constructs used and the overall hypotheses 
guiding the research narrative. In other words, complexities observed in the unit of 
observation were used to reweave some of the relevant theoretical threads 
emanating from the constructs, leading to a more accurate and insightful analysis 
of the research findings. 
Four aspects of the above design and procedure are particularly pertinent. Firstly, 
the research subjects were selected purposefully in that they met, to as great an 
extent possible, the predetermined criteria identified through a convergence of 
theory and context; were identified as potentially information rich objects of study; 
and were determined to be accessible as units of analysis (Patton, 2005). In sum, 
careful consideration and conscious decision making were applied in selecting 
units of analysis that were appropriate for the given research aims. Secondly, 
access to the objects of study was achieved through the auspices of an 
intermediary and was made easier because the author resided near the offices of 
the objects of study. Thirdly, the contents of the interviews were subjected to a 
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process of coding for which key concepts and points of departure were identified, 
allowing for the deciphering of commonalities and contradictions in the findings, 
as well as facilitating a basic quantifying of the qualitative findings.  Finally, a 
triangulation of sources was engaged and a recursive system of analysis was 
employed throughout the research process, which allowed for iterative reflection 
and re-clarification of the main research constructs, thus lessoning instances of 
misinterpretation and aiding construction of an accurate picture of the observed 
reality. 
4.4. Selection of the Region and Sectors of Investigation 
As previously established (Chapters 1 and 3), the LMR— due to the high 
concentration of venture capital activity oriented toward high-tech innovation in 
this metropolitan region — was selected as the regional setting for this study.  The 
heart of the region is London, a global centre of commerce, legal and financial 
services, and creative industries. As both a regional and global transport hub, 
London provides the LMR a gateway through which the wider region interfaces 
with itself and the world (Simmie, Sennett, & Wood, 2002). To the north of 
London are the counties of Oxford and Cambridge, often referred to as the Oxford 
to Cambridge Arc (O2C Arc). The county of Oxfordshire is home to Oxford 
University, 10 government laboratories, several science parks, and a prominent 
biotech cluster, as well as a growing number of science-driven entrepreneurial 
firms. Cambridge is home to Cambridge University, a number of related science 
parks and research institutes, technology clusters (including biotech), and 1,400 
high-tech businesses. The LMR also hosts numerous formal and informal networks 
(the O2C Arc alone boasts nearly 220 active business networks) and a number of 
industry-leading corporations, including those in pharmaceuticals and medical 
technology (Lawton Smith & Virah-Sawmy, 2008). 
As explained in Chapter 3, three high-tech sectors were chosen as a means to 
provide the study an insightful cross-sector comparison and demonstrate how 
different sectors, necessitating different input requirements and exhibiting different 
market factors, may show different propensities regarding collaboration between 
VC firms and large corporations. The three sectors are the ICT, the related sectors 
140 
 
 
of life science and biotech, and the clean tech sector. These sectors are the 
recipients of the majority of technology-focused venture capital investment in the 
United Kingdom (BVCA, 2010).  Investments in ICT and life science and biotech 
have dominated global technology-focused venture capital over the past 2 decades, 
with the clean tech sector experiencing large increases in venture capital 
investment in the United Kingdom and elsewhere over the past decade and 
increasingly so during the past 5 years (BVCA, 2011). 
4.5. Selection of Venture Capital Firms 
For this research, venture capital is defined as “independent, professionally 
managed, dedicated pools of capital that focus on equity or equity linked 
investments in privately held, high growth companies” (Gompers & Lerner, 2001, 
p. 146) or defined more generally as private firms that independently manage 
dedicated pools of capital that are devoted to equity or equity linked investments in 
privately held, generally young, technology based companies that are growth 
oriented (Isaksson, 2006; Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). From these definitions two 
primary selection criteria are derived, with a third criterion based on the selected 
geographic setting of the study. VC firms that were eventually selected for 
interviews were initially identified as meeting all three of the following criteria: 
(1) Engaged in significant early stage investing (i.e., investing in young 
companies)   
(2) Investing in technology oriented companies (preferably companies engaged in 
high-tech endeavours) 
(3) Actively investing in early stage, technology oriented companies located in the 
LMR. 
Regarding Criterion 2, the sector specificities of this technology investment, 
although anticipated, were decided on following the initial selection process.  In 
other words, although the expectation and aim of the study was to conduct a cross-
sector comparison, firms were not initially selected on the sector specificity of 
their investments. Furthermore, the third, location specific, criterion was based on 
the available data that placed the majority of UK based venture capital investment 
flowing into companies located in the LMR, the selected research setting for this 
study. Additionally, although it was expected that the majority of the selected VC 
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firms would be located in the LMR, the location of a venture capital firm’s office 
was not an initial selection criteria. 
To this end, the process of identifying, selecting, and gaining access to the subjects 
of research involved much trial and error including an iterative refinement of the 
search criteria, additional background research on potential interviewee firms, 
multiple attempts at contacting appropriately identified firms, and the eventual use 
of an intermediary for gaining widespread access. 
In identifying appropriate VC firms for potential selection, the author first used the 
online directory of the British Venture Capital & Private Equity Association 
(BVCA). At the time of this search the directory included 216 VC firms (the 
majority of UK based VC firms) and allowed for the searching of these firms by 
investment stage, sector specificity, and location (the updated version of the 
directory no longer allows these criteria based searches). Employing the research 
criteria, the author identified roughly 75 firms that qualified themselves as early-
stage technology investors. When applying the location function, all 75 of these 
firms were identified as investing in companies located in the South East. In doing 
an address search for these firms, 62 had offices located in the LMR. The 
remaining firms were scattered throughout the United Kingdom, with notable 
clusters in Scotland and Northern Ireland.  At this point in the selection process the 
sector specificity of the firms had not yet been identified, although the author had 
expectations (based on BVCA data) that many of these VC firms were investing in 
ICT, life science, and clean tech (see Chapter 3). When reviewing these VC firms, 
it was also evident that many of them specialised in a particular sector, with VC 
firms describing themselves as life-science or clean-tech investors (e.g. “we are a 
life science focused venture capital firm”). 
At this early point in the process the strategy was to contact several selected VC 
firms to gauge interest in the research topic and in a potential interview. This was 
an important first step because the author had no prior contacts in the venture 
capital community; gaining access to the research subjects was a highly uncertain 
proposition. Going on the assumption that a formal contact process was necessary, 
in July 2008 the author selected 20 VC firms to initially contact, posting 20 formal 
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letters, all on university letterhead, to the executive partners of these firms. The 
letters briefly explained the research aims and requested a 45 minute interview 
with a representative of the firm, stating that the interview would be recorded and 
that anonymity would be kept. The response rate was disappointingly low, 
garnering only two replies, both from life-science specific VC firms and both 
agreeing to interviews during the month of September 2008 (citing summer 
scheduling constraints). Although these interviews were agreed on, it was clear 
that a more aggressive form of access was required. 
In late August 2008 the author contacted by e-mail and formal letter the offices of 
BVCA in London. The letter introduced the author, explained the aims of the 
research, and inquired about BVCA’s interest in the research topic and potential 
findings and any assistance it might provide in facilitating the research.  The reply 
was prompt and positive, leading to a meeting in mid-September 2008 at the 
BVCA office.  During this meeting the author again explained the research topic 
and aims to representatives of BVCA’s research division. The representatives 
admitted that they knew little regarding collaboration between VC firms and large 
corporations, although they saw the rationale for the study. They agreed that 
corporate involvement in venture capital investing did occur, although it was not 
well-represented in the available data and was not well understood. The BVCA 
representatives believed the research could make a valuable contribution in this 
regard and agreed to assist the author in contacting UK based VC firms for 
interviews.  During this discussion the possibility of a survey based approach 
coupled with the interviews was raised by the author but rejected by BVCA. An 
interview based approach, assisted by BVCA, was then agreed on. 
Additional aspects of the research, including details concerning the intermediary 
role BVCA would play in gaining access, also were discussed during this meeting 
and through immediate follow-up communications with BVCA via e-mail. First, 
the author expressed an intention to include a cross-sector comparison in the study, 
offering a rationale based on the available data for considering the ICT sector, the 
life science and biotech sectors, and the clean tech sector as the three sectors to 
compare. BVCA confirmed assumptions, based on the data, that the largest 
proportion of technology oriented venture capital investment went to those 
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companies engaged in ICT.  In other words, ICT was the dominant sector invested 
in for UK based VC firms investing in technology oriented companies. However, it 
was also suggested in these discussions, and later confirmed, that the VC firms that 
invested most heavily in life science and biotech did so exclusively. Likewise, it 
was suggested that a number of VC firms that invested in clean tech also did so 
exclusively. Therefore, it was determined that doing some variation of a cross-
sector analysis considering the three sectors would be possible following 
additional background research on individual VC firms to gauge their sector 
specificity. This analysis would inform the final selection of potential interviewee 
firms. It was also suggested that the selection of interviewee firms be narrowed to 
those with offices in the LMR, which would allow for easier access given the 
intention to hold face-to-face interviews at the offices of the respective VC firms.  
In contacting VC firms to request interviews, the following procedure involving 
BVCA as intermediary was agreed on. First, the author revisited the identification 
of appropriate interviewee firms, doing more in-depth background research on 
potential firms with an additional emphasis on a firm’s investment sector 
specificity. Again, BVCA’s online directory was used for this purpose. This 
additional research narrowed the initial 62 VC firms to roughly 50. Contacting 
these 50 firms occurred in two waves, with 25 firms contacted in October 2008 
and the additional 25 contacted in March 2009. In each instance the author 
provided BVCA with a formal letter to the respective VC firms as an e-mail 
attachment. BVCA then sent an e-mail to the respective VC firms with the 
attached letter and an introduction and explanation, written by BVCA, regarding 
the aims of the research study, the qualifications of the author, and the request for 
an interview. The e-mail asked the VC firms to contact the author to discuss 
interest, availability, or any additional questions not clarified in the formal letter. 
The author was copied on all e-mails. 
The first wave of contacts directly resulted in 10 positive replies, all leading to 
interviews, carried out between late October 2008 and late February 2009. In three 
instances an interviewee introduced the author to a contact at another venture 
capital firm, resulting in an additional four interviews conducted during this time. 
This brought the total number of firms interviewed, based on the first wave, to 14. 
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The second wave of contacts resulted in 12 positive replies, 10 of which led to 
interviews. Referrals from two interviewees led to additional interviews with four 
VC firms. All 14 interviews occurred between March 2009 and June 2009. The 
total number of interviews comprising the object of analysis, including the initial 
two interviews, was 30. As previously explained, preconditions for all 30 
interviews included providing interviewees with a copy of the general interview 
questions prior to the interview and an agreement (stated in the formal letter) to 
keep the contents of the interviews anonymous. These preconditions were 
necessary for gaining access in most instances. 
4.6. Final Selection and Characteristics of Interviewee Firms 
The makeup and characteristics of the 30 interviewee VC firms (comprising the 
unit of observation) can be seen in Table 7. Although balance in sector specificity 
among the firms was strived for, the sample, as expected, was dominated by firms 
investing heavily in ICT. Importantly, however, a number of ICT-intensive 
interviewee firms were identified as multi-sector in that they invested primarily in 
ICT related companies but also invested in companies that were applying ICT to 
other sectors such as healthcare services and the energy sector. These additional 
sectors did not meet the definition of life science or clean tech; thus, they were not 
classified as such. In all, seven such interviewee firms were identified as ICT 
(multi-sector).  One firm was identified as investing heavily in both ICT and clean 
tech, and one firm was identified as investing in all three sectors. In both cases 
these firms were classified as ICT specific firms. Although not the ideal 
classification, a degree of single sector specificity was required to keep the coding 
of the findings consistent. That said, the author kept an awareness and appreciation 
of the multi-sector approaches of some interviewee firms during the analysis of the 
findings. Therefore, from the 30 firms selected, 18 firms are identified as investing 
heavily in ICT, seven as investing heavily in life science/biotech, and five are 
identified as investing heavily in clean tech. 
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Table 7: VC Firms Selected for Interviews and Firm Characteristics 
VCF LOCATION SIZE SECT. EARLY EXP LATE MBO % UK INV 
1 London L ICT  X X X X 100 
2 London 
 
L ICT  
 
X X 
 
50 
3 London L ICT  X X X 
 
58 
4 London/USA L ICT 
 
X X 
 
33 
5 Lon./Cam. L ICT, LS X X X 
 
38 
6 London/Boston L ICT, LS X 
   
33 
7 London/Global L ICT, CT 
 
X X 
 
12 
8 Oxford L ICT  
 
X X 
 
83 
9 London M ICT  
 
X X 
 
55 
10 London M ICT, LS 
 
X X 
 
50 
11 Oxford M ICT, LS X 
   
100 
12 Cambridge M ICT, LS X X 
  
75 
13 London S ICT X X 
  
100 
14 London S ICT X 
   
100 
15 Cambridge S ICT 
 
X X 
 
100 
16 Cambridge S ICT, LS X X 
  
100 
17 London S ICT X 
 
X 
 
70 
18 London/Beijing L ICT 
 
X X X 13 
19 London/Global 
London/Global 
L 
L 
LS 
LS 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
12 
17 20 
21 London M LS X X X 
 
70 
22 London M LS X X 
  
33 
23 Cambridge S LS X 
   
100 
24 London S LS X X 
  
80 
25 London S LS X X 
  
42 
26 Lon./New York 
London/Global 
L 
L 
CT 
CT 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
20 
15 27 
28 London M CT 
 
X X 
 
58 
29 London M CT 
 
X X 
 
80 
30 Lon./Munich M CT X X X 
 
38 
 
 
       NOTES: 
Large: £300 million + invested in 40 or more active investee companies 
Medium: £100–£300 million invested in 20 to 40 active investee companies 
Small: £50–£100 mil. generally invested in 10 to 20 active investee companies 
ICT: Information and communications technology 
LS: Life science and biotech 
CT: Clean tech 
               
Two interviewee firms had their main offices in Oxford, four had their main 
offices in Cambridge, and the remaining 24 were located in London. Nine 
interviewee firms had offices both in the United Kingdom and internationally, with 
some firms having offices in the United States (e.g. Boston and San Francisco), 
Europe (e.g. Munich), or Asia (e.g. Beijing). The size of interviewee firms ranged 
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from large (£300 million + invested in 40 or more active investee companies) to 
medium (£100–£300 million invested in 20 to 40 active investee companies) and 
small VC firms (£50–£100 million generally invested in 10 to 20 active investee 
companies).  The largest interviewee firm invested roughly £1 billion in about 70 
active investee companies; the smallest invested around £50 million in roughly 
eight active investee companies.  
Three fourths of the interviewee firms had active investment portfolios with a 
sizable number of investee firms located outside the United Kingdom. However, 
investee companies for some of the smaller interviewee VC firms were almost 
always located in the United Kingdom. An obvious connection, therefore, might be 
made between the size of a venture capital firm and the location of investee 
companies: the larger the venture capital firm, the greater its propensity to invest 
internationally. 
Importantly, although the main criterion used for selecting interviewee firms was a 
stated early stage focus of investments, a close examination of investment strategy 
and portfolio companies showed that 13 of 30 firms selected were investing more 
in expansion and later stage companies, some avoiding early stage investing 
altogether. Reviewing this phenomenon by sector specificity, only 10 of the 18 
firms engaged heavily in ICT investments were identified as focusing on early 
stage investments. A potential connection between investments in early stage 
companies and investments in life science may resonate; all seven interviewee 
firms engaged exclusively in life science investments focused on investments in 
early stage companies. The lack of an early stage focus was most apparent in the 
firms engaged exclusively in clean tech, where five of six firms focused on 
expansion and later stage investment.  Also, interviewee firms that engaged 
exclusively in clean tech tended to be either large or medium in size, although a 
connection between interviewee firm size and a propensity for a particular 
investment stage was not immediately clear. 
In sum, although all selected interviewee firms were investing in high-tech 
oriented companies located in the LMR, the core selection criterion of engaging in 
early stage investing indicated through the online directory of BVCA was not met 
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by all interviewee firms — a reality that was later verified through the actual 
interviews. This change in context was, in some ways, expected to be the result of 
changing investment patterns due to the sharp economic downturn. However, the 
expected implications for collaboration as captured by this study were less obvious 
going into the research procedure (i.e. conducting the interviews and analysing the 
findings). Possibilities ranged from a decrease in the propensity for collaboration 
— that is, less early stage investing might imply less need for early stage external 
inputs, resulting in less collaborative activity between VC firms and large 
corporations — to an increase in collaboration based on a need, in a down market, 
to facilitate both alternative investment inputs and investment exit options. 
4.7. Interview Guideline and Data Collection Process 
The author conducted expert semi-structured interviews with 30 VC firms, which 
represent the unit of observation for this study. Being semi-structured, the 
interviews allowed focused attention on the core topics, as determined by the 
author, while simultaneously providing for an open and sometimes divergent 
exchange. The discussion was allowed to traverse and move between the core 
topics, particularly when detailed explanations were offered or when certain topics 
did not hold relevance. The interviewee, to some extent, guided the discussion. 
Although openness and fluidity was encouraged in the interviews, having semi-
structured as opposed to fully open or unstandardised interview guidelines was 
important. The 45-minute interview length was agreed on prior to the interview, 
and follow-up communication with the interviewee was not expected or built in as 
a critical aspect of the research procedure. For all 30 interviews, therefore, the 
author adhered as much as possible to questions related to the core topics, making 
sure that each core topic had been addressed within the 45 minutes allotted. 
The author hoped that providing the interviewee with the general interview 
guideline prior to the interview would result in greater focus on the core topics 
during the interview, leading to more topical and thus valuable insights.  Again, 
the relatively short 45 minute window of opportunity offered by the interview 
meant that off topic or unfocused musings could not be afforded. 
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As previously explained, the interview guideline was comprised of key question 
sets aligned with the core topics. The interview began with an open question 
regarding the propensity to collaborate with large corporations and was followed 
by the first set of questions, which concerned the structures and mechanism for 
collaboration. An open question on how collaboration took place was followed, 
when appropriate, by more pointed questions regarding the use of business 
networks, strategic partnerships, syndication, and spin-outs. The next set of 
questions began with an open inquiry into the motivations for collaboration. This 
was followed, when appropriate, by more pointed questions concerning the finance 
motive and the deal flow motive, the selection motive, the exit motive, and the 
value-adding motive. A set of questions regarding the conditions for collaboration 
was then posed. This question set was a bit more open-ended than the previous two 
but was focused on two aspects in particular: (1) the stage of investment for which 
collaboration is most advantageous, and (2) the challenges and obstacles that 
collaboration presents. When appropriate, related questions were explored 
concerning, for example, interest alignment and issues pertaining to competitive 
confusion. The final set of questions inquired into the spatial and location 
dynamics of collaboration, involving a number of open-ended questions pertaining 
to the importance of close spatial proximity for collaboration and the role that the 
LMR, as a high capacity region, plays in facilitating collaboration between UK 
based VC firms and large corporations. 
This semi-structured interview guideline allowed for a focused yet flexible 
discussion on how and why firms collaborated with large corporations, including 
the types of knowledge pursued and exchanged and the opportunities and 
constraints associated with this collaborative activity. It also allowed for open 
discussion regarding the role that spatial proximity plays in facilitating 
collaboration — connecting the structures employed to location specific factors — 
and providing broad insights into how UK based VC firms leverage global and 
regional knowledge flows through collaboration. 
As previously explained, all interviews were conducted by the author with general 
partners at the offices of the respective firms. This setting ensured the expert status 
of the interviewee, allowing for a more open and candid discussion. Although the 
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majority of interviews lasted 45 minutes, two interviews had to be cut short to 
about 30 minutes each, and three interviews lasted roughly 90 minutes. All 
interviews were recorded using a digital audio recorder. Additionally, notes were 
taken during the interviews, indicating where emphasis was placed regarding the 
question sets and noting aspects of the discussion when clarity was lacking. This 
necessitated some follow-up questioning, either at the end of the interview or in 
later correspondence. Importantly, prior to each interview the author reviewed the 
background information compiled on the interviewee firm, looking particularly at 
its portfolio of investee companies with an eye for sector specificity, stage of 
investment, and the propensity for exits by corporate acquisition or merger (all 
taken from the investee firm’s website and supporting documents). 
Shortly following the interviews, the audio recording was uploaded and reviewed. 
This first hearing was important because it provided a means for isolating parts of 
the interview (comments made and language used by the interviewee) that were 
not clear or may have been misinterpreted by the author.  It also allowed the author 
to gauge the overall tone of the interview, particularly the attitude expressed by the 
interviewee toward certain questions, looking at where the interviewee emphasized 
either importance or a lack of relevance. Notes from this hearing were compared to 
notes taken during the interview. This process occurred after each subsequent 
interview, constituting a recursive process of theory and context refinement that 
was later integrated with the analysis of the interview transcripts and the 
triangulation of other sources.  Furthermore, this hearing provided the author with 
a means to reflect on the overall conduct of the interview itself in terms of the 
delivery and pace of the questioning. From this review of the recording additional 
notes and reflections were written down concerning lines of questioning that 
needed modification and where the conducting of the interview needed 
improvement. The goal was to improve subsequent interviews and therefore the 
data collection, leading to more accurate and insightful findings. When necessary 
the author returned to the background information compiled on the interviewee 
firm to compare the established context (i.e. that which was known or expected 
prior to the interview) to the intent of the interviewee (i.e. the information given by 
the interviewee), looking for commonalities and contradictions. 
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The triangulation of sources used to verify answers and enhance the credibility of 
the findings included five additional interviews with the corporate venturing 
divisions of five large corporations. As with previous interviews, questions were 
sent to the interviewee ahead of time, a digital audio recorder was used, and the 
author agreed to keep the contents of the interview anonymous. One of these 
interviews was conducted in December 2008, but the bulk of these interviews 
occurred between February and April 2009, with one occurring in July 2009. 
Employing a set of questions regarding the structures, motivations, and conditions 
for collaboration similar to the set used for the unit of observation, these interviews 
were much more open-ended. Importantly, these additional interviews allowed the 
inclusion of different perspectives to counter the reality shaped by the unit of 
observation, thus providing a significant degree of critical analysis to the findings. 
4.8. Transcribing the Interviews and Data Analysis 
All interviews were transcribed by the author. The initial plan was to transcribe 
each interview within 2 days following the interview. This was not always possible 
due to other commitments and constraints, and preparation for upcoming 
interviews almost always took priority over transcribing the previous interview. 
This backlog of interviews for transcribing meant that at least half the interviews, 
comprising the first wave, were transcribed during the winter break 2008, with 
subsequent batches of interviews transcribed over the spring break period (2009) 
and several being transcribed in August 2009.  Transcribing was done by listening 
to the audio recording and typing it — word by word — into a text document. 
Each interview took about 6 hours total to transcribe, longer interviews taking 
closer to 8 hours. When completed, the transcribed interviews comprising the unit 
of observation were organised by the identified sector specificity of the 
interviewee firm; that is, three groups of transcribed interviews were compiled and 
kept separate: (1) interviews with ICT focused firms, (2) interviews with life 
science/biotech focused firms, and (3) interviews with clean-tech focused firms. 
Analysing and categorising the interview contents began sporadically in May 
2009. However, the bulk of the analysis occurred from September 2009 through 
February 2010. Using Atlas.ti as a tool for qualitative text analysis, the author 
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subjected each interview to a two-part coding process. First, the entire interview 
was coded through an open coding process for capturing meaning in the data and 
classifying areas of emphasis at different levels of abstraction. This involved 
assigning codes based on key terms as articulated by the interviewee. For example, 
interviewees often referred to early stage investing or the first round of investing 
as “Series A” investing, thus, in such instances a code was assigned as “Series A.” 
Another example was the often phrased “deal tension” when interviewees 
discussed creating competitive bidding for an acquisition or merger; in such 
instances, the assigned code was “deal tension.” Another example would be when 
the term “corporate validation” was used to describe the use of corporate partners 
in the selection of portfolio firms; for this, the code “corporate validation” was 
assigned. Codes were also assigned when key terms or concepts derived from the 
literature were articulated by the interviewee, such as an interviewee using the 
term “deal flow” to describe benefits of collaboration, or when the term “exit by 
acquisition” was used; codes were assigned as “deal flow” and “exit by 
acquisition,” respectively. 
A significant benefit of this process was that of better connecting the language 
used by interviewees with the language employed in the academic literature 
regarding venture capital. Differences in language ranged from subtle variations of 
key terms to widely different term usage when describing common investment 
activity. Although this connecting procedure was recursive throughout the research 
process — during the interviews, initial interpretation and reflection, and the 
eventual transcribing of the interviews — it was not until the interview was 
properly coded that these connections were accurately ascertained and appreciated. 
Such connections were essential in clarifying key concepts, bridging the theory 
with the context, and improving the credibility of the findings (Barriball & While, 
1994). 
The second part of this coding process involved reengaging the previously 
assigned codes and assigning “super codes” to key passages, or quotes, from where 
families of codes were identified and clustered. These super codes were derived 
from the key terms and concepts found in the literature on venture capital and were 
used to construct the core topics and question sets employed in the interview 
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guideline. Examples of super codes are “business networks,” “syndication,” “value 
adding,” and “transport networks.” In many instances initial codes and eventual 
super codes were the same; for example, in some instances “value adding” was 
assigned as an initial code and then a super code. This process was facilitated by 
the interview guideline, which was structured in accordance with the question sets, 
with questions regarding structures preceding proceeding questions about 
motivations and so forth. Certain assigned codes were generally found in clusters 
concentrated within the answers and explanations that corresponded to the main 
question sets. The code identification and search function employed by Atlas.ti 
also made locating previous codes throughout all 30 interviews and identifying 
code families relatively easy. 
Based on the assigned super codes, interview quotes from across all interviews 
(the unit of observation) were lifted (copied) and categorised into three separate 
documents, each document corresponding to one of the three sectors compared. 
For example, all quotes super coded as “syndication” derived from interviews with 
life science/biotech-specific VC firms were amassed into the same document. 
Likewise, those quotes super coded for “syndication” derived from interviews with 
clean tech-focused VC firms were amassed in a separate clean tech-specific 
document. This process resulted in three content rich documents, each aligned with 
a specific sector, which tightly corresponded to the core research topics and related 
question sets as structured in the interview guideline. These three documents were 
then used to find patterns, commonalities, and differences within sectors and 
across them. Importantly, these documents were not analysed in isolation. The 
context established through background research was always considered, and the 
findings derived from the interviews with the corporate venture divisions was also 
analysed and compared to those derived from the unit of observation, with 
particular emphasis on apparent contradictions between the findings. This 
triangulation of sources played a significant role in the final analysis of the 
findings. The research procedure and process of analysis allowed for the credible 
capturing of collaborative activity between UK based VC firms and large 
corporations, as well as for different propensities for collaboration across sectors. 
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The overall research procedure, involving the selection of a purposeful sample for 
which representativeness could be argued and the use of the same interview 
guideline structured on core topics and question sets for all interviews comprising 
the unit of observation, lends itself to a basic quantifying of the qualitative 
findings. Quantification was employed for the analysis of two of the three core 
research topics addressed in the interview guideline: (1) structures for 
collaboration and (2) motivations for collaboration. Regarding structures for 
collaboration, four types of collaborative structures or arrangements were 
considered: business networks, strategic partnerships, syndication, and spin-outs. 
From each interview the propensity for each structure or arrangement type was 
measured as either NO (rarely if ever employed), YES WEAK (employed but on 
limited or infrequent basis), and YES STRONG (employed frequently as a 
standard mode of operation). Regarding motivations for collaboration, the same 
system was used to measure propensities for the following motivations: (1) the 
finance motive, (2) the deal flow motive, (3) the selection motive, (4) the exit 
motive, and (5) the value adding motive. This process of quantifying the 
qualitative findings carried with it two main benefits. First, it facilitated the 
disentangling of the rich empirical data gathered, establishing the existence (i.e. 
the frequency) of certain organisational constructs and bringing to the surface the 
core thrusts of the research inquiry: the how and the why regarding collaboration. 
Second, this facilitation carried over into the presentation of the empirical findings, 
complementing the deep qualitative content as presented in the proceeding 
chapters, thus sharpening the explanatory findings and enhancing the credibility of 
the conclusions made. 
4.9. Coping With Inherent Limitations 
Although all reasonable measures were employed in the research design and 
procedure to overcome some of the more pertinent issues associated with 
qualitative approaches, particularly issues of sample size and generalisability of 
the findings, some additional limitations remained present throughout the research 
process.  First, the unit of observation and supporting sources from which the 
findings of this research are derived capture the intent of the research subjects and 
not the actual outcome of the activity observed; that is, the findings are based in 
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large part on what the interviewee stated as reality (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). For 
example, an interviewee might have claimed to use collaboration with large 
corporations to obtain knowledge regarding business development that then was 
employed to develop portfolio firms; yet the research does not verify with the 
respective portfolio firm as to whether such knowledge was actually being applied 
via the interviewee firm. Again, the purposeful sample selected, the triangulation 
of sources, and the recursive process applied to this study ensured that the intent 
captured in the findings was as accurate as possible given the inherent constraints 
of the study. 
Second, the quality of the interviews was not consistent across all units of analysis. 
The interview procedure generally improved with each subsequent interview, and 
in some cases this progression improved the content of the interviews going 
forward. Allowing for recursive reflection and refinement is viewed as a strength 
of the research procedure; however, biases towards the content of later interviews 
may present themselves, although author awareness and the recursive process itself 
mitigated such instances to the greatest extent possible. 
4.10. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to present a qualitative research approach in which expert 
semi-structured interviews are the most appropriate research method for capturing 
information on how, why, and under which conditions VC firms collaborate with 
large corporations. As required of all qualitative approaches, the research design 
and procedure used in this study addresses and limits some of the common issues 
and constraints associated with qualitative approaches to research, particularly 
issues concerning credibility and the making of generalisations. In doing so, the 
research design and procedure are built on predefined theoretical and contextual 
constructs that, along with the facilitation of an appropriate intermediary, inform 
the selection of a purposeful sample and development of an appropriate interview 
guideline.  Credibility is further enhanced through measures taken that involved 
recursive reflections, feedback loops, and appropriate settings and demeanour to 
limit biases and misinterpretations that could arise through the conducting and 
transcribing of the interviews. In analysing the findings, a coding system and a 
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cross-sector comparison were used to capture commonalities, patterns, and 
contradictions within an information-rich empirical context. Finally, the findings 
derived from the unit of observation were triangulated with additional sources. 
Despite some inherent limitations (about which the author is aware and 
accountable) the combination of these design and procedural measures help to 
construct a credible and accurate interpretation of the particular observed activity, 
and these observations may be transferable to similar contexts. 
Three empirical chapters follow, each chapter presenting and analysing findings 
associated with a particular set of questions regarding collaboration between UK 
based VC firms and large corporations. Chapter 5 explores the how of 
collaboration, with a particular focus on the various structures employed and the 
arrangements engaged in for collaboration.  This chapter also connects structural 
propensities to the degree of significance that geographic proximity and the 
research setting have in facilitating collaboration. Chapter 6 then proceeds to 
capture the why of collaboration, focusing on the motivations for collaboration. 
Chapter 7 combines the last set of empirical findings, those regarding the 
conditions for collaboration with the importance of geographic proximity, with an 
overarching analysis involving the triangulation of other sources. 
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5. The Structures, and Processes of Collaboration, and the 
Importance of Geographic Proximity    
Venture capital firms are collaborative investment actors (Feldman et al., 2005; 
Florida & Smith, 1991; Gompers & Lerner, 2004). As previously discussed, a 
potentially significant source of specialised inputs for investing in and developing 
NHTCs, and therefore an obvious target for collaboration, are large corporations 
(Maula, Autio, & Murray, 2005). The literature points to strong anecdotal evidence 
that such collaboration is common. Founded on informal contacts and professional 
ties between these two actors, the collaborations are rarely captured in the 
literature, with the extent of formal collaboration likely underreported in the 
existing data (Dutshnitsky, 2006). From an organisational perspective, such 
collaboration is generally understood through the mechanisms by which it is 
established and maintained (i.e. the structures employed) and the related level of 
formalisation by which it is structured. It follows that informal collaboration 
precedes more formal collaboration and that the more specialised and proprietary 
the inputs exchanged are (e.g. science and technology), the more formal the 
collaborative structures employed will be (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
Therefore: 
(H1) the greater the science and technology inputs required by portfolio 
companies, the more important and formal collaboration between venture 
capital firms and large corporations becomes. 
Assessing such collaboration in three high tech sectors — ICT, life science, and 
clean tech — this chapter identifies and explores the extent to which four possible 
structures or arrangements are employed by venture capital firms in their 
collaboration with large corporations: (1) business networks, (2) strategic 
partnerships, (3) syndication partnerships, and (4) corporate spin-outs. The 
expectation is that with each consecutive structure (1 to 4) the potential level of 
formality increases.  Corporate spin-outs are the possible exception, because the 
level of formality involved probably depends on the intentions of the corporate 
parent company toward a specific spin-out. 
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Additionally, collaboration often necessitates a certain degree of geographic 
proximity between participating actors (see Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004). 
Venture capital investment and venture capital firms tend to locate in a select 
number of high-capacity metropolitan regions (Martin, 1999; Mason & Harrison, 
2002) for two reasons: (1) geographic proximity allows venture capital firms to 
better select and monitor portfolio companies (managing highly tacit knowledge, 
asymmetric information, and related agency costs), and (2) allows them to 
economise and leverage local investment and industry related networks for these 
purposes. The literature demonstrates that syndication between venture capital 
firms is strongly facilitated by geographic proximity and that the process of 
syndication results in dense geographically concentrated syndication networks 
(Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Furthermore, Chapter 3 established that a growing 
number of large multinational corporations have their UK and European corporate 
venturing offices in London. Compared to collaboration between venture capital 
firms, however, the degree of importance of geographic proximity and location as 
it applies to collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations is 
much less clear. In exploring these constructs, this chapter proposes that, 
(H4) collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations 
will be facilitated through both geographic proximity and the capacities of 
the LMR. 
For assessing hypotheses (H1) and (H4), this chapter has three objectives.  First, 
by capturing the various structures used by venture capital firms to collaborate 
with large corporations, this chapter verifies the frequency and extent of 
collaboration between these two investment actors in the United Kingdom (Sect. 
5.1). Second, the bulk of this chapter presents the types of structures (identified 
through interviews) that are employed by UK venture capital firms to collaborate 
with large corporations (Sect. 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5). In other words, this chapter 
illustrates what collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations 
looks like, rather than capturing or explaining what drives this collaboration. 
Therefore, findings presented in this chapter form the schematic foundation on 
which a potentially rich and complex collaborative activity occurs. 
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Finally, this chapter (Sect. 5.6) explores the potential location dynamics of 
collaboration between venture capital firms in the United Kingdom and large 
corporations. Therefore, this chapter attempts to verify whether the importance of 
geographic proximity and the capacities of the London metropolitan region more 
generally extend to collaborative activity between venture capital firms and large 
corporations. A more detailed analysis of these findings is offered in Chapter 7. 
5.1. Structures for Collaboration 
Interviews with venture capital firms demonstrate that interaction and 
collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations is not only 
common, but also has become a critical component to venture capital activity in 
the United Kingdom. From investment selection, investment structure, and 
oversight to investment exit, interaction with corporations is pervasive and 
integral. The interviews describe collaborative structures ranging from informal 
consultation and networking to formal strategic partnerships, as well as highly 
formal syndication or co-investing arrangements. Furthermore, collaborative 
activity between venture capital firms and large corporations was described as 
having become more prevalent and more open as an investment practice over the 
past decade and particularly over the past 5 years or so. An interviewee at a life 
science-focused venture capital firm captured the essence of this collaborative 
activity, as described by a number of venture capital firms interviewed: 
We have quite specific initiatives set up to collaborate with pharmaceutical 
companies. Recently, they have become much more open about what they 
are doing. In the past, they have been quite secretive, they would be 
developing a drug, and they would not be specific about what stage they 
were at. For about the past 2 years, they have been doing venture capital 
pharma days, where they actually invite you in, and they actually give you 
an overview of the areas they are looking to invest in, with the hope that you 
will go away, and maybe you have a portfolio firm that is developing 
something they are interested in, and a licensing deal might be established, 
or that you might start up a company in that particular area. Also, they tell 
you quite specifically what areas they are not interested in, which is also 
very helpful. You might think that everyone is interested in antibiotics, 
which might take 10 years to develop — if the big firms say that they 
already have it covered, then you don’t waste time and money setting it up. 
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For venture capital firms the foundation for collaborative activity with large 
corporations frequently includes both informal and formal interactions with 
personal and business contacts in the business development, corporate venturing, 
and R&D divisions. Almost all venture capital partners interviewed had substantial 
previous industry experience, particularly those venture capitalists focused on life 
science or clean tech (previously holding senior positions at leading 
pharmaceutical and energy companies). These past industry ties were said to be 
crucial in developing and maintaining relationships with corporations. 
Accordingly, the use and importance of informal and formal business networks 
were coded 27% Yes Weak and 73% Yes Strong. The summary findings from the 
interviews regarding the four types of collaborative structures coded for are shown 
in Table 8. 
Table 8: Relative Importance of Structures for Collaboration 
  
BUSINESS 
NETWORKS 
STRATEGIC 
PARTNER. 
SYNDI-
CATION  
SPIN-
OUTS 
NO 0 6.7 47 40 
YES WEAK 27 36.7 33 43 
YES STRONG 73 56.7 20 17 
  
100%       
N=30 
100%                        
N=30 
100%                      
N=30 
100%       
N=30 
Mature, more formal relationships with corporations were described as strategic 
partnerships, in which venture capital firms use formal channels of interaction 
with a select number industry leading corporations. Although not as widely 
employed as business networks, the use and importance of strategic partnerships 
are still significant, being coded 6.7% No, 36.7% Yes Weak, and 56.7% Yes 
Strong. Through formal strategic partnerships corporate pipeline needs and 
portfolio companies are routinely discussed for potential partnering, investing, and 
acquisition. Such partnerships often involve the placing of high-level individuals 
from these corporations on the advisory boards of both the venture capital firm and 
individual portfolio companies. 
The use of co-investing or syndication partnerships between venture capital firms 
and large corporations was described by the venture capital firms interviewed as 
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far less common. However, some venture capital firms, particularly those investing 
exclusively in life science, characterised syndication partnerships as regularly 
occurring on a case-by-case basis. Overall, the importance of syndication 
partnerships as a form of collaboration with large corporations was coded 47% No, 
33% Yes Weak, and 20% Yes Strong. 
Likewise, collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations 
involving corporate spin-outs was relatively rare among the venture capital firms 
interviewed. The firms cited particular challenges associated with spin-outs and 
pervasive scepticism about the quality of spin-outs as investment opportunities. 
The importance of spin-outs was coded 40% No, 43% Yes Weak, and 17% Yes 
Strong. 
The summary findings indicate a collaborative activity with foundations of 
extensive informal and formal business networks. However, and somewhat 
surprisingly, more formal structures, particularly co-investing activity between 
venture capital firms and large corporations, is less frequently employed (some 
reasons will be more fully explained in Chapters 6 and 7). 
The following sections contain a more detailed look at the four types of 
collaborative structures employed, with an emphasis on how these structures are 
used by venture capital firms investing in different sectors. This sector comparison 
begins to illuminate the connection between the formality of collaboration and the 
level of science and technology intensity of a given sector. 
Prior to discussing this connection it is important to clarify several contextual 
factors confirmed through the interviews that may contribute to the findings 
presented here and those of proceeding chapters. First, many of the venture capital 
firms interviewed confirmed that they had moved or were in the process of moving 
away from early stage investing, placing an increasing amount of their funding 
into more established (later stage) portfolio companies because of the severe 
downturn in the economy. The implication is that later stage firms need fewer 
inputs of specialised knowledge and less frequent oversight; thus, any related 
collaboration is less formal.  Second, a number of interviewees, particularly those 
engaged in clean tech, described their funds as relatively “young” (i.e. the overall 
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fund had been active for only 2 to 5 years with few to no exits having yet 
occurred). This implies that for such funds formal collaboration may not yet have 
had the opportunity to mature, thus prompting the comparable lack of formal 
structures coded for.  
Finally, the findings suggest some relation between venture capital firm size, the 
size of the overall fund, and the extent or degree of formalisation for collaboration 
with large corporations, although this connection, using these initial findings, is 
difficult to ascertain. A probable connection is that larger venture capital firms 
have higher propensities for formal collaboration than those of modest size. The 
contribution of these factors toward collaboration between venture capital firms 
and large corporations, although considered here, are further developed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
5.2. Business Networks  
The first type of structure employed by venture capital firms for interacting and 
collaborating with large corporations (probably viewed more accurately as a 
mechanism) explored through the interviews is a business network. Business 
networks can be described as socioeconomic interactions among three or more 
individuals within the same professional context that are engaged to exchange and 
act on information related to commercial opportunities (see Chapter 2). Such 
networks can range from informal interaction between an individual and several 
professional contacts, to informal or semiformal interaction through a website 
interface, to a face-to-face gathering or a community of professionals interacting 
through a formal business network organisation (e.g. professional associations, 
industry meetings, and conferences). Again, from the findings below, the use of 
business networks as a mechanism for collaboration is the most significant 
structure coded for, lending support to the idea that informal interaction between 
venture capital firms and large corporations lead to more formal collaborative 
structures. Findings for business networks, by sector, are shown in Table 9. 
Again, venture capital firms that described both informal and formal business 
networks as very important for facilitating collaboration with large corporations 
were coded as Yes Strong; firms attributing importance to either one or the other 
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(informal or formal business networks) were generally coded as Yes Weak. 
Importantly, not one venture capital firm is coded as No for the use or importance 
of business networks for collaboration with large corporations. In comparing 
differences between sectors, venture capital firms investing inclusively in life 
science are coded 100% Yes Strong. Those venture capital firms investing 
primarily in information technology were coded 33% Yes Weak and 67% Yes 
Strong, respectively.  Likewise, those venture capital firms engaged heavily in 
clean tech are coded 40% Yes Weak and 60% Yes Strong. 
Table 9: Relative Significance of Business Networks by Sector 
  ICT LIFE SCIENCE CLEAN TECH   
NO 0 0 0 0 
YES WEAK  33 0 40 27 
YES STRONG 67 100 60 73 
  
100%           
(N=18) 
100%                   
(N=7) 
100%                   
(N=5) 
100%                                 
(N=30) 
As quoted earlier in the summary findings, business networks along with other 
forms of collaboration facilitate the exchange of information regarding current and 
potential investments, informing investment decisions, and strategy (to be 
explained in detail in Chapter 6). All venture capital firms interviewed described 
business networks, at their core, as interactions between individual venture capital 
firm partners and their corporate contacts. Three mechanisms, in particular, were 
described by interviewees as contributing to the facilitation and development of 
these business networks: (1) past industry (corporate) experience and ties of 
venture capitalists, (2) initiative by venture capital firms to facilitate relationships 
between venture capital firm partners and corporate contacts, and (3) outreach 
efforts by large corporations geared toward building relationships with venture 
capital firms. Past industry ties were the more critical for the exchange of valuable 
information, whereas initiative and outreach efforts were important for catalysing 
relationships between large corporations and those venture capital partners with 
less past industry experience. 
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A venture capitalist at a life science-focused venture capital firm explained the 
importance and extent of past industry ties in facilitating collaboration between 
venture capital firms and, in this case, large pharmaceutical companies, ties that 
extend high up the corporate hierarchy: 
We’ve got the links to very senior levels. I know almost all the heads of 
R&D at all the Big Pharma companies, just because of my background. So 
we do have extremely strong links into pharma, and that is critical to our 
success. If you look at our partners (venture capitalist), almost all have had 
very senior positions in pharma. So I came from Big Pharma, as do most of 
the partners here and in our U.S. offices. And we have a bunch of what we 
call part-time venture partners, almost all of whom, especially those dealing 
in therapeutics, have had senior roles in Big Pharma. So the Pharma 
relationship is almost embedded in what we do, because most of us have 
come from Big Pharma. 
This comment, and similar comments made by other interviewees, corresponds to 
collaborative activity, as described in the literature, based on common industry 
affiliation and complementary aims and built on experienced-based trust (Arrow, 
1974.). The other important point, emphasized by this and other comments, is how 
completely integral this type of collaboration is for the majority of UK venture 
capital firms, being “almost embedded” in what they do. The importance of 
business networks, based on past industry ties, transcends sectors, although it is 
felt more acutely by those venture capital firms investing in life science and clean 
tech. An interviewee at a clean tech-focused venture capital firm commented: 
I would say that many if not most of us in clean tech have worked for the 
big corporates, and we use these connections regularly; they are very 
important for informing investment strategy and for building corporate 
partnerships which, in turn, are very important for our investee companies. 
The importance of business networks was felt by those interviewees working for 
information technology-focused venture capital firms, but the emphasis on past 
corporate ties to facilitate these networks was not shared. For these interviewees 
past entrepreneurial experience was a more common career characteristic of 
venture capital partners than past corporate experience. That being said, many of 
these interviewees described frequent interaction between themselves and 
representatives of corporate venturing divisions at many of the largest global 
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computer and information technology players (e.g. Microsoft, Oracle, Intel). An 
interviewee at an ICT focused venture capital firm commented: 
We have a lot of contact with the big IT players. More recently, they have 
been much more open and aggressive in contacting us, and it really is 
helpful for us in seeing what their pipeline needs are and what they might be 
interested in. 
Such comments indicate collaboration in which certain potential barriers, such as a 
lack of corporate ties and experience, are likely overcome by both parties’ need to 
collaborate. However, collaboration, occurring even in this absence of direct 
corporate experience, may also indicate that information technology as a sector 
needs fewer resource inputs, leading to less formal collaboration between venture 
capital firms and large corporations.  
Second, the importance of these business networks between venture capital 
partners and contacts at large corporations is well-recognized by the venture 
capital firms themselves. Several interviewees described firm-based initiatives to 
coordinate relationship building between their partners and large corporations. An 
interviewee at a life science-focused venture capital firm explained:  
We also have another big drive, this internally, to getting the right contact 
within the pharmaceutical company. It is very important to speak to the right 
person when formalizing a licensing deal. You need to know who the actual 
person is who makes the decision on the licensing deal. These deals can take 
a very long time, so knowing the right person is critical; you could end up 
talking to 20 different people and getting nowhere. Getting in contact and 
getting to know these right people is very important. So here, we have a 
program that involves maybe the top 20 pharma/biotech companies, and it is 
split among the partners, and it is their responsibility to go and build these 
relationships, probably meeting individually, seeing what they are interested 
in, what they might want to spin-out. 
The third mechanism for facilitating the development and use of business networks 
is industry meetings or conferences sponsored and run by large corporations, often 
in conjunction with industry network organizations. In connecting the use of 
industry meetings in facilitating collaboration with large corporations the same 
interviewee above from a life science-focused venture capital firm continued: 
All the major pharmaceutical companies, they set up these functions in 
Europe and the United States; we’ve been to all of these. So what we do is 
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collate the information. I’m in charge of all of this; I set up a spreadsheet 
indicating who is interested in what and who is not interested. That 
information, for us, is actually really useful. Obviously, if you have a 
product in phase 2 then everybody will be interested, but sometimes when 
you have something that is a bit more niche, it is important to go and target 
the firms, because you don’t want to go out and sell your products to 
everybody — that is not how it works. However, if you have something 
really interesting, often everybody comes to you. But these industry 
meetings have been quite a new thing …. And in fact, just last week there 
was this big conference in San Francisco that JP Morgan sponsored that is 
probably “the” biotech conference of the year. Everybody in the biotech 
world is there, all the Big Pharma players, all the biotech companies, all the 
investors, the bankers, the lawyers, headhunters, everybody is there, 10,000 
people attend this conference. And we spend all week talking to Big 
Pharma.  We use it as a mechanism to meet Big Pharma corporate players. 
The use of industry meetings and conferences, as described above, to catalyze 
relationships with large corporations was noted by just about every venture capital 
firm interviewed — transcending all three sectors. Such meetings were described 
as occurring in London and the LMR more generally, particularly in and around 
Oxford and Cambridge, as well as globally, frequently in the United States 
(California and Massachusetts in particular) and more recently in Asia. However, 
the importance of these meetings was particularly felt by those firms engaged in 
life science and clean tech. The likely reason for this is that, in the case of life 
science, the number of key corporate players is smaller than in other sectors, 
creating higher barriers of entry in the life science sector. 
Some interviewees were skeptical concerning the relevance of industry meetings in 
building corporate relationships. When asked whether industry venture meetings 
were important for collaboration with large corporations, an interviewee at an 
information technology-focused venture capital firm replied: 
There is so much interaction and partnering anyway, I’m not sure. Other 
people might do things differently. I think there is a lot exaggeration, talking 
it up! Often it is just through your investment pool, which generally has 
industry folks. We have made introductions that way.  But I have not seen 
as much as what appears to be talked about — some level of skepticism 
needs to be applied. 
This comment is notable because it reiterates the importance of personal corporate 
contacts as the primary mechanism through which venture capital firms develop 
and maintain relationships with large corporations, and it also hints at the use of 
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corporate relationships as a means of building a venture capital firm’s reputation 
within the venture capital community. Most notably, however, is the skepticism 
toward industry meetings as meaningful venues for collaboration purposes. Many 
of these meetings were described as being sponsored or organized by industry or 
related network associations, the importance and recent proliferation of which 
were questioned by a number of interviewees: 
There are too many of these network organisations; to be effective they 
need to be better coordinated. Otherwise, I can’t see much use for them. I 
mean, I can see how they might be useful to those with less industry 
experience; these relationships need to start somewhere. But for me, the 
interaction comes through my own contacts. 
This lack of coordination concerning network organisations corresponds to 
findings in the literature regarding broader innovation networks and clustering. 
With findings here placing an emphasis on the importance of establishing and 
developing the right contacts, policy might focus on better coordinating and 
streamlining the collective efforts of regionally based network organisations, more 
effectively facilitating the establishment of quality contacts that can better lead to 
the development of more formal collaborative relationships between venture 
capital firms and large corporations. 
5.3. Strategic Partnerships 
The second structure explored through the interviews is a formal strategic 
partnership.   Strategic partnerships can be defined as formal but not legally 
binding agreements between two parties, often commercial and generally in the 
same industry, to facilitate knowledge and resource sharing toward common 
objectives (Hagedoorn, 2002). As formal agreements, strategic partnerships differ 
from business networks in that they will probably be negotiated, authorised, and 
implemented at the executive level of the firm and often are publically promoted 
as a strategic asset. For venture capital firms, strategic partnerships with large 
corporations might involve a combination of activities ranging from the exchange 
of information regarding corporate pipeline needs, new portfolio companies, and 
overall industry dynamics (informing investment decisions and strategy) to placing 
corporate representatives on the venture capital firm’s advisory board or on the 
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boards of individual portfolio companies. Findings for corporate strategic 
partnerships are shown in Table 10. 
Table 10: Relative Significance of Strategic Partnerships, by Sector 
  
ICT LIFE SCIENCE CLEAN TECH 
NO 11 0 0 6.7 
YES WEAK  56 0 20 36.7 
YES 
STRONG 33 100 80 56.7 
  
100%           
(N=18) 
100%                   
(N=7) 
100%                   
(N=5) 
100%                                 
(N=30) 
The findings place strategic partnerships as the second most frequently employed 
structure for collaboration behind business networks. Formal strategic partnerships 
with large corporations were described as important and frequently used by 
roughly half the interviewees. This is not all that surprising, given that strategic 
partnerships were expected to build on the experience and trust established through 
business networks, encompassing a variety of more formal relationships between 
venture capital firms and large corporations. However, the propensity for venture 
capital firms to engage in strategic partnerships with large corporations outside the 
life science sector is somewhat weaker than expected. Venture capital firms 
investing exclusively in life science are coded 100% Yes Strong, showing a high 
propensity for using strategic partnership with large corporations in this sector. In 
contrast, venture capital firms investing heavily in information technology are 
coded 11% No, 56% Yes Weak, and 33% Yes Strong. Clean tech focused venture 
capital firms, however, are coded comparably higher, at 20% Yes Weak and 80% 
Yes Strong. 
Importantly, though, strategic partnerships were the most difficult structure for 
collaboration to code for: no particular model dominated, with the use of strategic 
partnerships involving a number of diffuse arrangements. Nor was it clear, in all 
cases, how formal these strategic partnerships were. A number of interviewees 
described strategic partnerships with large corporations as being loosely 
coordinated at the executive level of the venture capital firm, and then often 
carried out by individual venture capital firm partners. Other interviewees 
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described very little firm-wide coordination, with the maintenance of strategic 
partnerships being the responsibility of the individual partners. Yet interviewees 
still described such arrangements as “strategic partnerships,” and they were coded 
accordingly. 
For the majority of strategic partnerships described in the interviews, venture 
capital firms have a number of nonbinding agreements with a variety of corporate 
partners, including large corporations that operate in the same sector as the venture 
capital firm, leading investment banks and accounting firms, and major consulting 
outfits. Some venture capital firms promote these strategic partnerships on their 
websites as “our strategic partners” and claim that they add value to their 
operations. This promotion seems aimed at both investors and potential investee 
firms. The general function of these strategic partnerships, as briefly articulated 
during this structure phase of questioning, is to exchange information and expertise 
regarding specific portfolio companies, industry trends, and due diligence, and to 
bolster a venture capital firm’s reputation. These functions and others are 
extensively discussed and analysed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
As to whom venture capital firms are interacting with through these strategic 
partnerships, the interviews indicated a mix of corporate R&D personnel, 
corporate venture capitalists, and corporate executives (more commonly top-level 
management). However, corporate contacts in product development and at the 
executive level or in top management seemed to hold the most relevance regarding 
the value of the strategic partnership.  As one interviewee at a life science-focused 
venture capital firm described: 
We work very closely; we meet with their PD [product development] people 
quite frequently to discuss opportunities in our portfolio, for licensing 
agreements and for acquisitions. We have close relationships with their 
R&D people, etc.; we have very strong, ongoing relationships. 
Likewise, an interviewee at an information technology-focused venture capital 
firm commented: 
So it is important, but primarily it is important for the exit, and corporate 
venture groups tend to play a relatively minor part in that, because really we 
are selling a set of assets and capabilities to an organization. It is the 
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functional representatives of that organization that need to buy in and want 
whatever we got. 
There are two points to consider from the comment above, both of which will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 7.  First, strategic partnerships with 
large corporations appear to function as a mechanism through which the venture 
capital firm can position its portfolio firm for an exit via corporate acquisition: 
selling a portfolio firm to a corporate strategic partner. Second, significant 
interaction with corporate venture capitalists (i.e. corporate venturing divisions of 
large corporations) was downplayed by the majority of interviewees, suggesting 
collaboration where co-investing (i.e. syndication) between venture capital firms 
and large corporations is less common, and where corporate power resides in the 
parent company rather than in the corporate venturing division. In other words, a 
strategic partnership will often involve interaction with a corporate venturing 
division that lacks significant autonomy from their parent company, which may 
have implications for collaboration. 
Within these strategic partnerships the venture capital firm does seem to play an 
intermediary role, exchanging information with a corporate partner and then 
relaying it to portfolio companies. An interviewee at a life science-focused venture 
capital firm explained: 
Well, first all, we supply this information to our portfolio companies — 
their development people.  So it is not just used by us. I mean, clearly we 
are not going to give out anything confidential, but portfolio companies will 
know what big firms are interested in what. That is also useful for them if 
they have a meeting with a large corporate for something else; they all know 
that they are actually interested in a particular area. So we don’t just supply 
them with the information, but we also consult with them on approaches and 
strategy for meetings with corporate partners. 
Alluded to in this comment is the often cited role of the venture capital firm in 
actively assisting their portfolio companies in making connections to large 
corporate players. This is seen in the literature as a primary function of venture 
capital firms as active investors and as crucial for the business development of 
NHTCs (see Chapter 3). 
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Along these same lines, a common activity facilitated through strategic 
partnerships is the placing of corporate representatives on the advisory board of the 
venture capital firm or boards of specific portfolio companies. An interviewee at 
an information technology-focused venture capital firm explained: 
I was just at a meeting (with a corporate partner) where I walked them 
through the process of VC investment. One person (a corporate 
representative) asked if they could sit on a board of one of our portfolio 
companies. It had to be a firm where there was no direct interest. He met the 
directors of a firm and agreed on this arrangement. He comes to all the 
meetings, reads all the papers, and gives his input — it has worked very 
well. Building these relationships is very important to us. 
In most instances, even when a corporate representative sits on the board, the 
involvement of the corporate partner in decisions regarding venture capital firm 
strategy or portfolio firm development was described as fairly hands-off, although 
the input of a corporate board member is often used by the venture capital firm in 
their valuation of a portfolio firm from one investment round to the next.  An 
interviewee at life science-focused venture capital firm commented: 
Actually, they tend to be very passive. Quite often they might have observer 
seats; if they are on the board, they aren’t aggressive. Sometimes it is very 
good to have one of these people on the board, because in a sense they set 
the price when going into the next round. That price has to be set externally. 
They know the company because of this interaction, and they are the 
market, so they can set an accurate price going into the next round; there is 
price validation. 
Again, the interaction between the venture capital firm and the corporate strategic 
partner, as with almost all collaboration involving large corporations, is generally 
facilitated through individual venture capital firm partners and their corporate 
contacts rather than through the executive level of the venture capital firm. 
Occasional meetings are held between venture capital firm partners and their 
corporate contacts, and information is exchanged. But decisions ultimately are 
made and carried out by the venture capital firm without intimate corporate 
involvement, indicating a type of collaboration in which flexibility is desired and 
less formal structures are the norm. 
In moving from less formal to more formal collaborative structures, a number of 
factors need to be considered. A common sentiment expressed by interviewees is 
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that with formality comes increasing risk associated with both increased 
commitment on the part of the venture capital firm (a lack a flexibility about an 
inherently uncertain investment) and a loss of control (less ownership stake and 
more limited exit options); these are risks that not all venture capital firms are 
willing or able to assume.  As an interviewee at a clean tech-focused venture 
capital firm explained: 
There are two different types of collaboration. One is having investment 
collaboration, and two, the businesses themselves collaborating [investee 
firms collaborating with large corporations]. The major concerns are about 
the investment collaboration. That is quite different from the businesses 
themselves having partnerships. In the commercial collaborations where 
they ultimately become a customer or have a license agreement, there is a 
scale, a continuum of arrangements of different business models. You have 
the distribution model, where you just sell to them and they sell it on, to a 
kind of co-development model, partnership or 50-50 of everything.  It is 
interesting — the really, really big ones that have huge amounts of money to 
spend, I think that have lots more models for financing businesses, they 
have loads of money and can afford to take the optimal model in my point 
of view, which is put lots of money in so the business is self-financing, you 
control that and assume the risk, go year-to-year with the next round of 
funding based on achieving certain things.  Any partnering they do, they 
don’t need for cash flow, if you do a major deal with a big backer, you only 
do it for strategic purposes; you don’t need the cash. So they do deals that 
are very back-ended; they don’t need the money up-front. The idea being, if 
the product is successful, that royalty stream is so expensive for the 
corporate, that it makes entire sense to buy the company — great exit 
strategy for us [venture capital firm]! If you have the funds to do that type of 
thing, then that is how it should work. If you don’t have those types of 
funds, then partnering is a way to strike a balance to get those funds, but it 
does come with some costs.  
The costs associated with more formal collaboration, according to the above 
statement, are better managed by larger, better funded venture capital firms. 
Notions of obstacles and challenges as they relate to collaboration between venture 
capital firms and large corporations will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. The 
implication, however, is that engaging in more formal collaboration with strategic 
corporate partners may bring a venture capital firm — one that is able to manage 
the associated costs — more valuable strategic benefits. 
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5.4. Syndication Partnerships 
The third type of structure employed by venture capital firms to collaborate with 
large corporations is a syndication partnership. Syndication partnerships, in the 
context of venture capital, are formal contractual agreements between two or more 
investment entities (e.g. venture capital firms) to co-invest in an individual 
portfolio firm or group of portfolio companies within the same investment round 
(see Chapter 3). Syndication partnerships are more formal than strategic 
partnerships in that, among other things, they involve the contractual transfer of 
investment funds (Lockett & Wright, 2001). Unlike in a limited partnership, each 
syndicate partner shares in the risk of the investment, including profits and any 
accruing losses. It is assumed that syndication involves not only the sharing of 
funds but also the sharing of information regarding investment selection and 
strategy (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). Findings for syndication partnerships between 
venture capital firms and large corporations, by sector, are found in Table 11. 
Table 11: Relative Significance of Syndication Partnerships, by Sector 
  
ICT LIFE SCIENCE 
CLEAN 
TECH  
  
NO 72 0 20 47 
YES WEAK  22 29 80 33 
YES STRONG 6 71 0 20 
  
100%           
(N=18) 
100%            
(N=7) 
100%    
(N=5) 
100%                                 
(N=30) 
Based on the findings, the use of syndication partnerships as a form of 
collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations is less common 
than either business networks or strategic partnerships. It was expected that 
syndication partnerships would be employed less often than other forms of 
collaboration due to the greater formality involved. However, it was thought that 
the use of syndication partnerships would be more aligned with the findings on 
formal strategic partnerships as a mechanism for building capacities for more 
formal syndication partnerships. In comparing sectors, those venture capital firms 
investing exclusively in life science are coded 29% Yes Weak and 71% Yes 
Strong. Again, life science-specific venture capital firms showed a higher 
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propensity for formal collaboration with large corporations compared with firms 
investing in either information technology (coded 72% No, 22% Yes Weak, and 
6% Yes Strong) or clean tech (coded 20% No and 80% Yes Weak). 
As the findings indicate, those venture capital firms investing specifically in life 
science had a higher propensity to engage in syndication with large corporations 
than those investing in information technologies and clean tech, adding support to 
H1, which proposes that the more science and technology intensive the sector of 
investment, the greater the propensity for more formal collaboration. Interviewees 
described much of the formal syndication partnerships with large pharmaceutical 
companies as occurring through interaction with the corporate venturing and CVC 
divisions of these large companies. An interviewee at a life science-focused 
venture capital firm explained: 
A number of pharmaceutical companies have their own venture funds, and 
we work with many of the major pharma players; they have their own funds 
in house, and indeed they are syndicate partners with us in a number of our 
investments. We work very closely with their R&D people; we frequently 
meet to discuss opportunities in our portfolio — investment opportunities — 
and in potential spin-outs. This might also include discussion on possible 
licensing agreements and acquisitions. 
Another interviewee at a life science-focused venture capital firm stated: 
Syndication with Big Pharma does happen. Big Pharma do engage in  
venture portfolio funding, sort of a venture capital fund, if you like, and they 
do invest in many of our portfolio companies, and they do their investing 
along-side us. 
When syndication or co-investing with large corporations was noted as having 
occurred or as being a relatively common arrangement (a minority of those firms 
interviewed), the syndication structure employed was described as similar to 
syndication arrangements between venture capital firms. In these instances the 
preference of the venture capital firm was for the large corporation to enter the 
syndication at the early stage and remain as a syndicate partner in that investment 
through to the exit stage.  The interviewee quoted immediately above went on to 
comment: 
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That is the ideal situation and expectation. When we build a syndicate, we 
want our syndicate partners to be with us right through. And in fact, in the 
term sheets/agreements we have pretty stringent pay-to-play provisions.  So 
it is a worry for us. We don’t want syndicate players who don’t follow their 
money; this includes syndication with Big Pharma. 
That being said, syndication involving a large corporation was more commonly 
described as occurring during the later stages of the investment cycle, as the 
preference of the corporate partner, rather than at early or expansion stages, 
indicating a formal collaborative structure in which the optimal arrangement is 
often difficult to achieve. Similarly, an interviewee at another comparably smaller 
life science-focused venture capital firm expanded on the above notion: 
Yes, you do have situations when a company comes in as a co-investor, but 
that is something that we as a small fund would be very wary of — but not 
always. It depends on the circumstances and whether that partner could 
acquire the company in the end. I have come across a situation where a 
pharma fund had pharma people on the board, but they were beholden to the 
pharma company and thus were constrained in raising additional funds. 
Pharma ended up buying the company when the negotiating level was very 
low — the [venture capital] fund lost out. So you have to be very careful. 
They just sort of get in the way; they can stall you and then pick you up on 
the cheap. You want to avoid this kind of situation. 
The above comment adds to earlier suggestions that smaller venture capital firms 
— those with less capitalisation — generally forgo more formal collaboration with 
large corporations, preferring a more flexible path. Findings regarding when 
collaboration takes place in relation to the venture capital investment cycle, and 
the challenges involved, are confirmed and discussed in more detail in Chapters 6 
and 7.  
Outside the life science sector, syndication between venture capital firms and large 
corporations is rare. However, this does not imply that these venture capital firms 
are not engaged in investment partnerships with large corporations. The difference 
is that these partnerships do not follow a syndication model of equally shared risks 
or the significant involvement by the non-lead partner (e.g. corporate partner) in 
the strategy and monitoring of either the fund or individual portfolio firm. The 
large corporation is essentially a limited partner. An interviewee at an information 
technology-focused venture capital firm commented: 
175 
 
 
We do have corporations, through their corporate venturing divisions, that 
may have equity investments in our companies, but in those circumstances it 
is unusual for a corporation to take an active role in the company at all…. 
Certainly, if someone were to come along and ask us if we could run a fund 
for them that would be parallel to our funds and that would invest in 
selected things, then that is something we would consider. 
Likewise, an interviewee at a different information technology-focused venture 
capital firm said: 
We have corporate investors who invest directly into our funds, and we have 
been approached by corporations now to develop some very specific 
strategic funds with them, to help them.  So it is a major ongoing activity 
these days, and relationships between us and corporations on various levels 
are very strong, and we work with them to build these relationships.   
Most notable in the comments above is the mentioning of what are commonly 
referred to as dedicated funds: an arrangement in which a venture capital firm sets 
up and manages an investment fund for which a large corporation is the sole 
investor. Several interviewees mentioned that dedicated funds had been employed 
in the past with varying degrees of success, but not one of the 30 interviewees 
described such funds as active or as being planned. Yet even in the absence of such 
structures, the majority of interviewees, like those above, spoke of an openness 
and anticipation to such deals and a willingness to work toward more formal 
collaborative arrangements with large corporations. However, it is clear from the 
findings that for venture capital firms, moving from less formal to more formal 
collaboration with large corporations, particularly syndication deals, necessitates 
that the interests of the two parties are relatively aligned. In discussing the 
complexities of the syndication process, an interviewee at an ICT focused venture 
capital firm explained: 
When forming a syndicate, if we are leading the financing [lead investor], 
then we generally have control over the formation of the syndicate — 
getting the right people in for additional rounds — making sure that the 
syndicate partners have the same interests. So when you are trying to form 
the next round of financing, you are not all fighting about what the price 
should be. Looking to exit, the higher price is desirable; but if you are 
looking to raise more money, you might want a lower price, showing 
prospects for growth. It is not a simple process of just getting as much 
money as possible, for instance. So you want to make sure that all the 
investors are aligned in their interests, and that just means that everyone 
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involved wants the same thing for the company, making it easier going 
forward. 
Aligning the potentially competing interests of venture capital firms and large 
corporations is probably the most significant obstacle facing more formal 
collaboration between these two actors. However, Chapters 6 and 7 show how 
these interests are becoming increasingly complementary and perhaps more 
supportive of collaboration. For now, however, the challenges associated with 
collaboration, particularly the aligning of interests, are effectively illuminated in 
the context of collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations 
as it relates to the corporate spin-out. 
5.5. Corporate Spin-Outs 
The fourth type of collaborative structure explored in the interviews involves 
investment arrangements associated with corporate spin-outs. A spin-out (often 
referred to as a spin-off) is an independent business that has been intentionally 
separated (spun-out) from the core organisation. This differs from another 
definition of a spin-out, which refers to entrepreneurs formally employed by an 
incumbent firm starting their own businesses. In most cases, a spin-out will take 
personnel, intellectual property, technology, and often a specific product from the 
parent company (Tidd & Barnes, 2000). Spin-outs may have strong strategic 
connections to the parent company, or the relationship may be more hands-off. For 
venture capital firms spin-outs represent another possible investment opportunity 
as portfolio companies. The expectation is that a venture capital firm’s investment 
in a spin-out will involve some level of collaboration with the parent company, 
usually a large corporation. It was thought that spin-outs could be very formal, 
perhaps involving a syndication partnership between the venture capital firm and 
parent company. On the other hand, the spin-out might be less formal, involving 
very little collaboration between the venture capital firm and the parent company. 
Findings for collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations 
associated with corporate spin-outs are found in Table 12. 
Somewhat surprisingly, collaboration between venture capital firms and large 
corporations associated with corporate spin-outs is the least common form of 
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collaboration coded for. Although spin-outs are expected to involve considerable 
formality and collaborative complexity, they also can be thought of as an obvious 
investment opportunity for venture capital firms. Indeed, they are thought to be a 
more common form of venture capital investment than the findings here indicate. 
Importantly, the findings should not be interpreted as an indication of limited 
venture capital investment in spin-outs, but rather as a lack of collaboration 
between venture capital firms and large corporations in relation to spin-outs. In 
comparing sectors, those venture capital firms investing exclusively in life science 
are coded 43%t Yes Weak and 57% Yes Strong, continuing a pattern in which life 
science-specific venture capital firms are more formally engaged in collaboration 
with large corporations than are other sectors.  Those venture capital firms 
engaged heavily in information technology are coded 56% No, 39% Yes Weak, 
and 6% Yes Strong. Likewise, those venture capital firms investing exclusively in 
clean tech are coded 40% No and 60% Yes Weak. 
Table 12: Relative Significance of Corporate Spin-outs, by Sector 
  IT LIFE SCIENCE 
CLEAN 
TECH   
NO 56 0 40 40 
YES WEAK  39 43 60 43 
YES STRONG 6 57 0 17 
  
100%           
(N=18) 
100%                   
(N=7) 
100%    
(N=5) 
100%                            
(N=30) 
Interviewees described two types of corporate spin-outs. The first involves a large 
corporation spin-out of a technology or product team with the aim of better 
developing that product through an external business in which the parent company 
will often invest knowledge and capital. Venture capital firms view such a spin-out 
as a potentially valuable investment opportunity because the spin-out has the 
assumed backing of the parent company (i.e. the parent company is invested in the 
success of the spin-out). For the venture capital firm investing in such a spin-out, 
collaboration with the parent company, typified by significant corporate 
involvement, was described by interviewees in this study as both “formal” and 
“ideal” from an investment perspective. An interviewee from a life science-
focused venture capital firm explained: 
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There are some circumstances and certain deals where at the outset, say if a 
Big Pharma is spinning out something that we then take on, that the 
corporate venture groups of that company would get involved, and they 
could make an investment on the back of an asset that they know about. And 
that has been done with one of my companies where we actually hard-wire 
in a deal with that company at the beginning. So, that is a very easy one to 
handle. 
In the second type of spin-out described by interviewees, a large corporation spins 
out a technology or product (but usually not the product team) because they have 
not yet identified a particular need for it, so continued development costs are not 
yet justified, or other projects take priority due to changing pipeline needs. There 
could be any number of possible reasons. That the development or product team is 
retained is, according to some interviewees, a decent indicator as to the large 
corporation’s lack of interest in the spin-out.  In such instances the parent company 
generally takes a very hands-off approach to the spin-out — a “let’s see what 
happens” attitude.  The spin-out then becomes a riskier investment for the venture 
capital firm. The same interviewee from a life science-focused venture capital firm 
continues: 
The flip side is when they just spin something out. Now, these are tricky for 
us to do, because for these products, you need to determine why they 
spinning them out. Sometimes it is generally the case that they don’t have 
the dedicated in-house resources to carry it out — developing the products 
— and they think that someone else can do a better job, developing it faster, 
cheaper, and they keep an option to it later on. This does happen. With a 
company I worked on, it was the technology that they did not think was 
interesting, so they spun it out, and we developed it, and a different 
corporate bought it. We made a lot of money, and it is still doing well. You 
need to be careful though; a lack of corporate interest might signal a lack of 
quality [in the spin-out], so it can be very tricky. 
The experience of most interviewees was that spin-outs are generally of the second 
type; that is, they are spun-out due to a lack of corporate interest and thus must be 
approached with certain amount of skepticism regarding quality. This does not 
mean that the interviewees were not investing in spin-outs. But there was a 
pervasive attitude in the interviews that spoke of wariness and caution regarding 
spin-outs. An interviewee at an information technology-focused venture capital 
firm commented: 
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We’ve been involved in a number of spin-out deals, some successful, others 
not so. Sometimes it feels like they just unload these things [spin-outs]. The 
ones that have corporate backing are ideal; we prefer this, but that is just not 
always the case, so you need to be careful. Sometimes they say they have 
corporate backing, but it might be just talking it up. As an investor, you 
need to ask yourself: Why are they spinning this out? The spin-out might 
very well be junk! 
Considering these comments, corporate spin-outs illustrate not only the importance 
of aligned interests when it comes to collaboration between venture capital firms 
and large corporations, but also the inherent tension and the resulting balance that 
is sought between the need for flexibility and the need, at times, for formalization 
when investing in and developing NHTCs. With most of the structures for 
collaboration explored in this chapter, the desire for significant flexibility on 
behalf of the venture capital firm seems paramount. This need for flexibility 
drives, in part, the preferred model of less formal collaborative structures between 
venture capital firms and large corporations. Therefore, the example of the 
corporate spin-out is interesting in that the more valuable and preferred spin-out 
arrangement, as described by interviewees, is one in which the parent company 
(large corporation) is heavily involved in the development of the spin-out. 
Increased corporate involvement might very well cause secondary problems for the 
venture capital firm participating in the spin-out (as discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 7), but the willingness of the venture capital firm to trade some flexibility 
(in some cases considerable flexibility) for enhanced investment confidence in the 
said spin-out is informative. 
In considering the structures coded for, including corporate spin-outs, the findings 
clearly indicate that those venture capital firms investing specifically in life 
science show a higher propensity for engaging in formal collaboration with large 
corporations than those engaged in information technology or clean tech. Again, 
on a structural level this seems to support the main hypothesis of this chapter (H1), 
which proposes that the more science and technology intensive the sector of 
investment, the greater the propensity for more formal collaboration. This is based 
on the notion that formalisation is necessary to secure specialised inputs of 
knowledge and resources, expected to be comparably higher in life science than in 
other high-tech sectors. The full basis of this hypothesis, though, is not confirmed 
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here. Although uncertainty and the related need for investor confidence are noted, 
the role, if any, that sector-specific inputs play in the careful balancing act between 
flexibility and formalisation remains inconclusive, and will be addressed in the 
next chapter. 
5.6. Collaboration, Co-location, and the LMR 
Given the importance that geographic proximity and face-to-face interaction holds 
for venture capital investment and related monitoring activities (e.g. investment 
syndication behaviour), it was thought that some degree of geographic proximity 
between venture capital firms and large corporations would be a precondition for 
collaboration between these two actors, or for at least some aspect of the 
collaboration process (see Chapters 2 and 3; see Florida & Smith, 1991). The 
tendency for large corporations to locate their R&D centres and corporate 
venturing divisions in innovative regions, including the LMR, reinforced such 
expectations (see Chapter 3). In this way, it was thought that some degree of co-
location of these two actors in the LMR would both facilitate face-to-face 
interaction and subsequent collaboration between them, and that the LMR itself 
would reinforce this collaboration through its capacities for innovation and 
knowledge exchange. In assessing the relevance of geographic proximity for 
collaboration as proposed by (H4), this chapter first connects propensities for 
certain collaborative mechanisms and structures to the importance of face-to-face 
interaction. This is followed by a discussion on how interviewees (VCs) 
interpreted the role of co-location and the LMR in facilitating collaboration with 
their corporate connections and partners.  
5.6.1. Geographic Proximity and Face-to-Face Interaction 
First, the propensity of venture capital firms to use both personal and business 
networks to initiate and maintain collaborative relationships with large 
corporations would seem to be a clear indication that some degree of geographic 
proximity is necessary for facilitating such relationships. With information being 
exchanged regarding complementary assets, as some interviewees implied, and 
with much of this information understood as tacit in form, it is almost certain that 
some face-to-face interaction, even if not taking place regularly, will be required to 
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facilitate this information exchange. Furthermore, with many of these 
relationships, as described by interviewees, built initially on the past industry ties 
of venture capitalists, the use of face-to-face interaction to either strengthen or 
maintain a necessary degree of trust between parties, would seem preferred, if not 
integral.  
Therefore, face-to-face interaction should be particularly important for VCs 
without significant industry experience or connections, not only for initial 
introductions, but, just as for more experienced VCs, for follow-up discussions 
regarding possibly proprietary and confidential information about corporate 
pipeline needs and complementary portfolio companies. In this context, the sizable 
number of interviewees who stressed the importance of industry association 
meetings and conferences for initiating and maintaining relationships with large 
corporations, particularly for those VCs without significant previous industry ties 
or contacts, adds further importance to face-to-face interaction in this regard. The 
fact that many of these meetings and conferences are held in the LMR speaks to 
not only of the LMR as a centre of innovative activity and venture capital 
investment, but also to the importance of local industry networks and related 
intermediaries, in this case industry associations, in bringing complementary actors 
together. Such notions also demonstrate that large corporations have an active 
presence within these local networks, hinting at a supposed co-location dynamic 
within the LMR between the local venture capital community and large 
corporations.   
Furthermore, for those venture capital firms engaging large corporations in 
strategic partnerships, some degree of geographic proximity between the venture 
capital firm and large corporation, or at least a corporate representative, would 
appear to be necessary. For example, a number of interviewees described strategic 
partnerships involving the placing of corporate representatives on the boards of 
directors of both individual portfolio companies and on a venture capital firm’s 
scientific advisory board. The literature on venture capital board member makeup 
clearly suggests that most board members reside within close geographic 
proximity of the portfolio companies or venture capital firms on whose boards they 
sit, geographic proximity facilitating the board’s critical monitoring activity of 
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portfolio companies (see Chapter 3). Therefore, it is assumed that corporate 
representatives appointed by venture capital firms to sit on respective boards will 
reside in close geographic proximity to either the respective venture capital firm, 
the portfolio company, or both. 
Likewise, for those venture capital firms engaging in investment syndication 
partnerships with large corporations, some degree of geographic proximity 
between the parties would seem to be required given the assumed need for regular 
face-to-face interaction in coordinating monitoring activities and exchanging 
relevant and likely specialised information and knowledge regarding investment 
decision making and the evaluation of portfolio companies. Indeed, as some 
interviewees indicated, regular meetings between VCs and corporate R&D heads 
and scientists was a common occurrence in the life science sector where 
syndication partnerships are more prominent. Finally, in instances involving 
venture capital investment in a corporate spin-out, it is assumed that face-to-face 
interaction, thus some degree of geographic proximity, would be important 
between the venture capital firm (as lead investor) and the large corporation (as the 
parent company), particularly when there is strong corporate interest and thus 
corporate involvement in the monitoring of the spin-out. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that most spin-outs will locate within close geographic proximity of both 
the lead venture capital investor and the corporate parent company because being 
close to the parent company allows the spin-out better access to corporate expertise 
and supply chains. 
Overall, when looking at the findings regarding the structures and mechanism for 
collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations, geographic 
proximity would seem to play an important role, particularly in facilitating face-to-
face interaction between the two parties. The question, then, is whether co-location 
within the LMR is advantageous or necessary for these productive face-to-face 
interactions between venture capital firms and large corporations to occur. 
5.6.2 Co-location or Regional Capacities? 
Initial interview questions regarding the role that geographic proximity plays in 
facilitating collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations 
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focused on the significance of co-location within the LMR and to the advantages 
that the LMR held in this regard. In other words, the line of inquiry focused on 
whether co-location within the LMR facilitates face-to-face interactions between 
venture capital firms and large corporations toward the coordination and 
development of collaborative relationships between them. And in what ways does 
the LMR directly or indirectly facilitate this collaboration, even in the possible 
absence of any substantial co-location synergies between actors? Importantly, 
these initial questions did not focus on when geographic proximity was most 
beneficial for facilitating collaboration between venture capital firms and large 
corporations. Such conclusions are drawn later from the findings in Chapter 6 and 
the analysis in Chapter 7. Partially as a result, perhaps, answers from these initial 
questions downplayed the role of geographic proximity, particularly in terms of 
co-location as a mechanism for face-to-face interaction, while emphasising the 
importance of the LMR as a centre of innovative activity and international 
knowledge exchange — regional capacities that, according to interviewees, held 
relevance for collaboration between the two actors.  
According to interviewees, close geographic proximity does play a facilitating role 
in collaboration with large corporations: all interviewees expressed the need for 
face-to-face interaction with corporate contacts and partners, which provides some 
support for (H4). But interviewees stressed that such face-to-face meetings were 
not as frequent as between venture capital firms, describing much of their 
interaction with corporate contacts as “over the phone” and “periodic rather than 
frequent.” Furthermore, although some regular interaction with corporate contacts 
facilitates the development and maintenance of collaborative relationships, 
interviewees explained, those corporate contacts do not need to be in constant 
geographic proximity for these relationships to be initiated, maintained, and 
leveraged. Likewise, most interviewees commented that although the presence of 
large corporations in the LMR (e.g. headquarters, corporate venturing offices, and 
R&D facilities) offers some advantages by facilitating face-to-face contact and 
adding to the overall investment and innovative milieu, co-location does not 
appear to be a determining factor in whether collaboration between a venture 
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capital firm and a large corporation will occur. Regarding geographic proximity, 
an interviewee at an ICT focused venture capital firm commented: 
I think [geographic proximity] must add something in terms of convenience 
for going to meetings. I think it is easy to underestimate the burden of being 
far away and removed. However, the space is global, especially in modeling 
these partnerships; you don’t do the home market first and then expand. The 
market that really matters is the U.S.; the U.S. subsidizes the rest of the 
world. We see the U.S. as an ‘A’ market and Europe being more different 
markets, although the U.S. can be seen as different markets but with a 
common language — different drivers, dynamics, and cultures. British 
companies often fail to realize this when entering the U.S. market; thus, a 
high failure rate. 
That being said, interviewees from life science focused venture capital firms 
stressed the advantages of having the R&D centres of major pharmaceutical 
companies located in the LMR for exchanging information with corporate 
contacts, indicating that some degree of co-location is important for this type of 
collaboration in the life science sector. This aligns somewhat with (H1), which 
proposed that collaboration would be more important and more formal when the 
science and technology inputs required by portfolio companies are high. This 
argument might be extended to geographic proximity in that the more formal the 
collaboration, as in a syndication partnership, the more important co-location 
becomes for coordinating joint investment monitoring and evaluation activities. If 
this is indeed the case, then overall propensities for less formal collaboration 
among the venture capital firms engaged in ICT and clean tech may well be 
contributing overall to the lessened emphasis placed co-location in the findings. In 
other words, less formal collaboration may require less co-location between actors. 
As indicated in the comment above, however, a more important factor contributing 
to the lower value given to co-location by interviewees might be the global nature 
and focus of both venture capital investment and related corporate partnerships. In 
fact, when asked about the importance of geographic proximity in relation to co-
location, the majority of venture capital firms interviewed responded (almost 
immediately) that “this is a global industry” with “global partners” and “global 
markets” and pointed to the “international flows” thought to increasingly 
characterise venture capital investment. Furthermore, these responses were fairly 
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uniform across sectors. An interviewee at a life science-focused venture capital 
firm explained: 
Local, global, it makes no difference at all. We don’t have any particular 
U.K. focus. We have three main offices: San Francisco, Boston, and 
London. And we invest in three sectors: pharmaceuticals, medical devices, 
and healthcare services. Devices and healthcare services are predominately 
U.S. But therapeutics is done through the London and San Francisco office. 
So out of the London office we will deal with the East Coast of the U.S. and 
all of Europe. In San Francisco we deal with all of North America; so along 
with Boston, we here in London sort of overlap on the East Coast. We see 
ourselves as a global life sciences venture capital firm: we invest globally. 
The fact that we are in London doesn’t really matter. We could just as easily 
be in Paris. There is a strong regional element to all of this, but it is not 
driven by the location of Big Pharma. 
This comment, and there were many like it, is interesting in several respects, not 
least because it shows some contradictions concerning geographic proximity. First, 
it makes the point that many London based venture capital firms, regardless of 
sector focus, are investing not only in portfolio companies located in the LMR, but 
also those located in other innovative regions across the globe. However, the 
comment also makes clear that London based venture capital firms coordinate with 
their branch offices, which are located in these innovative regions, to carry out this 
investment activity. In other words, some degree of geographic proximity between 
venture capital firms and portfolio companies is still necessary, even if this 
proximity involves a branch office or regional headquarters.  
Second, the comment “the fact that we are in London doesn’t really matter — we 
could just as easily be in Paris” might well be true, but it is doubtful that a venture 
capital firm would locate to a region that is not considered a centre of venture 
capital activity. In other words, even if, according to the above interviewee, 
London itself “doesn’t matter” in that there are alternative locations, metropolitan 
regions such as London (e.g. Paris, Boston, San Francisco) do matter when it 
comes to venture capital investment activity. Furthermore, although co-location by 
large corporations may not drive the geographic concentration of venture capital 
investment, they must certainly play a role in anchoring the clusters of NHTCs in 
these innovative regions. Therefore, it is possible that the importance of co-
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location in facilitating collaboration between venture capital firms and large 
corporations may be more significant than most interviewees admit or realise.  
According to interviewees, playing a more significant, if not direct, role in 
facilitating collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations — 
and venture capital related collaboration more generally — is the LMR itself, both 
as a high-capacity region and as a global gateway. All 30 interviewees stressed the 
importance of the London region as a magnet for venture capital investment and 
innovative activity, pointing particularly to “the best entrepreneurial culture 
outside the United States,” robust science and technological capacities (e.g. Oxford 
and Cambridge), a substantial industry base, and unrivalled financial expertise 
present in the region. According to the interviewees, these capacities attract global 
investment, talent, and skills, including large corporations and their corporate 
venturing divisions, creating synergies and opportunities for collaboration. An 
interviewee at a life science-focused venture capital firm explained: 
So if you look at the UK, you’ve got the so-called biotech golden triangle of 
Oxford, Cambridge, London; and obviously GSK and Pfizer are close, but 
AstraZeneca is more near Manchester, so I think it has more to do with the 
academic base, due to the fact that Oxford, Cambridge and Imperial have 
had tech transfer programs longer than most places, where they have been 
very effective in creating companies. And then, of course, all of the life 
science venture capital firms are based in London, along with most of the 
patent lawyers are here, the banks, so you have a critical mass on multiple 
fronts. And then, the serial entrepreneur wants to be where there are 
multiple companies and opportunities — manage personal risk. 
Similar comments point to the agglomeration advantages that large metropolitan 
regions such as London offer individuals, firms, and organizations engaged in 
innovative activity. An interviewee at a clean tech-focused venture capital firm 
further expanded: 
It is very important to attract top management to wherever the deals are 
occurring. One attraction for top management is other opportunities if things 
go bust. You will have a very difficult time recruiting top management for a 
company in the north of Scotland because of the lack of other companies. 
This would be an enormous risk, moving their family, etc.  Cambridge is 
much more attractive because of the cluster. The same can be said about the 
Oxford cluster, where it is really valuable in the early stage technology area. 
So this cluster dynamic is definitely important: the more companies you 
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have, the more talent you have, the more innovation you have. There is an 
innovation culture, and we benefit from this.   
However, London’s global transport links, particularly Heathrow Airport play a 
more direct role in facilitating collaboration between venture capital firms, large 
corporations, and collaboration more generally. The LMR is not only a magnet for 
global knowledge and finance. The region is also highly accessible to these flows 
(e.g. London is a primary meeting place for venture capital partners and their 
global corporate contacts and a location for international industry meetings and 
conferences). In summing up the attributes of the London region, an interviewee at 
an information technology-focused venture capital firm stated: 
When we are talking about the advantages of London, we are talking about 
two things. The first is academic; you’ve got the University of London, 
Imperial College, and Oxford and Cambridge, all of which are a big 
advantage to us in that they are all important for new ideas, due diligence, 
and looking at new companies. One area is that London acts as a magnet. It 
can’t be stressed enough that people flying to Europe often fly through 
Heathrow. If they have time, they often come into London to see some firms 
or universities, and they can stop by and see us. It makes setting up and 
conducting meetings very easy, and we can easily introduce them to others; 
really helps build our network and helps with our investments. For example, 
I first set up a company in Cambridge, and an identical company was set up 
in Kent. We absolutely hammered them! 
These findings add to a growing and assumed construct indicating that geographic 
location and the capacities of the LMR matter when it comes to innovative activity 
in the United Kingdom, activity in which London based venture capital and large 
corporations play a significant facilitating role. These initial findings, however, do 
not identify a direct connection between location and geographic proximity more 
specifically, and the formalisation of collaboration between venture capital firms 
and large corporations. That being said, the importance of geographic proximity in 
facilitating collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations is 
probably downplayed in these initial findings and, as shown in Chapters 6 and 7, 
somewhat contradicts findings associated with why venture capital firms 
collaborate with large corporations and when such collaboration is most beneficial. 
The frequency with which the interviewees above mentioned the role of meetings 
between venture capitalists and corporate contacts coupled with the importance of 
industry associations and conferences occurring in the LMR as relationship 
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mechanisms would seem to imply that geographic proximity or at least the 
presence of large corporations or their representatives within the LMR  facilitates 
the strategic partnerships and less common syndication relationships between 
venture capital firms and large corporations. 
5.7. Conclusion 
Findings derived from the interviews demonstrate that collaboration between 
venture capital firms and large corporations is pervasive, with all 30 venture 
capital firms interviewed confirming that such collaboration plays a significant and 
important role in the venture capital investment process. The majority of those 
firms interviewed also described such collaboration as being more openly pursued 
and discussed within the venture capital community and related industry networks, 
with large corporations being increasingly aggressive in courting venture capital 
firms for collaborative purposes. The foundations for all collaborative structures 
employed are informal and formal business networks that are based on the past 
corporate experience and industry ties of venture capitalists, many of whom 
formerly held corporate positions. Formal strategic partnerships with large 
corporations were described by roughly half the interviewees as important and 
frequently used. Such partnerships were viewed as an important mechanism for 
exchanging information, often through the use of corporate board members. In 
most instances, however, the involvement of the corporate strategic partner in 
decisions regarding venture capital firm strategy or portfolio firm development 
was described as fairly “hands-off.”   
More formal collaborative structures involving large corporations such as 
syndication and corporate spin-outs were described as occurring, but were less 
common. Syndication was described as the exception, even by interviewees 
employing strategic partnerships with large corporations. Somewhat surprisingly, 
instances of venture capital firms collaborating with large corporations on a 
corporate spin-out were, like syndication arrangements, not all that common. 
Interviewees cited the need for scepticism about the quality of spin-outs and 
corporate intentions. The challenges involving formal syndication and spin-out 
deals with large corporations are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. However, 
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the findings presented here do speak to collaboration where obstacles barring the 
aligning of interests (e.g. differences in strategic aims and culture) may result in 
the propensity for more flexible and informal collaborative arrangements.  
When the three sectors are compared, those venture capital firms investing 
specifically in life science placed greater importance on collaboration with large 
corporations and showed a higher propensity to engage in more formal 
collaboration than was evident in other sectors, although venture capital firms 
investing in clean tech also showed a propensity for formal collaboration, 
particularly when compared to firms engaged in information technology. The 
primary explanation is that for venture capital firms investing in life science, and 
perhaps clean tech, the science and technology inputs required by their portfolio 
companies are greater than those in information technology, lending support to 
(H1) which proposed that the greater the science and technology inputs required 
by portfolio companies, the more important and formal collaboration between 
venture capital firms and large corporations becomes. This hypothesis is further 
developed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
In assessing (H4), which proposed that collaboration between venture capital 
firms and large corporations will be facilitated through both geographic proximity 
and the capacities of the LMR, support is more mixed. The findings demonstrate 
that collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations is 
facilitated by geographic proximity in that it enables face-to-face interaction 
between the two parties, but the importance of co-location in the LMR is 
surprisingly downplayed. Rather, interviewees pointed to the global focus of their 
investments, explaining that although co-location made it easier to meet with 
corporate contacts and partners, it did not offer any decisive advantages in 
developing and maintaining corporate partnerships. Playing a more significant, if 
not direct, role in facilitating collaboration between venture capital firms and large 
corporations and venture capital related collaboration more generally is the 
London region itself. All 30 venture capital firms interviewed stressed the 
importance of the London region as a centre for venture capital investment, 
innovation, and international knowledge exchange.  
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These constructs and themes are further explored and expanded on in Chapters 6 
and 7. With the structures and mechanism for collaboration between venture 
capital firms and large corporations identified and the role of geographic proximity 
for this collaboration tentatively established, Chapter 6 looks at the motivations for 
venture capital firms to collaborate with large corporations, thus presenting a 
richer, perhaps more complex picture of both the process dynamics of this 
collaboration and the investment objectives and behaviour of venture capital firms 
operating in the LMR. 
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6. The Motivations for Collaboration: from Pure Finance and 
Deal Flow, to Enhanced Selection and Value Adding  
For VC firms it is thought that the commercial development and capacity building 
of portfolio companies is intrinsically linked to venture capital investment return: 
developing quality portfolio companies is the surest route to profitable investment 
exits. It is from this notion that VC firms are thought to provide their portfolio 
companies with considerable nonfinancial value-added toward their development 
(Flynn & Forman, 2001; MacMillan, Kulow, & Khoylian, 1989; Sapienza, 1992). 
In this way, portfolio companies themselves are as much a product of venture 
capital as are returns to institutional investors. A key mechanism used by VC firms 
to develop their portfolio companies is collaboration and information exchange 
with other VC firms via syndication and alliances with other investment partners 
and connections to local industry networks (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008). This 
chapter and this research more generally propose that it is from collaboration with 
these other partners, large corporations in particular, that VC firms seek, obtain, 
and use significant knowledge and expertise for better investment selection, 
monitoring, and the capacity building of their portfolio companies, leading to 
improved investment performance, investment exit, and higher investment returns. 
The previous chapter captured the frequency of collaboration between VC firms 
and large corporations, the mechanisms and structures employed, and the 
importance of geographic proximity for this collaboration. This chapter presents 
the second group of empirical findings: the motivations for VC firms to collaborate 
with large corporations. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify why VC firms 
collaborate with large corporations and to verify whether this collaboration is used 
by VC firms to develop the capacities of their portfolio companies.   
Questions regarding motivations for collaboration are derived mainly from the 
literature on venture capital syndication — syndication being one of the primary 
mechanism by which VC firms share risks and exchange information about the 
development of portfolio companies (see Chapter 3). The syndication study by 
Manigart and colleagues (2006) is particularly informative because it groups 
reasons for syndication into motivations for improving either overall portfolio 
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management and performance or the management and performance of individual 
portfolio companies. Within the first category are the finance motive and the deal 
flow motive; within the second category are the selection motive and the value 
adding motive (see Chapter 3). In looking at why VC firms collaborate with large 
corporations, five main motives are considered. These include the four above, as 
described by Manigart, in addition to the exit motive (i.e. collaborating with large 
corporations to improve investment exit).    
It was expected that all five motivations would to some extent be identified as 
reasons for VC firms to collaborate with large corporations, particularly the 
selection motive, the value adding motive, and the exit motive.  With venture 
capital’s focus on developing NHTCs, though, it was expected that the value 
adding motive would hold particular prominence as a reason for collaboration.  It 
follows that higher input requirements will correspond to more substantive value 
adding activities, with VC firms more readily connecting portfolio companies to 
critical external sources of specialised knowledge, resources, and commercial 
capacity. In this way: 
(H2) the greater the science and technology inputs required by portfolio 
companies, the more important collaboration between venture capital firms 
and large corporations becomes for value adding purposes. 
This chapter is structured by first presenting the summary findings (6.1), showing 
the extent to which all 30 VC firms were coded for each motivation. Findings are 
then presented for each type of motivation, showing sector comparisons. 
Motivations for enhancing overall portfolio management are presented first: the 
finance motive (6.2) and the deal flow motive (6.3). Motivations for enhancing the 
management of individual portfolio companies are then presented: the selection 
motive (6.4), the exit motive (6.5), and the value-adding motive (6.6). The value-
adding motive is further broken down into sub-motives pertaining to corporate 
industry and market knowledge (6.6.1), commercial and business development 
(6.6.2), and science and technology (6.6.3). Findings are discussed for each 
motivation, with a particular emphasis on connections made between them. The 
chapter concludes with a synthesis of the main findings and analysis and connects 
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these findings with those presented in Chapter 5, thus offering some broader 
implications for venture capital behaviour and setting up the final empirical 
chapter. 
6.1. Summary Findings 
In considering the overall findings (see Table 13) a broad mix of motivations were 
identified for why VC firms collaborate with large corporations. As expected, 
motivations for better management and performance of individual portfolio 
companies (the selection motive, the exit motive, and the value-adding motive) are 
described and coded as being more important than those associated with better 
portfolio performance (the finance motive and the deal flow motive). That being 
said, the finance motive and the deal flow motive in particular are still identified as 
significant motivations for collaboration, indication perhaps of the secondary 
benefits or outcomes of collaboration with large corporations. Furthermore, 
whereas all firms interviewed indicated that the value-adding motive was 
important in their decisions to collaborate with large corporations, the value-
adding motive is less significant than the selection motive and the exit motive. 
Thus, while the value adding motive is important, these findings do not fully 
support (H2). 
Table 13: Relative Importance of Motivations for Collaboration 
  FINANCE DEAL FLOW 
SELEC-
TION EXIT 
VALUE 
ADDED 
NO 43.3 7 0 0 0 
YES WEAK 43.3 43 13 10 50 
YES 
STRONG 13.3 50 87 90 50 
  
100%                
(N=30) 
100%                
(N=30) 
100%                
(N=30) 
100%                
(N=30) 
100%                
(N=30) 
What is clear from the summary findings, however, is the considerable importance 
that VC firms place on this collaboration for enhancing investment selection and 
exit. By looking at each motivation separately and in detail and by sector, 
interdependent connections might be drawn between various motivations (e.g. 
connections between the selection motive and the value adding motive). These 
connections may lend support to the importance of some motivations over others 
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in ways not apparent in the summary findings, offering greater insight to into why 
VC firms collaborate with large corporations and the impact that collaboration 
may have on the development and success of portfolio companies.  
6.2. The Finance Motive  
The finance motive refers here to motivations for collaboration geared toward 
increasing venture capital portfolio  diversification (sharing and mitigating 
investment risk) and access to investment funds (large corporations as a source of 
funding) (Manigart et al., 2006). Importantly, large corporations as “sources of 
funding” refers here to them as co-investors in individual portfolio companies (e.g. 
syndicate partners) and not as institutional investors. In comparison to the other 
possible motives for collaboration the finance motive is the least significant motive 
described. This finding is not especially surprising given the expectation that VC 
firms will collaborate with large corporations primarily for obtaining resources 
associated with knowledge rather than capital. Additionally, the previous chapter 
explained that although co-investment and syndication between VC firms does 
occur, such instances are the exception. However, some interesting variation 
emerges when looking more closely at the finance motive in regard to sector 
specificity, showing that the finance motive is indeed relevant for a number of VC 
firms interviewed. For findings associated with the finance motive, refer to 
Table14. 
Table 14: Relative Significance of the Finance Motive, by Sector 
  ICT 
LIFE 
SCIENCE 
CLEAN 
TECH   
NO 56 0 60 43.3 
YES WEAK  44 43 40 43.3 
YES STRONG 0 57 0 13.3 
  
100%           
(N=18) 
100%                   
(N=7) 
100%    
(N=5) 
100%                                 
(N=30) 
All life science focused VC firms described the finance motive as being 
significant, with 43% of those firms coded as Yes Weak, and 57% Yes Strong. For 
VC firms investing primarily in ICT the finance motive is considerably weaker: 
56% of these firms ascribed little to no significance to the finance motive, and 
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44% coded as Yes Weak. Similar results were found for those firms investing 
primarily in clean tech: 60% attributed little to no significance to the finance 
motive, and 40% coded as Yes Weak. Why do the life science-focused VC firms 
assign such high importance to the finance motive compared to those firms 
investing in ICT and clean tech? 
As shown in the previous chapter, VC firms investing in life science have a much 
higher propensity to co-invest and syndicate with large corporations than do firms 
investing primarily in ICT and clean tech. Unlike other potential forms of 
collaboration discussed, co-investing and syndication involve the transfer of not 
only knowledge and expertise, but also capital in the form of investment funds. In 
this way, the large corporation behaves very much like a traditional venture capital 
syndicate partner for which the motives to syndicate are at least as much a matter 
of finance as of knowledge. Furthermore, this corresponds (as explained in 
Chapter 5) with a high propensity for life science-focused VC firms to engage 
directly with the corporate venture capital divisions of Big Pharma. These finance 
motives probably involve motivations of validation and reputation, as discussed 
later in this chapter. The majority of life science-specific VC firms interviewed 
described co-investing with large corporations as a mechanism that drives 
additional funding for their high-risk portfolio companies. Having a large 
corporation invest in a specific portfolio company signals confidence in that 
company, attracting further investment; as one interviewee said, “One of the 
challenges is that it is very difficult to get any of those businesses funded 
adequately, so bringing in corporate partners drives funding.” 
As described by several life science focused VC firms, having corporate partners 
as co-investors also helped drive additional funding during later investment stages, 
leading to exit. In this way, the presence of a corporate investor builds overall 
investor confidence in a soon-to-be exiting portfolio company, thus driving further 
investment during the last critical investment stages, signaling a heightened value 
of a specific portfolio company, and increasing the potential profitability of an 
IPO, merger, or acquisition: 
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We often look to our corporate partners as an important source of funds. 
Sometimes we will bring in a corporate venture group if we need to raise a 
bit more money as we are getting closer to the exit … so, important for both 
funding and investor confidence as we prepare a business for exit. 
Comments like the one above were also shared by several VC firms investing 
heavily in ICT and clean tech, but such funding through corporate partnerships 
was much less important when compared to the life science-focused VC firms. 
This difference is almost certainly attributed to the comparably higher risk and 
higher resource intensity of life science companies: the higher the uncertainty, the 
more important corporate partners become for building investor confidence. More 
specifically, confidence seems to be substantially heightened when a corporate 
partner is not just supporting a portfolio company through engagement with that 
company, but is also placing its own money in the portfolio company. Such formal 
co-investing may be deemed necessary in the life science sector but not all that 
necessary in other high tech sectors. Investing in information technologies and 
clean tech might be considered less risky; thus, it may be easier to raise funds, 
making inclusion of a corporate investor less important. Going forward, this 
interpretation will be further assessed and developed, particularly in regard to the 
interesting and somewhat surprising connection between the finance motive and 
the management of individual portfolio companies. 
The finance motive is weakest for VC firms investing heavily in clean tech, coded 
as 40% No and 60% Yes Weak.  Much of this might be due to the lack of 
corporate co-investing and syndication as described by clean tech focused VC 
firms. An additional explanation might be found in the relative youth of the 
majority of clean tech-focused VC firms interviewed, which were established only 
in the past 5 to 7 years. Several of them had not yet successfully exited a portfolio 
company, so perhaps the need for corporate investors as confidence builders 
during the later and exit stage had not been realised. Also, co-investment 
relationships take time to develop, and a related issue of experience might 
therefore be at play. Second, clean tech is currently a hot sector, making it 
relatively easy for these VC firms to raise funds. Therefore, the need for corporate 
investors, both as signals of confidence and as sources of funds, is less critical than 
in other sectors. 
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Three further points need mentioning. First, few if any of the VC firms 
interviewed discussed the finance motive in terms of increasing diversification or 
sharing risk. Diversification benefits were downplayed even for life science-
focused VC firms engaged in co-investing with large corporations. Although risk 
sharing was mentioned, it was not discussed or coded to any significant degree. 
The benefits of the finance motive, if attributed, were clearly the funding that 
corporate partners provided as co-investors, and perhaps more important, the 
reputation effects those corporate funds have on individual portfolio companies, 
which drive additional funding. Second, answers to questions regarding the finance 
motive and diversification were often quickly interjected by the interviewees, with 
comments articulating deal flow as a significant benefit: “not diversification really, 
but rather the deal flow which corporate partners provide.” This comment, typical 
of interviewees, is interesting because it shows both a clear distinction between the 
finance motive and the deal flow motive in the minds of venture capitalists — 
aligning with the distinction made in the literature — as well as the inclusion of 
the two motives within the same conceptual motive category, that is, questions 
regarding the finance motive bring about answers involving deal flow. 
6.3. The Deal Flow Motive 
The second motive associated with improving overall portfolio performance is the 
deal flow motive, which prompts collaboration with large corporations as a way 
for VC firms to increase the quantity and quality of future investment opportunities 
(Manigart et al., 2006). The main assumptions are that by collaborating with large 
corporations VC firms will realise enhanced deal flow through access to a large 
corporation’s corporate venturing portfolio, corporate spin-outs, and the ability of 
the relationship to raise a VC firm’s reputation and visibility, all increasing the 
number and quality of potential investment opportunities. Based on the literature 
and the previous chapter, it was initially assumed that the deal flow motive would 
be connected primarily to instances of co-investing and syndication between VC 
firms and large corporations. Therefore, the significance of this motivation was 
expected to be relatively less when compared to other motivations. However, the 
findings present a surprising level of importance attributed to the deal flow motive 
in regard to collaboration with large corporations for a majority of the VC firms 
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interviewed. For findings associated with the deal flow motive and sector 
comparisons, refer to Table 15. 
Table 15: Relative Significance of the Deal Flow Motive, by Sector 
  ICT 
LIFE 
SCIENCE 
CLEAN 
TECH   
NO 11 0 0 7 
YES WEAK  61 0 40 43 
YES STRONG 28 100 60 50 
  
100%           
(N=18) 
100%                   
(N=7) 
100%    
(N=5) 
100%                                 
(N=30) 
For life science-focused VC firms, the deal flow motive was described as a 
significant reason to collaborate with large corporations, with 100% of these firms 
coded as Yes Strong. Somewhat less so, ICT-focused VC firms were coded 11% 
No, 61% Yes Weak, and 28% Yes Strong. Clean tech-focused VC firms were 
coded 40% Yes Weak and 60% Yes Strong. At first glance, the strength of this 
motivation for life science-focused VC firms appears to be strongly connected to 
their high propensity to co-invest and syndicate with large corporations; 
collaboration with large corporations gives these VC firms access to both 
technology and firms within corporate venturing portfolios, as well as related deals 
involving corporate spin-outs. Comments like the following from an interviewee 
were repeatedly given by those VC firms heavily engaged in life science:  
They are an important source of new deals for us. They are increasingly 
looking at their own investees. They may not be able to afford developing 
some things in their pipeline, or they have certain things they would either 
like to get rid of entirely, or to outsource the development of these programs 
in some way, so there is that aspect as well. 
In this way, the deal flow motive very much involves the exchange of information 
about technology and portfolio companies between the VC firm and the corporate 
partner, which can lead to new investment deals; increasing the volume and quality 
of deal flow can be viewed as the result of this information exchange. The 
unexpected importance that some ICT and clean tech-focused VC firms attribute to 
the deal flow motive implies, however, that the importance of increasing deal flow 
through collaboration with large corporations is not entirely based on a propensity 
to co-invest with these corporate partners on a particular deal. Motivations for 
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obtaining investment access to the portfolio of corporate partners was not coded as 
significantly important by the majority of VC firms interviewed. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, the exchange of information regarding potential deals and/or 
leading to new deals appears to occur regardless of the collaborative structure 
employed. So in the absence of co-investing, how might this pursuit or outcome of 
enhanced deal flow (the apparent importance given to this motive) be more fully 
explained? 
One possibility is that collaboration between VC firms and corporate partners will 
indeed transpire as described above: collaboration will involve the exchange of 
information regarding the technology and portfolio companies within a corporate 
venturing investee, resulting in a spin-out for which the VC firm then develops 
within its own investee. In this scenario, however, this spin-out will be developed 
without any substantial co-investment from the corporate partner; that is, it will be 
a traditional spin-out. Although reasonable, this explanation is not-well supported 
by the research (see Chapter 5). Excluding the life science-focused VC firms, spin-
outs resulting from corporate collaborations are not all that common and are often 
avoided. 
An alternative explanation is grounded in the connection between collaboration 
and compounding reputation effects. For this explanation, most forms (structures) 
of collaboration between a VC firm and a large, often industry-leading, 
corporation improve the reputation and raise the visibility of the VC firm and its 
investee in the eyes of the wider venture capital community, including other VC 
firms, investment banks, entrepreneurs, and other large corporations. This 
heightened visibility attracts additional investors and partners who bring with them 
their own knowledge and expertise regarding sector trends, promising 
entrepreneurs, and quality portfolio companies. The result is new investment 
opportunities for the VC firm, which increase the amount and quality of deal flow. 
This notion of increased reputation through collaboration likely corresponds to the 
previously discussed view that collaboration with large corporations often drives 
funding; the presence of an interested and engaged corporate partner breeds 
confidence in the value of a VC firm’s portfolio or specific portfolio company. 
Therefore, the reputation effects of collaboration can be viewed as transcending 
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both the finance motive and the deal flow motive, making increased reputation not 
only an outcome of collaboration, but also a likely motivation for collaboration. 
Finally, the propensity for VC firms to attribute significance to the deal flow 
motive in regard to collaboration with large corporations can also be explained in 
the context of knowledge exchange and investment selection. Increasing deal flow 
is an outcome of improved investment discovery and selection through corporate 
collaboration. Based on this explanation, new deals come about not so much from 
a VC firm’s enhanced access to a corporate venturing investee and spin-outs as 
from a combination of idea exchange concerning corporate pipeline needs and the 
capabilities of a VC firm’s current and potential portfolio companies. The result of 
this exchange is either the selection of a particular company to invest in (new 
portfolio company) or of a promising technology or product that a portfolio 
company is then created to develop. In other words, through collaboration, new 
investment opportunities are discovered and assessed and investment decisions are 
made, increasing the amount and quality of a VC firm’s deal flow. 
6.4. The Selection Motive 
Correspondingly, the first motive associated with improving the management of 
individual portfolio companies is the selection motive.  The selection motive refers 
to the improvement of information assessment as provided by potential portfolio 
companies to deliver more accurate due diligence and validation of proposed 
technology, products, and entrepreneurial team, leading to the selection of higher 
quality portfolio companies (Manigart et al., 2006). Mirroring the overall findings, 
the selection motive is coded as the second most important reason in all sectors 
that VC firms collaborate with large corporations. Findings for the selection 
motive, by sector, are shown in Table 16. VC firms focused on life science are 
coded 14% Yes Weak and 86% Yes Strong. Likewise, VC firms investing heavily 
in ICT are coded 11% Yes Weak and 89% Yes Strong. Similarly, VC firms 
engaged exclusively in clean tech investments are coded 20% Yes Weak and 80% 
Yes Strong. For the selection motive, not one of the VC firms interviewed is coded 
No. 
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The importance of the selection motive was described using similar comments, and 
common points of emphasis were articulated. As an interviewee at an ICT-focused 
VC firm commented: “For us, corporate validation is crucial for selecting 
companies to invest in: It demonstrates commercial viability and that there is a 
credible end-user. It is also important in that it [corporate validation] drives further 
funding.” 
Table 16: Relative Significance of the Selection Motive, by Sector 
  ICT 
LIFE 
SCIENCE 
CLEAN 
TECH   
NO 0 0 0 0 
YES WEAK  11 14 20 13 
YES STRONG 89 86 80 87 
  
100%           
(N=18) 
100%                   
(N=7) 
100%    
(N=5) 
100%                                 
(N=30) 
Despite these similarities some variation does exist, with several VC firms 
questioning the importance of collaboration with large corporations for selecting 
new portfolio companies. Furthermore, the selection motive is described primarily 
as the commercial validation of a technology or product rather than as a validation 
of a proposed business plan or entrepreneurial team. Overall, three scenarios in 
which the selection motive applies emerged from the interviews. 
The majority of VC firms interviewed emphasised the importance of collaboration 
with large corporations for better assessment of potential portfolio companies, 
leading to a decision to take them on. In this scenario the VC firm discusses a 
potential portfolio company with a corporate partner. Again, the emphasis of this 
discussion centres on the commercial viability of the technology or product the 
potential portfolio company proposes to develop and sell. Such discussions are 
likely to unfold as previously described, with commercial viability being 
determined through information exchanges regarding corporate pipeline needs, 
recent moves by corporate competitors, market/industry trends, and the VC firm’s 
assessment of a potential portfolio company (i.e. the firm’s capabilities and 
potential). A corporate partner may show interest in a particular technology or 
product that a potential portfolio company is proposing; sometimes the corporate 
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partner agrees to provide guidance and, less frequently, investment funding to the 
potential portfolio company. If so, the VC firm will likely select the firm as an 
investee. As one interviewee at a life science-focused VC firm explained: 
The validation aspect that our corporate partners bring is huge. We spend a 
whole lot of our time assessing businesses for investment. This is a time 
consuming but critically important process — choosing the appropriate 
businesses is key! What we are looking for from our corporate partners is 
the commercial validation that this is something they might use. Again, we 
do the due diligence, but having that end-user interest from the corporate is 
huge, it provides additional confidence. 
An interviewee whose firm invests primarily in ICT went so far as to claim, “We 
won’t invest in a company without first talking to our corporate partners. If they 
[corporate partners] are not interested, we will likely not invest in the company.” 
Although very direct in espousing the importance of corporate validation in the 
selection process, such a comment was very much the norm among VC firms 
interviewed; these firms coded as Yes Strong. Whether occurring through informal 
corporate contacts, formal corporate strategic partners, or formal corporate 
syndicate partnerships (either separately or in combination), collaboration between 
VC firms and large corporations was described by most VC firms as performing a 
crucial role in portfolio company selection and validation. Without prior corporate 
validation, a decision to invest in a particular firm is much less likely to occur. 
However, the need for corporate validation at the investment selection stage was 
not held by all interviewees, with a minority arguing that the validation of a 
potential portfolio company is determined more by the venture capitalist than by 
any corporate stamp of approval. This view accounted for those firms coded Yes 
Weak. The following quote comes from interviewee at a life science-focused VC 
firm. Most revealing is the caution described concerning venture capital’s drive for 
corporate validation of potential investments: 
Life science and biotech companies try to do deals with Big Pharma, and 
one of the reasons they do that is they see it as validation. Now, there is an 
element of truth to that, but for us, we don’t see that as a validation. Because 
we will do our own due diligence, we are all from Big Pharma, and we 
know that in Big Pharma there is a massive herd mentality, very evident in 
the genomics revolution — one company does a big genomics deal and then 
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everybody thinks they should be doing one, so to a degree it validates. But 
because of this herd mentality, you have to be careful that it is not a false 
validation. So, we don’t see them as validation really, we just see them as 
another investor that happens to have a corporate link. Now, some of the 
companies [portfolio companies] think it is validated — thinking they have 
persuaded a corporate venture group, but we don’t necessarily see it that 
way. 
This notion of false validation and herd mentality has resonance. For now, several 
important interpretations can be derived from the above quote and reaffirmed from 
previous chapters. First, as previously assumed, the process of selecting a portfolio 
company through collaboration involves the exchange of information, probably 
complimentary, between the VC firm and the large corporate; no one party holds 
all relevant information. It is reasonable to assume or even expect that large 
corporations will have difficulty in accurately assessing their current or future 
pipeline needs, particularly when forecasting these needs and matching them to 
potential portfolio companies with 5- to 10-year development timelines. 
Collaborating with VC firms can help large corporations identify these pipeline 
needs (i.e. “I’ll know it when I see it”). Likewise, it is safe to assume that in 
selecting portfolio companies experienced venture capitalists rely as much on their 
own expertise and intuition as on the corporate partner’s knowledge. Finally, a 
likely assumption could also be made that many of the potential portfolio 
companies brought forward for corporate validation have already been well-vetted 
and have the confidence of the VC firm. The goal of collaboration, therefore, is not 
to validate a technology or product, but rather to gain corporate interest that can 
then be promoted to drive funding (i.e. reputation effects). 
However, the same life science interviewee quoted above goes on to describe the 
validation benefits that large corporations can bring to an investment deal: 
From the commercial validation standpoint, I can see the benefits. On a 
spin-out deal I led earlier this year, they already had substantial early 
funding from a large molecular company. So, that funding partnership gave 
us confidence in the investment, an interest in the end user, which is 
obviously very valuable to us. 
This quote, as well as the one just previous, lends support to the second scenario 
for which the selection motive applies: VC firms often select portfolio companies 
that already have corporate backing, irrespective of any collaboration between the 
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VC firm and the said corporation. This prior corporate backing weighs heavily in 
the VC firm’s decision to invest. The scenario was readily described by 
interviewees as being quite common and important for the selection process, 
although some skepticism was aired. An interviewee at a VC firm focused on ICT 
observed:  
We absolutely encourage firms to get corporate backing, and we look 
favourably upon those that do. This is very common, and we would be 
shocked if they hadn’t already [spoken with a large a corporate] every single 
one them [potential portfolio companies] claims to have corporate backing. 
However, you never know how in-depth those discussions have been. But 
everyone tries to say that they are engaged in intense discussions with 
company X or Y. But it doesn’t really mean anything. 
A likely interpretation of the quote above is that the promotion of corporate 
backing by a potential portfolio company obviously will be followed up and 
verified by the VC firm as the firm performs the necessary due diligence of the 
entrepreneurs involved and the proposed business plan. Again, much more than 
just corporate validation is needed when selecting portfolio companies. Two 
important points deserve mentioning (and will be readdressed later in this chapter 
and in Chapter 7). First, it is clear that entrepreneurial firms often establish 
relationships with large corporations without the use of a VC firm as an 
intermediary. This propensity adds to earlier suggestions that collaboration with 
large corporations by other actors of the venturing milieu is common, which 
indicates a certain level of collaborative embeddedness, thus placing large 
corporations firmly within venture capital networks. Correspondingly, initial 
questions might be raised regarding just how important the intermediary role of 
VC firms is in connecting portfolio companies to corporate partners (i.e. business 
development). Second, the propensity for VC firms to select portfolio companies 
with prior corporate backing might suggest that the firms being selected are not 
traditional early stage firms.  
The third scenario associated with the selection motive involves not the selection 
of portfolio companies but rather the continuing validation of portfolio companies 
after selection. Collaboration plays a significant role in a VC firm’s evaluation of 
portfolio companies from one funding round to the next. In this way, a large 
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corporation’s measured interest in an portfolio company will be a contributing 
factor in how a VC firm proceeds with that portfolio company after selection (e.g. 
in decisions regarding strategy and funding). Several of the VC firms interviewed 
described this continuing corporate validation as more important than any initial 
validation for selecting portfolio companies. As an interviewee at a life science-
focused VC firm explained:  
The greatest thing for our portfolio companies in terms of corporate 
collaboration is the validation of the technology, meaning that big corporate 
is prepared to back them. Our companies think it’s good, that it will work, 
and that it’s worth money in terms of their reputation and share price. For 
us, corporate validation is important for raising money for additional 
rounds, because that is really the only validation you can get besides the 
product getting approved, so that is the greatest thing really. 
The use of corporate validation to drive funding is again alluded to here, as is the 
notion that collaboration between VC firms and large corporations is something 
that can and does occur beyond the selection stage of the venture capital cycle (i.e. 
beyond the decision to invest in a new portfolio company). Therefore, a VC firm’s 
collaboration with a large corporation might be viewed as contributing in some 
capacity to the ongoing development of a portfolio company through subsequent 
funding rounds. An interviewee at a clean tech-focused VC firm commented: 
These corporate relationships very much help us in our due diligence of our 
investee companies [post-selection]. We can ask a corporate partner what 
they think about a particular product being developed by an investee 
company. It is clearly part of the ongoing process in positioning our investee 
companies, just to gauge and maintain their interest. 
As with much of the collaborative activity described here, the extent to which such 
post-selection validation includes or leads to additional portfolio company 
development is likely to change on a case-by-case basis and is explored a bit later 
in the chapter. The quote above, however, presents a common theme from the 
interviews: for VC firms the goal of post-selection validation through collaboration 
with large corporations is to maintain the interest of the large corporations in 
particular portfolio companies to position these portfolio companies for corporate 
acquisition or merger. Therefore, a clear and direct connection exists between the 
two most important motives for collaboration described by interviewees. The 
selection motive is pursued not only to drive funding but also to initialise a 
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relationship-building process between corporate partners and portfolio companies, 
a process that continues after selection, to realise the exit motive.  
6.5. The Exit Motive 
The second motive associated with improving the management and performance of 
individual portfolio companies is the exit motive. The exit motive describes VC 
firms’ collaboration with large corporations to increase potential exit opportunities 
by positioning their portfolio companies for corporate acquisition or merger. As 
shown in Table17, the exit motive is coded as very significant for all sectors; it is a 
primary, possibly overarching, reason for VC firms’ collaboration with large 
corporations. For the exit motive, VC firms focused on life science are coded 
100% Yes Strong. Similarly, VC firms investing heavily in ICT are coded 89% 
Yes Strong and 11% Yes Weak. Greater variation is exhibited by those firms 
engaged exclusively in clean tech, coded 60% Yes Strong and 40% Yes Weak. 
Table 17: Relative Significance of the Exit Motive, by Sector 
  ICT 
LIFE 
SCIENCE 
CLEAN 
TECH   
NO 0 0 0 0 
YES WEAK  11 0 40 10 
YES STRONG 89 100 60 90 
  
100%           
(N=18) 
100%                   
(N=7) 
100%    
(N=5) 
100%                               
(N=30) 
Of all the motivations for collaboration discussed here, the exit motive carries the 
least amount of ambiguity. Descriptions of the exit motive by interviewees are 
fairly straightforward, leaving little room for different interpretations or 
circumstances for which the exit motive might apply. The overriding explanation 
for such pursuit is that corporate acquisition or merger has become, in an era of 
weakening IPO markets, the only viable exit for most VC firms in the United 
Kingdom. An interviewee at an ICT-focused VC firm, in describing the 
importance of corporations as exit mechanisms, explains: 
To a large degree, [large corporations] are our customers. They are the 
people we want to sell our companies to. Currently, public markets are a 
poor route to liquidity for venture capital funds these days, so it has become 
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a much more merger and acquisition exit market, so first of all they are our 
customers. 
Similar comments were made by interviewees at several life science-focused VC 
firms. Adding further clarification: 
Just to put it into context, the major route for exit for our investments is 
through trade sale of our biotech companies to Big Pharma. So the 
relationship between our investee companies and Big Pharma is crucial. 
You do have other exit routes, you could sell to other investors or IPO, but 
the IPO industry has been so fragile for so long, and so the big exits, they 
would come from a corporate. 
Another interviewee at a life science-focused VC firm said: 
Acquisition does occur, and it is a very important exit; in fact, they merge 
generally. It is very, very important. Two ways to exit, IPO or acquisition – 
Pharma and big biotech are the only ones who have the money to do this. So 
yes, this is essential to our business. If they weren’t there, you would be 
stuck with the IPOs, and the market right now is shot. Without acquisition, 
exit would be impossible. 
Although pervasive for the majority of firms interviewed, the importance of the 
exit motive is coded comparably weaker for VC firms engaged heavily in clean 
tech. Two overarching factors may be contributing: (1) the newness of clean tech 
funds and (2) the type of portfolio companies in which these funds invest. First, as 
discussed previously, the clean tech-focused VC firms interviewed here and the 
funds they manage are relatively young for the most part, with most funds 
(investees) in the fifth year of funding. Therefore, a possible explanation might be 
that these firms have yet to feel the imperative or necessity of an exit by 
acquisition in a severely downgraded IPO market. The firms also might expect the 
IPO market to improve by the time their portfolio companies reach the exit stage, 
thus placing less emphasis on the exit motive. This might coincide with an 
expectation that because clean tech is a currently hot sector, an IPO market will 
eventually materialize. Such explanations could also be indicative of a propensity, 
at least for VC firms investing exclusively in clean tech, to court corporate partners 
for acquisition purposes only during the later stages of the investment cycle. 
Again, the importance of the exit motive has yet to be realized and thus is 
downplayed by the clean tech-focused VC firms. 
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Findings regarding when collaboration is more likely to occur (discussed more 
fully in Chapter 7) lend support to the notion that collaboration between VC firms 
and large corporations is generally more intense during the later stages of the 
investment cycle. But this is evident across sectors. Also, the relative newness of 
the clean tech-focused VC firms as a contributing factor is ambiguous at best when 
placing the interviews in context. As with the majority of venture capitalists 
interviewed, those focused on clean tech had extensive experience in venture 
capital and in the energy industry, making it highly unlikely that they were 
unaware or unconcerned about the poor IPO market and the opportunities for exit 
via corporate acquisition. A more plausible explanation, if not more compelling, is 
that the clean tech-focused VC firms, due to the relative newness of their funds, 
were more reluctant to discuss exit strategies with the author. In other words, if 
exits via corporate acquisition are being pursued, such information might be 
withheld because of the sensitivities surrounding the early development of such 
exits (e.g. competitive confusion, dislike of publicizing the pursuit of acquisition 
exits in a hot sector where expectations for new technologies and new firms are 
high). 
A second possible factor contributing to the comparably weaker importance that 
some clean tech firms attribute to the exit motive might be the propensity of these 
VC firms to invest in already established firms. Many of these portfolio companies 
are not start-ups or young firms developing novel technologies, but rather small or 
medium-sized firms established in the broader energy sector. They are probably 
engaged in the development of more energy efficient processes that they can then 
sell to large energy corporations seeking ways to reduce emissions and cost or 
diversify their production output. The reasoning follows that these more 
established portfolio companies are deemed less risky than their early-stage 
counterparts; they may already be profitable and thus produce a steady stream of 
returns and fees to the VC firm without the need for intense oversight and 
monitoring. The point for the VC firms and portfolio companies alike is 
development of venture capital deals that produce intellectual property, license 
agreements, and corporate partnerships. Exits are then structured more around 
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mergers and formal alliances with large corporations and other established firms 
rather than outright acquisition. 
Multiple factors are probably contributing to the varying degrees of importance 
attributed to the exit motive. What is abundantly clear, however, is that the exit 
motive is a primary motivation driving VC firms in the United Kingdom to 
collaborate with large corporations. As explained by an interviewee at a life 
science-focused VC firm: 
The other desire that drives partnering is the end market. These markets 
have huge barriers to entry, so the corporate partnering drives that . . . and of 
course it makes more sense if you are identifying corporate venture groups 
with partners that are more likely than not to be interested in your assets. 
The prominence of the exit motive is indicative of a UK venture capital industry 
focused on first selecting those portfolio companies that have some form of 
corporate backing and then positioning these firms as niche businesses that 
compliment the pipeline needs and product lines of large, industry leading 
corporations. Such positioning makes these portfolio companies very attractive for 
corporate acquisition or merger, which is the only really viable venture capital exit 
in an environment of limited exit options.  
This exit positioning occurs through post-selection monitoring and evaluation 
involving collaboration with a corporate partner. It is assumed that this process of 
positioning will result in adjustments made to the portfolio company. For example, 
one could imagine that through collaboration with a corporate partner, a VC firm 
may well conclude that a portfolio company, in developing a new product, will 
need to change its production processes to comply with new industry standards. As 
a result, adjustments to that portfolio company might be made in the form of new 
personnel, new manufacturing partners, increased funding, and perhaps upgrades 
to facilitates, all geared toward overcoming the technical challenges and costs 
posed in realigning production processes. 
6.6. The Value-Adding Motive 
The third motive associated with improving the management of individual 
portfolio companies is the value-adding motive. As previously defined, the value-
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adding motive explains VC firms’ collaboration with large corporations to connect 
to and use specialised corporate knowledge and expertise to help develop their 
portfolio companies. Applied after selection, this corporate knowledge and 
expertise can be broken down into three broad, often interconnected types: (1) 
industry and market knowledge, (2) commercial and business development 
knowledge, and (3) expertise in science and technology. As explored in this way, 
value adding is very much understood as an input of knowledge as opposed to a 
finance or resource input. Subsequently, it is expected that the more science and 
technology intensive a given portfolio company is, the more important and hands-
on the value adding gained through collaboration will be. Findings for the value-
adding motive, by sector, are found in Table 18. 
For life science-focused VC firms the importance of the value-adding motive is 
coded 100% Yes Strong. This differs significantly from VC firms engaged heavily 
in ICT, coded 72% Yes Weak and 28% Yes Strong. Clean tech-focused VC firms 
attributed a comparably stronger importance to the value-adding motive, coded 
40% Yes Weak and 60% Yes Strong. Importantly, not one VC firm interviewed 
spoke of the value-adding motive as being irrelevant; all firms acknowledged that 
value adding was either a motivation or an outcome of collaboration with large 
corporations. 
In comparing sectors, the varying importance attributed to the value-adding motive 
is not entirely surprising. When connecting these findings to those from Chapter 5 
(i.e. structures of collaboration), it is possible to build assumptions regarding the 
importance of value adding and the extent to which collaboration between VC 
firms and large corporations is formalised between the two parties: the more 
formal collaboration is, the more value added is accrued and used by the VC firm. 
For the value-adding motive, the 100% Yes Strong coded for the life science-
specific VC firms corresponds to the high propensity of these firms to have both 
formal corporate strategic partnerships and co-investment/syndication partnerships 
with large pharmaceutical companies. Likewise, the 60% Yes Strong that clean 
tech-focused VC firms attribute to the value-adding motive corresponds to the high 
propensity of these firms to engage in formal strategic partnerships with leading 
energy companies. In contrast, the comparably weaker importance that ICT-
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focused VC firms attribute to the value-adding motive, coded only at 28% Yes 
Strong, corresponds to a comparably lower propensity exhibited by these firms to 
engage in formal collaboration with the leading ICT companies. 
Table 18: Relative Significance of the Value Adding Motive, by Sector 
  ICT 
LIFE 
SCIENCE 
CLEAN 
TECH   
NO 0 0 0 0 
YES WEAK  72 0 40 50 
YES STRONG 28 100 60 50 
  
100%           
(N=18) 
100%                   
(N=7) 
100%    
(N=5) 
100%                                 
(N=30) 
Also emerging from the findings in conjunction with the above assumption is a 
clear connection between the value-adding motive and the science and technology 
intensity of a given sector, lending some support to hypothesis (H2). 
Although all three sectors studied here can be considered high tech and all involve 
substantial inputs of science and/or technology, it was assumed that the life science 
sector employs a comparably higher degree of science and technology than ICT or 
clean tech. It was expected, therefore, that collaboration between the life science-
focused VC firms and large corporations would be more likely to occur and be 
more intensive than such collaboration involving other sectors. Accordingly, it was 
expected that the value-adding motive would be more important for life science-
specific VC firms than other sector-specific VC firms. 
This expectation, however, was thought to be countered somewhat by the early 
stage focus of the VC firms interviewed on the assumption that at the early stage 
all three sectors exhibit high propensities for initial inputs of either science, 
technology, or both. Thus, all sectors were expected to place relatively high 
importance on the value-adding benefits of collaboration with large corporations. 
Indeed, the value-adding motive was expected to be the most important reason for 
VC firms to collaborate with large corporations. Additionally, VC firms were 
expected to show propensities for different types of value-adding at different 
points of the venture capital cycle. For example, it was reasonable to assume that 
most VC firms would initially seek and use, through collaboration, value adding in 
the form of science and technology expertise. This would be followed up in the 
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expansion stages with value adding in the form of commercial and business 
development. This relative weakness for the value-adding motive, particularly 
regarding science and technology, can likely be attributed to factors previously 
discussed: the comparable newness of the clean-tech focused VC firms and a 
shifting of investment, particularly among the ICT focused firms, from early stage 
portfolio companies to more established later stage firms. A more plausible 
explanation for this weakness rests in the probable embeddedness of the value-
adding motive within the other motivations for collaboration (i.e. the value adding 
importance becomes diluted in the findings). Some of this can be seen when 
looking at the different types of value adding. 
6.6.1. The Value-Adding Motive: Industry and Market Knowledge 
The first type of value adding explored with the interviewees was the importance 
of industry and market knowledge. It was expected that, through their 
collaboration with large corporations, VC firms seek and obtain valuable corporate 
knowledge and expertise related to information on changing market trends, new 
market opportunities, emerging industry players, and changing regulatory 
environments. It was expected that this knowledge, along with other forms of 
nonfinancial value adding, would be used to better position and develop portfolio 
companies. Of the three types of value adding, industry and market knowledge 
were expected to be easiest to obtain through corporate collaboration (i.e. taking 
the least amount of interaction and formality) and the least sector driven of the 
value-adding types. Thus, industry and market knowledge should be the most 
common form of value adding sought and obtained. It was also thought that 
industry and market knowledge would be more an outcome of collaboration than a 
direct reason for collaboration with large corporations. 
Findings associated with industry and market knowledge are presented in Table 
19. VC firms focused specifically on life science were coded 100% Yes Strong, 
attributing a very high importance to the industry and market knowledge accrued 
through collaboration with large pharmaceutical companies. In contrast, VC firms 
investing primarily in ICT were coded 56% Yes Weak and 44% Yes Strong. For 
clean tech-focused VC firms the significance of industry and market knowledge 
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was stronger, coded 40% Yes Weak and 60% Yes Strong. Overall, these findings 
are surprising, particularly the weaker significance that ICT-intensive VC firms 
attribute to this motive, with simple explanations being difficult to ascertain. 
Table 19: Relative Significance of Value Adding: Industry and Market  
  ICT 
LIFE 
SCIENCE 
CLEAN 
TECH   
NO 0 0 0 0 
YES WEAK  56 0 40 40 
YES STRONG 44 100 60 60 
  
100%           
(N=18) 
100%                   
(N=7) 
100%    
(N=5) 
100%                                 
(N=30) 
Although the relative weakness attributed to industry and market knowledge is 
surprising, this type of value added is still, as expected, the most common form of 
value added sought and used by VC firms through collaboration with large 
corporations. Not one firm identified this type of value adding as insignificant — 
40% of ICT-focused VC firms were still coded as Yes Strong. Industry and market 
knowledge was typically described as a combination of information regarding 
changing market trends and industry dynamics, particularly changing regulation, 
which was frequently mentioned by VC firms engaged in life science and clean 
tech investments. An interviewee at a clean tech-specific VC firm commented: 
We use our corporate partners to keep up-to-date on what are often changing 
industry and market environments, particularly changing regulation — this 
is invaluable for developing our companies … this is probably the most 
significant contribution our corporate relations bring to our companies. 
Most comments by VC firms regarding industry and market knowledge, such as 
that above, were made in conjunction with explanations regarding the process of 
seeking out corporate validation for their portfolio companies, both during the 
selection process and for evaluating portfolio companies from one funding round 
to the next. In other words, this type of knowledge is used in large part for the 
commercial validation of portfolio companies. Therefore, the importance of 
industry and market knowledge can be viewed as being far more significant than 
the findings in Table 19 indicate.  Taking this further, it seems appropriate to 
expand the categorization of nonfinancial value added, as Large and colleagues 
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(2008) propose, to include validation as a form of passive value adding that VC 
firms confer on their portfolio companies. This also reaffirms that the use of 
corporate knowledge by VC firms occurs throughout the investment cycle; such 
knowledge is not used simply as a mechanism for portfolio company selection, but 
also for monitoring.  
The many instances when VC firms attributed a weak significance (Yes Weak) to 
the importance of industry and market knowledge do not imply that such value 
adding is unimportant, but rather indicate that collaboration with large 
corporations is not a significant source of industry and market knowledge for these 
firms. Instead, industry and market knowledge is derived from and used by the VC 
firms themselves, most VC firms citing a wealth of internal industry and 
entrepreneurial experience and knowledge. Much of this knowledge is sector 
specific and held by individual venture capitalists, many of whom previously 
worked in corporate executive positions. In such instances, collaboration with 
large corporations becomes a more subtle, less direct, and less formalized 
exchange of complementary knowledge, indicating collaborative relationships 
based on fairly low barriers of entry and a high degree of embeddedness. This type 
of knowledge exchange is very passive and inherently fluid in its transmission 
between parties. 
That being said, an interviewee at a VC firm investing primarily in ICT hinted at a 
more involved relationship, one that connects the use of industry and market 
knowledge with the business development of portfolio companies. Using the 
example of a portfolio company formed around a university spin-out, the 
interviewee commented: 
Very often these spin-outs have a very nice and sexy technology, but 
because they are basically academic, they find it very difficult to position 
their technology from an industrial point of view. And so these corporate 
venture groups can be very helpful and supportive in helping these 
companies in terms of the commercial positioning, not the 
commercialization, but the commercial positioning of whatever they have 
…. These corporate venturing groups also help position our firms by 
bringing a managerial rigor to their operations. 
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Similar comments point to a collaborative relationship in which corporate 
knowledge translates into managerial adjustments regarding a portfolio company’s 
strategy and operations.  
6.6.2. The Value-Adding Motive: Business Development 
The second type of value adding explored here as a function of collaboration with 
large corporations is the importance VC firms attribute to knowledge and expertise 
associated with the commercial and business development of their portfolio 
companies. It was expected that VC firms would collaborate with large 
corporations to seek and obtain knowledge and expertise regarding the 
development of a portfolio companies’ production, distribution, marketing, and 
sales functions. Such knowledge and expertise is understood as applying to the 
growth and expansion of a portfolio company; thus, it is expected that the use of 
business development through collaboration will most likely occur during the 
expansion and later stages of the venture capital cycle (Flynn & Foreman, 2001). 
Furthermore, business development, in the context of venture capital, is commonly 
understood as the process of connecting portfolio companies to external actors; it 
is relationship building with complementary firms, business organisations, and 
customers (Fried & Hisrich, 1995; Maula et al., 2005). 
The findings derived from the interviews here are not conclusive; although the 
relative weakness attributed to business development as an important type of value 
adding accrued through collaboration with large corporations may point to the 
former. A likely possibility, however, is that large corporations are indeed 
important for business development purposes but are viewed by VC firms as a 
component or member of these business development networks, rather than as a 
central network node by which other network members are accessed. Of course, 
another interpretation might be that VC firms in the United Kingdom are not all 
that engaged in the business development of their portfolio companies, thus 
making the findings regarding commercial and business development weaker than 
expected. Findings for the value-adding motive associated with commercial and 
business development are shown in Table 20. 
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Table 20: Relative Significance of Value Adding: Business Development 
  ICT 
LIFE 
SCIENCE 
CLEAN 
TECH   
NO 11 0 0 7 
YES WEAK  56 43 60 53 
YES STRONG 33 57 40 40 
  
100%           
(N=18) 
100%                   
(N=7) 
100%    
(N=5) 
100%                                 
(N=30) 
Compared to the significance of industry and market knowledge, the findings 
associated with the importance of commercial and business development as a form 
of value-adding obtained through collaboration with large corporations is 
noticeably weaker. For life science-specific VC firms the importance of business 
development was coded 43% Yes Weak and 57% Yes Strong. The importance was 
significantly weaker for VC firms investing primarily in ICT, coded 11% No, 56% 
Yes Weak, and 33% Yes Strong. In contrast, clean tech-specific VC firms were 
coded 60% Yes Weak and 40% Yes Strong and were thus more in line with the 
importance that clean tech VC firms assign to commercial and market knowledge.  
In discussing the importance of corporate partners — in this case, corporate 
venture capital divisions of large pharmaceutical companies — as sources of 
commercial and business development, an interviewee at a life science-specific 
VC firm explained: 
Because of where they sit in Big Pharma organizations, they are very 
helpful to these small companies from a business development standpoint 
because they are usually well-networked within the industry and can help 
them not only to make the necessary contacts with different business 
development groups within the pharmaceutical industry, they can help these 
companies construct the story that would make them attractive to a 
corporate partner … they also provide management expertise, and 
manufacturing expertise. They have a valuable network back to the 
corporation which the portfolio company can utilize. 
Strong comments such as that above regarding corporate collaboration and 
business development were typical of life science-specific VC firms but were 
shared less frequently by those firms engaged in ICT and clean tech, even when 
such firms were coded Yes Strong. The propensity to invest in more established 
portfolio companies may be a contributing factor. However, an additional factor 
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perhaps offers a stronger explanation: the barriers to entry in the life science sector 
are far higher than those for ICT and clean tech, which is a result of the more 
intense R&D (e.g. clinical trials) for life sciences coupled with a greater degree of 
specialisation and related resource and capital intensity. Such conditions have 
created an industry that, while being large and relatively diverse, continues to be 
dominated by a small number of large pharmaceutical companies. For a new 
entrant to successfully establish itself within the life science sector, perhaps the 
only viable path is through the large pharmaceutical companies. 
Perhaps this explains why life science-specific VC firms place such strong 
importance on collaboration with large corporations regarding commercial and 
business development and the value-adding motive more generally. These VC 
firms correctly identify the large pharmaceutical companies as the primary nodes 
in the global life-science network, actors with which they must partner to gain 
access to the broader network of life science players and customers. Such access is 
absolutely vital for the business development of their portfolio companies. 
Again, the comparably lower importance attributed to business development 
through collaboration with large corporations by those VC firms focused on ICT 
and clean tech is somewhat surprising, given that business development is the 
heart of what is thought to be active investing. However, these findings do align 
with the hands-off relationship described in Chapter 5 by the ICT- and clean tech-
specific VC firms regarding structures for collaboration. Furthermore, it is very 
possible that the comparably lower barriers to entry into the ICT and clean tech 
sectors require less specialised knowledge and resource exchange than in the life 
science sector. Therefore, the follow-on commercial and business development 
through collaboration with large corporations (during the expansion and growth 
stages of the portfolio company) is less significant. This explanation is further 
bolstered when the importance for VC firms of collaboration with large 
corporations in obtaining and using corporate expertise in science and technology 
is considered. 
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6.6.3. The Value-Adding Motive: Science and Technology  
The third type of value adding explored here as a motive for collaboration with 
large corporations is the importance that VC firms attribute to corporate 
knowledge and expertise associated with science and technology. As previously 
explained (see Chapters 2 and 4), it is posited that VC firms investing in early 
stage high-tech enterprises seek out corporate knowledge and expertise in science 
and technology through collaboration with large corporations and use or direct this 
knowledge and expertise to assist their portfolio companies in the R&D of science 
and technology intensive products and processes. Findings for the value-adding 
motive associated with expertise in science and technology are shown in Table 21. 
Table 21: Relative Significance of Value Adding: Science and Technology 
  ICT LIFE SCIENCE 
CLEAN 
TECH   
NO 11 0 0 7 
YES WEAK  72 0 60 53 
YES STRONG 17 100 40 40 
  
100%           
(N=18) 
100%                   
(N=7) 
100%    
(N=5) 
100%                                 
(N=30) 
The findings show that expertise in science and technology is the weakest type of 
value adding coded for overall, although wide variation was evident among the 
three sectors. Unsurprisingly, VC firms investing specifically in life science 
attributed a very high level of importance to this motive (coded 100% Yes Strong). 
For ICT and clean tech-focused VC firms the importance of collaboration with 
large corporations for obtaining corporate expertise in science and technology is 
weaker in some ways than was expected. Those firms engaged heavily in ICT were 
coded significantly weaker, with 11% coded No, 72% coded Yes Weak, and 17% 
coded Yes Strong. Compared to ICT, the clean tech-specific VC firms attributed 
greater importance to the science and technology value added accrued through 
collaboration with large corporations, coded 60% Yes Weak and 40% Yes Strong. 
Again, the expectation was that all three sectors would show a propensity for 
seeking out and using corporate knowledge and expertise in science and 
technology through collaboration with large corporations. Portfolio companies 
219 
 
 
engaged in life science were expected to necessitate higher level inputs of science 
and technology than those in the ICT and clean tech sectors. However, inputs for 
technology for all three sectors were expected to be considerable, though science 
inputs might be less. Importantly, the findings themselves should not be viewed as 
directly indicative of lower science and technology input requirements for the ICT 
and clean tech sectors, although that may be a large part of the explanation. What 
the findings demonstrate is that UK VC firms investing in life science view 
collaboration with large corporations as being substantially more important for 
obtaining inputs of science and technology than do those engaged in ICT and clean 
tech. These findings may not be indicative of the sectors as a whole, but rather 
only of the firms in which UK VC firms are investing. 
Looking more closely at the life science-focused VC firms, the importance of 
collaboration with large pharmaceutical companies as a source of expertise in 
science and technology is strongly evident, as one interviewee explained: 
We do have a number of deals where the corporate venture group via their 
link back to the corporate parent has specific sets of expertise that you can 
link to in the Big Pharma player. They certainly bring the Big Pharma 
technical expertise, they have access to experts in a particular therapeutic 
area, or in chemistry, or biology, or in whatever it might be. So that is one 
important area that they contribute in. 
The comments of another interviewee at a life science-focused VC firm reiterated 
this emphasis on collaboration as an important source of specialized corporate 
expertise: 
Big Pharma provides a lot of expertise. I mean a Pharma generally has a 
fantastic investee of scientists and to be able to work with that is a great 
opportunity. And they may not be the fastest but they are very smart people. 
They also have extensive networks, not only the people internally but 
external contacts. For example, if you have a problem with manufacturing 
you can seek someone out who has seen this before and they can sort it out 
much faster than we can. 
From the comments above, two points in particular resonate, reinforcing findings 
from the previous chapter that point to the very formal and interdependent ties 
between UK life science-specific VC firms and large pharmaceutical companies. 
First, the UK life science-specific VC firms interviewed here all spoke of readily 
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available access or open channels between themselves and large pharmaceutical 
companies; such access is not only welcome but also relied on for expertise in 
developing their portfolio companies. Second, access to and use of corporate 
expertise in science and technology through collaboration with Big Pharma for 
these firms — involving access to “extensive networks” — is inseparable from the 
commercial and business development of their portfolio companies. This appears 
obvious, but it is an important point to make for this sector more than others, 
because the combination of science and technology is at the core of what most life 
science portfolio companies do. It permeates most if not all of these firms’ 
functions in commercialising new products or processes, particularly those firms 
engaged in drug discovery and therapeutics. This connection between science, 
technology, and business development is a significant driver of collaboration 
between life science-specific VC firms in the United Kingdom and large 
pharmaceutical companies. 
Another instance in which collaboration leads to the exchange of expertise in 
science and technology is with corporate spin-outs. As established earlier (see 
Chapter 5), corporate spin-outs involving the VC firms interviewed here are not all 
that common, but they do occasionally occur, particularly in the life science sector. 
In such instances corporate expertise in science and technology is directly 
transferred from the corporation to the newly formed portfolio company. 
Typically, not only is the technology spun-out, but the corporate employees 
(scientists and technologists) are spun-out with it, becoming the core of the new 
portfolio company. An interviewee at a life science-specific VC firm explained: 
Spin-outs can be difficult for a variety of reasons. If done correctly, though, 
they provide some advantages. The main benefit being the corporate 
expertise — some science, some technology — which is spun-out with the 
corporate personnel; they spin these people out! And that works very well 
for the Pharma company, because then they aren’t firing those people, and it 
works very well for us, because their expertise and background should help 
to develop the project [portfolio company]. 
The considerable importance placed on collaboration with large corporations by 
life science-focused VC firms for accessing and using corporate expertise in 
science and technology is not shared by VC firms investing primarily in ICT and 
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clean tech. These VC firms did not describe science and technology as 
unimportant inputs for their portfolio companies, but rather noted that that 
collaboration with large corporations is not a formal source of such inputs. Again, 
the lower resource intensities of these two sectors when compared to the life 
science sector undoubtedly play a significant role in these findings (findings for 
the value-adding motive more generally) and indicate lower barriers of entry into 
these sectors, making collaboration with large corporations less essential than in 
the life science sector. A related factor, as previously established, is the propensity 
for VC firms focused on ICT and clean tech to invest in later stage portfolio 
companies, which are more established and have more mature technologies and 
products 
For VC firms focused on clean tech and ICT the factors mentioned above translate 
to a relationship between the VC firm and the large corporation which, although 
not unimportant, is much less direct and very much hands-off when compared to 
similar collaboration in the life science sector. When asked about the importance 
of collaboration with large energy and utility companies for accessing and using 
corporate knowledge and expertise in science and technology, an interviewee at a 
clean tech-focused VC firm commented: 
Yes, in terms of technology, our strategic partners [large corporations] do 
provide our companies [portfolio companies] with guidance, and a lot of 
partnerships [between large corporations and individual portfolio 
companies] involve this, but for us it is really the validation of the 
technology, the commercial validation, where the value of a corporation 
comes in … it builds confidence for our companies and helps [us] set 
strategy. 
Comments similar to those above were shared by other clean tech-focused VC 
firms, as well as those VC firms heavily engaged in ICT. Two points in particular 
need mentioning. First, for VC firms in these two sectors most corporate 
knowledge and expertise in science and technology obtained through collaboration 
are identified with the corporate validation of a technology, that is, the selection 
motive. As such, value adding in these two sectors — as the findings indicate — 
corresponds more directly with the importance of industry and market knowledge; 
collaboration informs the development or direction of technology based products 
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and processes but does not generally act as a problem-solving mechanism by 
which technological challenges are overcome. Second, when the transfer of 
corporate expertise in science and technology might be considerable for these two 
sectors, the VC firm may play a more limited intermediary role. An interviewee at 
an ICT-focused VC firm commented: 
Some of that [exchange of technical expertise] does occur, but that isn’t the 
role of these partnerships [with large corporations]. You need to understand 
that these corporate venture capitalists are looking for new firms to acquire 
and partner with. They play a scouting role for their parent. They don’t want 
to get highly involved in any one particular venture; they are very hands-off. 
Now for spin-outs, you obviously get that corporate expertise, but this [a 
spin-out] is rare. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 7, such informal partnerships appear to work best, 
both for the corporate venture capital programme and the VC firm. However, this 
does not mean that large corporations are not a source of scientific knowledge and 
technological expertise for portfolio companies. Echoing earlier comments, an 
interviewee at another ICT-focused VC firm stated: 
Our portfolio companies connect to corporate expertise through their own 
personnel; whether it is technologists, programmers, even management, 
many of them come from the big IT companies — all the big ones — 
bringing their expertise and experience with them. 
For portfolio companies, therefore, past corporate ties appear to be the most 
prevalent means by which corporate knowledge and expertise are transferred and 
exchanged (see Chapter 5). But what this does imply, of course, is that formal 
collaboration between most VC firms and large corporations (the life science 
sector being the exception) is not the primary, direct bridge for the transfer of 
complex corporate knowledge and expertise in science and technology. Therefore, 
the overall findings regarding the value-adding motive speak to a UK venture 
capital model in which collaboration with large corporations does enhance the 
development of portfolio companies, particularly in terms of building business and 
commercial capacity.  But the findings also show a model in which the capacity 
building or business development of portfolio companies may be more a function 
of the portfolio company’s relationship with a corporate partner. 
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6.7. Conclusion 
The previous chapter established the high propensity for VC firms to collaborate 
with large corporations and their corporate venturing divisions. This chapter 
explored the motivations for collaboration, gaining insight into whether VC firms 
use collaboration with large corporations to build the capacity of their portfolio 
companies. According to the findings, the most important motives for 
collaboration are the selection motive and the exit motive. Therefore, VC firms use 
collaboration with large corporations to validate technology and/or products 
proposed by potential portfolio companies, leading to a decision to invest. This 
process of corporate validation was described as continuing during the post-
selection monitoring phase. The purpose of this corporate validation, both in 
selecting and monitoring portfolio companies, seems less about determining 
commercial potential and more about gauging and maintaining corporate interest 
for positioning portfolio companies for exit via corporate acquisition or merger, 
with the current weakness of the IPO market very much driving the importance of 
the exit motive.  
The weaker importance attributed to the finance motive was expected, because it 
was assumed that only VC firms heavily engaged in syndication and co-investing 
would attribute much importance to this motive (syndication with large 
corporations being rare outside the life science sector). That aside, the relative 
importance attributed to the deal flow motive was surprising. VC firms described 
the deal flow as associated with the selection motive and the on-going validation 
of portfolio companies. Corporate validation raises the visibility and reputation of 
both the VC firm and portfolio company, driving additional funding and increasing 
the amount and quality of future portfolio companies, that is, the deal flow. In this 
way, the deal flow motive very much involves the exchange of information 
between the VC firm and the corporate partner. 
Also surprising was the relative weakness of the value-adding motive, which went 
counter to expectation that the value-adding motive would be the most important 
motive sought and used through collaboration. Following the exit motive and the 
selection motive in importance, the value-adding motive was most associated 
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with industry and market knowledge, much more so overall than with commercial 
and business development or corporate expertise in science and technology. In 
this way, the value adding motive is very much connected to the selection motive 
and the on-going post-selection validation and monitoring of portfolio companies 
leading to adjustments in strategy, but rarely to hands-on intervention in the 
development of a product or process. Most surprising, though, was the relative 
weakness attributed to collaboration for commercial and business development, 
thought to be the essence of the active VC firm. Apart from those VC firms 
investing specifically in life science, commercial and business development 
appeared to be more a function of the relationship between large corporations and 
the portfolio companies themselves, rather than any substantial intermediary role 
played by the VC firm. 
In comparing sectors further, collaboration with large corporations is more 
important for those VC firms investing in life science than it is for those investing 
in ICT and clean tech. This appears to confirm the assumption that higher 
resource intensities necessary in the life science sector, including inputs of 
science and technology, are probably driving life science VC firms to collaborate 
with large pharmaceutical companies. Therefore, the findings lend further support 
to hypotheses (H1) and to some extent (H2): for VC firms collaborating with 
large corporations the greater the science and technology inputs required by an 
investee company, the more important collaboration becomes for the use of value 
added in the post-selection monitoring and development of an individual portfolio 
company. More than just the need for specialised knowledge and expertise (i.e. 
value adding), however, is at play here. Controlled by a few dominant global 
pharmaceutical companies, positioning portfolio companies to successfully enter 
the life science sector necessitates that VC firms closely collaborate with Big 
Pharma. From selection and validation to monitoring and business development 
to eventual exit, the need for collaboration is pervasive. 
That being said, it was expected that VC firms investing in ICT and clean tech 
would still seek out considerable external inputs of knowledge and expertise 
through collaboration with large corporations, including some inputs of science 
and technology. Overall weaker findings for these two sectors can probably be 
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attributed to several factors, including lower resource intensities, lower barriers to 
entry, more readily available investment capital due to hot markets, and fewer 
mature investment funds (a lack of exit stage investments). However, what 
appears to be driving the weaker findings for these two sectors is a shifting by VC 
firms of early stage funding to later stage funding. VC firms identified by this 
research as early stage investors are selecting and then allocating a greater share 
of their funds to later stage, more established portfolio companies. These later 
stage portfolio companies need less specialised value added inputs and probably 
have pre-existing partnerships with large corporations. 
These concepts are further developed in Chapter 7, which looks at the 
circumstances under which VC firms collaborate with large corporations and the 
challenges and disincentives presented by this seemingly important form of 
investment collaboration. 
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7. The Circumstances and Location Dynamics of Collaboration: 
Patterns, Challenges, and Analysis 
For effectively selecting and monitoring portfolio companies, and then 
successfully exiting investments in them, VC firms combine and leverage their 
own experience and expertise with the external knowledge and resource capacities 
of their local investment and industry networks, which include large corporations 
(Zook, 2004). This reliance on local networks is due in large part to the highly tacit 
and asymmetric knowledge flows and related agency costs that characterise the 
innovation process and the development of NHTCs more specifically. In this 
context, the previous two chapters have established how and why VC firms 
collaborate with large corporations and offered some insight into the degree of 
importance that geographic proximity plays in facilitating this collaboration. 
Findings suggest that this collaboration is increasingly common, but more formal 
collaborative structures are the exception. Driving this collaboration is the 
exchange of complementary knowledge for purposes of better investment selection 
and investment exits through corporate acquisition or merger. Initial findings place 
some importance on geographic proximity in facilitating collaboration but with an 
emphasis on the regional network capacities of the LMR rather than any 
significant co-location between actors. 
This chapter combines the findings and analysis of the previous two chapters and 
provides further clarification and analysis regarding the circumstances under 
which collaboration is pursued and leveraged (i.e. the when of collaboration). 
Although the majority of VC firms interviewed downplayed the value-adding 
benefits of collaboration with large corporations, VC firms investing heavily in life 
science and biotech were the exception, supporting expectations that the more 
specialised the required inputs for investment, the more important collaboration 
becomes for developing portfolio companies. It follows that for investing in new 
life science companies, the propensity for VC firms to use collaboration with 
corporate partners as a source of value added inputs (e.g. science, technology, and 
business development) is directly connected to the relatively higher capital costs, 
longer development timeframes, and related barriers to market that new life 
science companies must face and navigate – factors that make aligning new 
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products with the pipeline needs of large pharmaceutical companies an imperative 
for both new life science companies and the VC firms investing in them. 
 For venture capital investment, value-adding activities are strongly associated 
with the post-investment monitoring phase and the subsequent development of 
portfolio companies (see Zook, 2008). Therefore, in exploring propensities for 
corporate collaboration at each phase of the venture capital cycle, this chapter 
assesses the expectation that  
(H3) the greater the science and technology inputs required by portfolio 
companies, the more important collaboration between venture capital firms 
and large corporations becomes for investment monitoring and evaluation. 
In doing so, this chapter also looks to further refine the role that geographic 
proximity plays in facilitating this collaboration at each phase of the venture 
capital cycle. Research on venture capital (e.g. Zook, 2004) suggests that 
geographic proximity is particularly important during the post-selection 
monitoring phase of the venture capital cycle. Therefore, corresponding with H3, 
this chapter also assesses the expectation that  
(H5) for collaboration between venture capital firms and large 
corporations, the importance of geographic proximity will be most 
prominent during the post-selection monitoring and evaluation of portfolio 
companies. 
Finally, in exploring the circumstances under which VC firms collaborate with 
large corporations, this chapter further clarifies the challenges to collaboration 
posed by the organisational constraints and opposing interests of these two 
seemingly different yet complementary actors. 
The structure of this chapter corresponds to the various phases of the venture 
capital cycle, analysing varying propensities for collaboration exhibited during the 
investment selection phase (Sect. 7.1), the post-selection monitoring phase (Sect. 
7.2), and the exit phase (Sect. 7.3).  For each phase the connection between 
collaboration and geographic proximity is explored. This is followed by a 
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discussion of the main challenges this collaboration presents (Sect. 7.4), along with 
some concluding discussion and analysis (Sect. 7.5). An important aspect of this 
analysis is the triangulation of the findings through the perspective of several large 
corporations and their corporate venturing divisions that operate out of London 
based offices. This additional perspective, derived from in-depth semi-structured 
interviews, is used to verify and sharpen the main findings, adding a further 
dimension of credibility. 
7.1. Collaboration During the Investment Selection Phase 
The screening and investment selection phase of the venture capital cycle is 
characterised by high propensities for collaboration between VC firms and large 
corporations. As established in previous chapters, this collaboration is particularly 
important for VC firms as a mechanism for enhancing the investment selection 
process. The purpose of this collaboration for investment selection is twofold: (1) 
it provides insight into the commercial viability of a proposed technology or 
product, and (2) it determines a large corporation’s degree of commercial interest 
in a proposed technology or product. These motivations are connected and occur in 
tandem, but findings position the latter as more relevant for VC firms when 
making a decision to invest in a new company. A large corporation’s commercial 
interest in a particular technology or product signifies the potential market 
viability, but perhaps more important, it also suggests a potential investment exit 
through a corporate acquisition or merger. The findings suggest that establishing 
this corporate interest in a proposed technology or product is a main driver for VC 
firms’ collaboration with large corporations. 
However, the use of collaboration by VC firms for investment selection purposes 
is not as simple as just asking a large corporation for an opinion on a potential 
portfolio company. This early stage collaboration is a mutual and recursive 
exchange of information that may or may not lead to a decision to invest in a 
particular company. Information gained through this interaction is often used by 
VC firms to seek out potential portfolio companies that best match the pipeline 
needs of their corporate partners; these potential portfolio companies are then 
further screened through additional information exchange with a corporate partner, 
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leading to an investment decision. This exchange of information at the selection 
phase may also lead to greater and better quality deal flow for the VC firm (as 
described in Chapter 6) in that the VC firm may gain exposure and access to new 
investment opportunities, including corporate spin-outs – investment opportunities 
that carry with them possible corporate validation and the potential for corporate 
acquisition. Therefore, this interaction for investment selection purposes acts as the 
initial mechanism through which the majority of collaboration between VC firms 
and large corporations occurs and on which subsequent collaboration follows. 
However, in most cases this exchange of information regarding investment 
selection does not lead to eventual co-investment arrangements. The more likely 
outcome is a strategic partnership in which information about potential 
investments is recursively exchanged and current portfolio companies are 
continuously evaluated. When asked about the timing of collaboration, a venture 
capitalist at a life science-focused VC firm commented: 
Well, I would say [collaboration] is more common at the selection phase. 
One of the roles of these corporate venture groups is to be out scouting out 
new technologies, and that involves the research groups of Big Pharma, and 
the research groups are very good at the mid- to late stage drug discovery 
stage, so they don’t really spend their efforts looking around at that point of 
the value chain. They are much more interested in early and breakthrough 
technologies. So the corporate venture groups are often involved in seeding 
academics, companies being spun out by universities, these early stages. So 
in my experience, they are there early, and that is great for the spin-out 
entity, because they get some corporate and pharma expertise early on, and 
when the next round of investors comes in it is sort of validated. 
This interpretation of the findings is verified through interviews with several 
corporate venturing divisions of large corporations, which described the interaction 
with VC firms as a fluid exchange of information regarding complementary needs, 
leading to investment decisions by both actors. The head of a corporate venturing 
division of large ICT oriented company explained: 
Our relationship with the VC [venture capital] community is extremely 
important. We take two perspectives: one is the inbound perspective where 
we have lots of products but we don’t have everything. If there is good stuff 
out there which complements what we have or can plug holes, it is good to 
know the companies that have that, and to bring them in-house in terms of 
partnerships or any other commercial model where we can offer a broader 
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global solution. The second area (perspective) where working with other 
innovative companies is important is where we want to expand our brand 
into the ICT community. The ICT industry is very “sticky,” most people 
who begin in the ICT industry stay in the ICT industry: study computer 
science, begin in a start-up company, end up working for the ICT 
department at Merrill Lynch. It’s very important that people in IT will want 
to continue to use our products – growing another generation of users.  
This comment is informative because it highlights the use of this collaboration by 
large corporations to scan for companies that are complementary from a 
technology and product perspective. Therefore, VC firms clearly can be viewed as 
network intermediaries in that they act as information repositories for the network: 
they collect and hold comprehensive information on the makeup and competencies 
of network participants (i.e. current and former portfolio companies).  The above 
comment also alludes to the significant interdependence and connections between 
sector-specific venture capital networks and broader industry networks.  In this 
way, large corporations seem to recognise that venture capital networks are an 
important source of new innovations and new talent within an industry, and that 
participating and in some ways encouraging these venture capital networks has 
long-term benefits for both themselves as network incumbents and the broader 
industry. A representative at another corporate venturing division expanded on 
these themes: 
We are engaging with independent venture capital because they are a really 
good entry into networks of innovative firms. We don’t know everyone out 
there. We are really good in working with large companies, but small 
companies — not as good. With individuals, small firms, and start-ups, we 
are lost, and just not equipped to handle them. VCs see 500 business plans a 
year, only invest in 5, have a portfolio of 50 — great way of engaging (the 
due diligence is done). We do that across the continent, we have a good 
chance of identifying good, interesting companies.  
This notion of large corporations having difficulty in handling small firms can be 
interpreted in two ways. The first alludes to a lack of capability on the part of large 
corporations to integrate small firms organisationally into their operations, whether 
through acquisition or merger (i.e. internalising to a degree the acquired firm) or in 
working alongside a small firm in the form of a partnership. In this view, 
collaborating with a VC firm, with the VC firm acting as an intermediary, provides 
a degree of organisational learning for a large corporation. In this way, 
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collaboration assists large corporations in effectively establishing and then 
developing their partnerships with small entrepreneurial firms.  
This leads to the second interpretation: that large corporations have difficulty in 
identifying which small firms are most appropriate for partnering and acquisition 
purposes, not just from a product or asset perspective but also organisationally. In 
this view, collaborating with VC firms is particularly valuable for large 
corporations in selecting small firms for partnerships and acquisition. The findings 
lend more support to the latter, particularly when describing collaboration at the 
early stage; identifying appropriate firms for acquisition or partnership seems to be 
the primary motivation for large corporations to seek out and engage in 
collaborative activity with VC firms, thus corresponding to the overarching 
motivations for collaboration as described by the VC firms interviewed. Building 
on the above, these comments further establish VC firms as not only investment 
intermediaries but also as knowledge brokers in that they identify 
complementarities between portfolio companies and large corporations and then 
facilitate in bringing them together, helping the two to overcome certain 
organisational barriers (e.g. strategic and cultural differences). 
In sum, the comments above highlight the complementary nature of this 
collaboration between VC firms and large corporations. First, from the venture 
capital perspective, early stage collaboration with large corporations is engaged in 
to obtain both the commercial validation for potential portfolio companies and for 
beginning a long-term process of nurturing potential or current portfolio 
companies for corporate acquisition or merger. In other words, corporate 
commercial validation and corporate interest in a potential portfolio company are, 
in large part, driving a VC firm’s decision to invest. This collaboration regarding 
investment selection also grants a VC firm access to additional investment 
opportunities (e.g. through a large corporation’s investment portfolio, and raising a 
VC firm’s reputation), leading to better quality deal flow. Second, from the 
corporate venture capital perspective early stage collaboration with independent 
VC firms provides a window on emerging technology and, more important, acts as 
a selection mechanism for identifying new firms for partnerships, investment, and 
acquisition. Large corporations will have a measure of confidence in potential 
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portfolio companies that are brought to their attention by a VC firm because of the 
extensive due diligence already performed by the VC firm. 
In many respects, for both VC firms and large corporations this collaboration 
geared toward investment screening and selection is about obtaining and using 
complementary market knowledge for selecting commercially viable portfolio 
companies and complementary technologies and products through acquisition and 
partnering, thus reducing to some extent the substantial market uncertainty 
inherent in innovation (see Chapter 2). In contrast, the less prominent exchange of 
technical knowledge at the selection phase is not all that surprising. Technical 
knowledge is certainly necessary for evaluating potential portfolio companies, but 
it appears that in most instances the technical soundness of the proposed 
technology or product has been vetted through other means prior to any formal 
corporate collaboration. Again, from the venture capital perspective it is market 
viability and corporate interest (i.e. the market test) that are sought through early 
stage collaboration. The exception is with those VC firms investing in life science 
and biotech, where a considerable amount of technical know-how appears to be 
exchanged between the VC firm and large corporation (see Chapter 6). The 
explanation is that requirements for science and technology and subsequent 
development costs are higher here compared to other sectors (see Chapter 3). 
These requirements necessitate greater collaboration and knowledge exchange 
between the two parties at the selection phase. The aim here is to better align and 
integrate the portfolio companies with the corporate product pipeline needs and to 
establish this early on in what will likely be a long investment or partnering 
commitment by both parties. 
Regarding further sector propensities, the complementarities concerning selection 
benefits and the propensity to seek these out through early stage collaboration were 
felt across sectors. VC firms investing in life science, ICT, and clean tech all 
engaged with large corporations for investment selection purposes. Again, VC 
firms engaged in life science exhibited a higher degree of interaction between 
themselves and their corporate partners in the pharmaceutical industry. This 
interaction was not so much formalised as it is systemised to a degree that these 
VC firms had procedures in place for facilitating collaboration for investment 
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selection and other purposes going beyond the selection phase. This level of 
systemisation was not as evident for VC firms investing in ICT and clean tech, 
indicating venture capital’s more developed intermediary role in the life science 
sector, where the relationship between large pharmaceutical companies and 
smaller biotech firms is more co-dependent and long-established (see Chapter 3). 
However, as the findings in Chapter 5 suggest, early stage collaboration between 
VC firms and large corporations is characterised by informal interaction, which 
may or may not lead to more formal collaborative structures. As one venture 
capitalist commented:  
These relationships are “relationships.” We don’t have many formal 
agreements with  anybody; nobody has rights to any information 
whatsoever. It is an ongoing dialogue,  and at a certain time they may say 
that they are interested in a certain company, we  make an introduction, and 
away it goes. 
This emphasis on informal collaboration was shared by a representative at a 
corporate venturing division: 
There is not much interaction at a formal level or structure, but there is 
definitely an interaction at an informal network level. We go to lengths to 
inform the VC community that this is what we do and this is what we are 
interested in, and we invite VCs to come to us with ideas. The most 
structured it becomes at this stage comes down to individual phone calls 
with fund managers. They say “we have a company [portfolio company] 
that we are raising money for, and we think you might be interested.” 
With considerable early stage collaboration occurring between VC firms and large 
corporations, pursued and engaged in by both parties for identifying and validating 
potential investments and partners and leading to decisions to invest, the question 
then becomes, what occurs after investment selection regarding this collaboration? 
Some comments from the interviews (e.g. “we make an introduction and away it 
goes”) may characterise not only this early stage collaboration as it is experienced 
by most VC firms, but may also hint at a propensity for less direct interactions 
between VC firms and the large corporations as the relationship proceeds through 
the expansion stage. In other words, from the venture capital perspective, the 
process of investment selection may well introduce a large corporation to a 
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portfolio company, thus catalysing a relationship between them where the role of 
the VC firm as intermediary declines in importance. 
7.1.1. Investment Selection, Collaboration, and Geographic Proximity 
As discussed in Chapter 3, geographic proximity plays a very important facilitating 
and determining role in a VC firm’s screening and selection of portfolio 
companies. The tacit and asymmetric nature of the information that characterises 
new ideas and technologies associated with NHTCs generally requires VC firms to 
select and invest in local portfolio companies where necessary face-to-face 
interaction and information exchange is less costly. For screening and selection 
purposes, geographic proximity also allows VC firms to leverage their local 
networks of other VC firms and industry contacts. Information exchange with 
these local actors is viewed as integral to enhancing due diligence and verifying 
the market and technical viability of a proposed product or technology. For this 
reason, it was expected that a VC firm’s collaboration with corporate contacts and 
partners (e.g. large corporations) for investment selection purposes would be 
greatly facilitated by geographic proximity and related access to local industry 
networks. 
Although the findings presented in Chapter 5 downplay the role of co-location as 
facilitating collaboration between VC firms and large corporations, the majority of 
interviewees stressed the importance of face-to-face interaction in meeting with 
corporate contacts and corporate partners, with much of this interaction based on 
the past industry ties of VCs and through local business and professional networks 
operating within the LMR. Coupled with the significance that almost all 
interviewees placed on this collaboration for investment selection purposes, it is 
almost certain that geographic proximity facilities this exchange of information 
between these two actors regarding potential portfolio companies and corporate 
pipeline needs, leading to investment selection decisions. Again, many 
interviewees claimed that they would not select a company for investment if the 
company did not have the interest or backing of their corporate contacts or 
partners. In this way, corporate validation of a portfolio company (product and 
technology) is almost overarching for determining market viability, and to some 
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extent, technical viability – this places large corporations firmly, and intimately, 
within the decision making process by which VC firms screen and select new 
companies for investment, a process dominated by interactions within local 
networks. 
Furthermore, when taking into account comments made by interviewees, 
particularly those at life science focused VC firms, about the advantages of having 
pharmaceutical company R&D centres located in the LMR for meeting purposes 
and information exchange it is difficult not to connect some degree of importance 
to co-location for facilitating collaboration for investment selection purposes. 
Although a substantial number of interviewees stressed the global focus of their 
investments, investing not only in the United Kingdom but also in other venture 
capital markets around the world, a still sizable amount of their funds involved 
investments in portfolio companies located in the LMR. For selecting these local 
companies (i.e. screening and due-diligence), London based VC firms will 
undoubtedly leverage their local industry networks. In other words, if VC firms are 
basing much of their due-diligence on information from local actors (e.g. other VC 
firms and entrepreneurs), why would they not engage large corporations that have 
a local presence in the LMR for these purposes, particularly given how important 
collaboration with corporate partners is for selecting portfolio companies, as 
described by interviewees?  In this way, a strong argument can be made that 
geographic proximity, including some degree of co-location, plays a significant 
role in facilitating collaboration between VC firms and large corporations during 
the investment selection phase of the venture capital cycle. 
7.2. Collaboration During the Post-selection Monitoring Phase 
In considering the venture capital investment process with its emphasis on staged 
funding rounds, and the active monitoring of portfolio companies involving the 
provision of nonfinancial value added toward the development of these companies, 
it was thought that the benefits of collaboration between VC firms and large 
corporations would be felt most during the post-selection monitoring phase, from 
the early stages of investment up through the expansion stage. Furthermore, it was 
expected that the importance of collaboration for monitoring and value added 
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purposes would be greater for those portfolio companies requiring substantial 
inputs of science and technology (H3). Whereas the investment selection phase 
emphasises the reduction of market uncertainty through corporate validation and 
interest, it was thought that corporate collaboration during the investment 
monitoring phase, particularly during the early investment stages, would 
emphasise the reduction of technical uncertainty and, during the expansion stage, 
focus on the building of business and commercial capacity of portfolio companies.  
Based on the findings discussed in Chapter 6, collaboration with large corporations 
does hold some importance for the post-investment monitoring phase, but the 
significance or intensity of this collaboration decreases somewhat from that 
experienced at the investment selection phase. As established in Chapter 6, 
motivations for accessing and using knowledge and expertise for value-adding 
purposes, while evident, were not identified by the majority of VC firms 
interviewed as primary motivations for collaboration and were less important than 
motivations for enhancing investment selection and investment exit. The findings 
suggest that for the majority of VC firms, collaboration with large corporations 
during the post-investment monitoring phase covering both the early and 
expansion stages of the investment is a more informal continuation of the 
collaboration that occurs during the selection phase; whereas on-going 
collaboration  is used to enhance the monitoring and evaluation of portfolio 
companies, this continuing evaluation is focused on ensuring the market viability 
(industry and market knowledge) of a portfolio company while maintaining the 
acquisition or merger interest of a large corporation. In some instances, this 
ongoing evaluation might lead to decisions regarding product development and 
necessary technical adjustments, but the more likely outcome are changes to 
business and marketing strategy. 
As established in Chapters 5 and 6, collaboration during the investment monitoring 
phase, similar to collaboration during the selection phase, is characterised by 
informal interaction between individual venture capitalists and their corporate 
contacts. This informality continued even when strategic partnerships were held 
between a VC firm and a large corporation. In such arrangements, placing 
corporate representatives on the boards of portfolio companies was common, but 
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their involvement in the monitoring of those portfolio companies was described by 
the majority of interviewees as limited and “very hands off.” In this way, the 
monitoring of portfolio companies seems to be the responsibility of the VC firms 
themselves and their syndicate partners, generally other VC firms. The role of the 
corporate partner seems to be to provide guidance to the VC firm when required, 
but this is only periodic and generally aligns with changes to investment strategy, 
such as when moving from what would be considered early stage investment to 
expansion or later stages. Again, the need for flexibility by both parties keeps 
formal or contractual agreements between them to a minimum, making instances 
of syndication and co-investing between VC firms and large corporations less 
probable. 
This does not mean that substantive exchange of information and knowledge, 
beyond the exchange of industry and market knowledge, is not occurring through 
this collaboration during the monitoring phase. A number of interviewees from 
across sectors spoke of the technical and commercial benefits of corporate 
partnering to their portfolio companies. For the most part, though, this was either 
not widespread or the value added was the result of partnerships between large 
corporations and portfolio companies with little coordination required by the VC 
firm. The exception to this was VC firms investing specifically in life science and 
biotech, for which propensities for syndication and co-investing with corporate 
partners was significantly higher compared to other sectors. The degree of formal 
collaboration exhibited in this sector corresponds to more substantive exchanges of 
knowledge and expertise between VC firms and large corporations regarding 
science and technology during the monitoring phase. An interviewee at life 
science-focused VC firm commented:  
We also find that collaborating with corporate venture groups where the 
group sits firmly within the parent company has advantages, because those 
groups measure more on what they deliver back to the corporate and not 
necessarily on return. In such cases, we collaborate for a very particular 
reason in that this corporate has unique expertise which aligns with a 
company we are investing in. And it is very often the case that these are 
very early stage companies, where we are talking very high risk, 
breakthrough science. 
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This comment is interesting in that it points to some advantages of collaborating 
with a corporate venturing division that resides firmly within the parent company. 
This runs counter to what most VC firms interviewed described; their preference 
was to collaborate with a corporate venture capital division that worked more 
independently from its parent company, because these are more investment return 
focused (see Section 7.4.2).  For VC firms focused on investments in life science, 
however, the complementary knowledge and market validation obtained through 
collaboration with large pharmaceutical companies seems to matter most. The 
combination of such knowledge is used not only to overcome technical challenges, 
but also to aid the business and commercial development of portfolio companies. 
An interviewee at a life science-focused VC firm elaborated: 
If you can get comfortable with their agenda, a corporate partner can bring a 
lot in terms of knowing the commercial market. Although you do hear often 
about a gap in that many biotech firms believe they know more about the 
market than the pharma companies, or that the pharma CVC are run by 
pharma execs that don’t understand the biotech culture – you can debate it 
in different directions. But, in many “spaces” the corporate partner can bring 
a lot in terms of industry knowledge, commercial capabilities, and 
connections. They can be a good partner in that respect. 
Comments such as these, and there were several, hint at the complementarities that 
can be realised through this collaboration, both between VC firms and large 
corporations and between large corporations and small entrepreneurial companies. 
From this perspective, VC firms can be viewed as effective intermediaries and 
knowledge brokers in helping to bring together the complementary asset of 
NHTCs and large corporations, thus connecting NHTCs to valuable enabling 
infrastructure (see Chapter 2). In summarising and verifying the complementary 
benefits of this collaboration, an interviewee at a corporate venturing division 
commented: 
The real positive thing about investing with VC firms and other partners is 
that you get different capabilities. What we bring is a real good 
understanding of the commercial and consumer markets, marketing, and 
certain technologies, and we like to invest in funds with a really good track 
record in successful commercialization and exit in particular technology 
sectors. For example, one of our companies is a chemical catalyst company 
which has made very good commercial progress. However, we don’t know 
much about catalysts. Therefore, we work with a VC co-investor who has a 
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lot of experience in the chemical industry. For us, it is worth potentially not 
going for the highest valuation and bringing in a real capable investor that 
can add a lot of value. So there is a spectrum of motivations from the real 
cynical risk management, to the practical utilitarian stretching of funds, to 
the real upside of enhancing capabilities. 
Again, the strong propensity for life science focused VC firms to use collaboration 
with large corporations during the monitoring phase for value adding purposes was 
not shared to the same extent by VC firms investing in ICT and clean tech, 
although corporate knowledge in science and technology was significant for clean 
tech focused VC firms. Several interrelated explanations for these differences were 
offered in Chapter 6, from a lack of value-adding activity on the part of VC firms 
to the view that large corporations are not a significant source of value-adding 
capacity for use by VC firms, value-added being derived from other sources. 
Neither of these explanations satisfies. Rather, it seems more probable that the 
downplay of the value-adding benefits from collaboration with large corporations 
is the confluence of several factors involving sector differences in the degree and 
substance of the factor inputs required to develop and commercialise new 
technology based products and processes and the corresponding barriers to market 
(see Chapter 3). Compared to the life science sector, factor inputs and barriers to 
market are less in the ICT and clean tech sectors, resulting in less demand in these 
sectors for value added inputs through corporate collaboration.  
Furthermore, although the effects of the severe economic downturn (2007–2010), 
particularly the contraction of the IPO market occurring during the time of this 
study, appear to be driving VC firms to collaborate more frequently with their 
corporate partners, these effects may also be diminishing the value-adding 
potential of this collaboration. Under these conditions, the aim of most VC firms is 
to select portfolio companies that align with the product pipeline needs and 
strategic objectives of large corporations and to then better position portfolio 
companies for an exit via corporate acquisition or merger. To make this outcome 
more likely, VC firms are selecting portfolio companies that are more established 
(i.e. not early stage), and therefore require less initial capacity building (value-
added) and thus less corporate input and participation in the monitoring of the 
companies. This shift away from early stage companies was confirmed by a 
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number of interviewees, particularly those at ICT focused VC firms. Clean tech 
focused VC firms were also investing heavily in more established companies, but 
this was not considered a shift in investment strategy, but rather a standard 
investment practice for these VC firms. Subsequently, these more established 
portfolio companies are likely to have pre-existing collaborative partnerships with 
large corporations, thus lessening the need for the VC firm to connect these 
portfolio companies to corporate contacts. Thus, the confluence of these factors 
results in weaker than expected findings for the value-adding motive. 
7.2.1. Monitoring, Collaboration, and Geographic Proximity 
According to the literature, although geographic proximity and local investment 
networks greatly facilitate VC firms in the selection of portfolio companies, the 
reliance on local actors and capacities becomes even greater during the post-
selection monitoring phase, when asymmetric information persists, agency costs 
potentially increase, and technical uncertainty associated with product 
development is at its highest, particularly at the early investment stages (Mason, 
2007). Active monitoring, however, is very time-consuming. Being in close 
geographic proximity to the portfolio companies they invest in reduces the costs of 
monitoring by allowing VC firms to meet regularly not only with portfolio 
companies, but also with other VC firms and partners participating in the on-going 
monitoring process. This collective monitoring effort contributes to the continual 
evaluation of portfolio companies – determining potential adjustments in strategy, 
personnel, and funding amounts from one investment round to the next (Zook, 
2004).  For this reason, it was thought that collaboration between VC firms and 
large corporations for investment monitoring purposes would be greatly facilitated 
by geographic proximity, with the importance of co-location increasing for the 
monitoring of portfolio companies with substantial science and technology input 
requirements (H3). 
In considering the findings, particularly the decreased importance that a majority 
of the interviewees placed on the value adding contributions that collaboration 
with large corporations generates, coupled with the largely informal and somewhat 
periodic interaction with corporate partners described by interviewees during the 
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post-selection monitoring phase, the overall significance of geographic proximity 
during the monitoring phase is, surprisingly, markedly less than during the 
investment selection phase.  It seems that for most VC firms, regular face-to-face 
access to corporate partners is not particularly advantageous for the monitoring of 
portfolio companies, further suggesting that for most VC firms, corporate contacts 
and partners are not intimate participants in the investment monitoring process. 
Similar to the investment selection phase, the industry and market knowledge that 
corporate contacts and partners provide is deemed most beneficial during the 
monitoring phase (assisting the VC firm in adjusting business and marketing 
strategy). Such information only periodically sought and described as easily 
communicated over the phone. 
For life science focused VC firms, however, the importance of corporate partners 
for obtaining knowledge and expertise regarding science and technology, as well 
as for business and commercial development, indicates a more substantive and 
coordinated relationship during the post-selection monitoring phase. Furthermore, 
the propensity for life science VC firms to engage in syndication with corporate 
partners probably, in such instances, increases the interaction and knowledge 
exchange between the two for investment monitoring purposes. Such knowledge 
exchange, even if not particularly frequent, probably requires face-to-face 
interaction, making geographic proximity and some degree of co-location a 
likelihood, if not a necessity. In this way, the findings lend some support to (H3).   
Finally, this research does not adequately capture the relationship and location 
dynamics between venture capital-backed portfolio companies and the large 
corporations that, it is assumed, are often initially brought together by an 
intermediary VC firm. It is very possible that such relationships are facilitated by 
geographic proximity and, to a certain extent, the co-location of portfolio 
companies and large corporations. In this way, the overall importance of 
geographic proximity in regard to corporate partnerships may well be more 
significant than the interviewees admit. In other words, for VC firms, the 
importance of geographic proximity in facilitating collaboration with corporate 
contacts and partners might very well decrease following the investment selection 
phase, whereas geographic proximity becomes more significant for facilitating 
242 
 
 
relationships between portfolio companies and large corporations, these 
geographically proximate relationships contributing to the post-selection 
monitoring phase. 
7.3. Propensities for Collaboration during the Exit Phase 
Corresponding to the exit aims of most VC firms, collaboration between VC firms 
and large corporations culminates in the later stages of the investment cycle 
leading to an investment exit, with the interaction between the VC firm and 
corporate partner(s) intensifying somewhat from that experienced during the 
investment monitoring phase. Aligned with the exit motive, VC firms reengage 
their corporate contacts and corporate strategic partners to facilitate a successful 
investment exit. The general aim is a successful exit by corporate acquisition or 
merger. Importantly, the actual process of collaboration for investment exit was 
not articulated at length by interviewees, making it difficult to fully characterise 
the interaction between VC firms and large corporations during the exit phase. 
Some of this might be due to VC firms’ sensitivities in discussing both exit 
strategies and details regarding exit negotiations with corporate partners. Also, it 
was unclear from the interviews the extent to which portfolio companies were 
acquired by large corporations that were actual collaborative partners of the 
respective VC firms, either as strategic or syndicate partners. In other words, 
collaboration with corporate partners may be used to position portfolio companies 
for exits by acquisition, but those corporate partners may not always be the 
acquiring companies. 
Furthermore, in positioning portfolio companies for exit, the facilitating role of 
collaboration appears to take two forms, one of which is not entirely connected to 
an exit by acquisition or merger. First, VC firms may seek out large corporations 
to obtain additional investment funding (as demonstrated in Chapter 6), which may 
be crucial in getting a portfolio company to the exit stage and may also increase 
investment awareness about a particular portfolio company, raising the visibility of 
the portfolio company and perhaps the reputation of the VC firm (see Neus & 
Walz, 2005). When the IPO market is more robust, such a strategy probably will 
still be employed. This strategy takes on further resonance during an economic 
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downturn, the aim being to drive additional funding for the portfolio company and 
attract additional corporate interest, setting up a potentially lucrative bidding race 
for the acquisition of the portfolio company. Even when corporate funding is not 
sought, corporate partners will still be approached by the VC firm to assess their 
interest in an acquisition or merger with the respective portfolio company. 
Therefore, it is the exit phase of the venture capital cycle that informs and 
characterises much of the cycle’s preceding phases and stages (as discussed in 
Chapter 3). As previously discussed (see Chapter 6) collaboration with corporate 
partners is aimed, in large part, at selecting portfolio companies that have 
corporate backing or validation, and then positioning these companies for 
corporate partnerships or exits by corporate acquisition or merger – the only real 
viable venture capital exit in an environment of limited exit options (see 
Schwienbacher, 2008). It is also apparent that diminishing exit options have 
coincided with a shift by venture capital investors from early stage funding to later 
stage funding in more established portfolio companies.  These later stage portfolio 
companies may be better aligned with the more immediate technology and product 
pipeline needs of large corporations than early stage companies.   
7.3.1. Investment Exit, Collaboration and Geographic Proximity 
Given the relative lack of detail provided by interviewees concerning the processes 
by which collaboration with large corporations facilitate the investment exit phase, 
it is somewhat difficult to assess the importance of geographic proximity in this 
regard. As discussed in Chapter 3, the literature on the connections between 
venture capital investment and geographic location focus primarily on the 
significance of geographic proximity as it relates to the investment selection phase 
and post-selection monitoring phase; discussion regarding geographic proximity 
and the exit phase is mainly absent.  That being said, both the findings and the 
literature lend themselves to two possible interpretations. First, given the 
importance of the exit motive as described by interviewees, it can be assumed that 
a substantial amount of face-to-face interaction will occur in the lead-up to an exit 
between a VC firm and their corporate partners. It can also be assumed that face-
to-face meetings will occur between respective corporate partners and the portfolio 
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companies they are hoping to acquire. Therefore, some degree of geographic 
proximity should be advantageous, if not necessary. Again, however, the extent to 
which portfolio companies are being acquired by large corporations that have a 
strong presence (i.e. a headquarters or R&D division) in the LMR is unclear, 
bringing some doubt over the significance of co-location for investment exit. 
Second, VC firms and large corporations engaged in an exit by acquisition or 
merger involving a London based portfolio company will probably rely on the 
financial and legal services  found in London, particularly investment banks, 
corporate law offices, and patent attorneys.  In other words, whether or not co-
location is significant, the processes through which a London based VC firm and a 
large corporation pursue and finalise an exit by acquisition are predominantly 
local. Finally, these local processes and subsequent interactions between London 
based VC firms and large corporations for investment exit purposes, are, as 
suggested by interviewees, facilitated by the London region’s international 
transport links, thus allowing substantive interaction in the absence of significant 
co-location. 
7.4. Challenges to Collaboration 
An understanding of when VC firms collaborate with large corporations  gives not 
only knowledge of the complementarities of this collaboration, but also illuminates 
the inherent challenges in bringing these complementary actors together, thus 
demonstrating the advantages of informal collaborative structures and the 
limitations of more formal co-investing arrangements. These challenges often are 
grounded in different organisational interests and strategic objectives that, in some 
respects, highlight not only the potential barriers to integrating the needs and 
functions of NHTCs with those of large firms as discussed in Chapter 2, but also 
the different investment approaches and aims between independent venture capital 
and corporate venturing activities. In the most basic sense, this is about reconciling 
two competing interests: the relatively long-term development and investment 
return objectives of independent venture capital and the short-term technology and 
acquisition objectives of large corporations. These challenges manifest themselves 
in two ways: (1) challenges associated with different strategic interests and 
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expectations and (2) challenges associated competitive confusion, particularly as it 
relates to the investment exit phase. 
7.4.1. Different Strategic Interests and Expectations 
First, challenges to collaboration associated with different strategic interests and 
expectations are most apparent when moving from less formal interaction to more 
formal collaborative arrangements such as formal strategic partnerships and 
syndication partnerships. As discussed previously, one of the main objectives of 
most corporate venturing programs is to gain access to emerging technology, that 
is, identifying complementary technology or products and scouting the market for 
potential partners to secure it. This constitutes rather a “wait and see” strategy, 
which seems to typify the collaborative approach of most large corporations 
toward independent venture capital partners. This is also an approach that seems to 
align with the interests of most VC firms. For collaboration to evolve to more 
formal co-investing arrangements, VC firms expect corporate partners to treat the 
portfolio company as a true venture capital investment in which the focus is on the 
development and successful exit of the portfolio company, with an emphasis on 
optimal investment return. As one interviewee venture capitalist bluntly articulated 
regarding such co-investing:  
We want corporate syndicate partners who align with our interests — that is 
making money! If their major interest is something else, they may do things 
that may not be right for the investors in a specific small company, because 
their goal is to access technology. 
This comment is similar to those of other interviewees whose firms engaged in 
syndication partnerships with large corporations. Such comments by VCs were 
acknowledgments of a sort that even as co-investors, the primary aim of these 
corporate partners is to enhance their access to new products and technology. Such 
aims have obvious benefits for VCs and portfolio companies regarding potential 
value added and investment exit opportunities. However, in addition to these 
benefits not always being realized, these aims do not always coincide with the aim 
of developing portfolio companies to their upmost potential as companies or 
valuation as investments. In other words, VC firms want both the capital and the 
value added that corporate partners can provide toward the development of 
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portfolio companies, and they want potential exits by corporate acquisition, but not 
at the expense of investment returns. As one interviewee venture capitalist 
explained: 
The way we interact with these corporate groups is very much determined 
on their modus operandi, what their real goals are. So, when we are building 
a syndicate, we are just as careful with choosing our investment partners as 
we are with the science and technology aspects of the investment. It needs to 
be handled carefully. Overall it is a very positive contribution, but you just 
have to be cautious, particularly in handling the confidentiality. I mean, if 
you were to go to a corporate player and exchange confidential information, 
that confidential information can’t find its way back, even if they say there 
are Chinese walls and it’s not going to get through, you still have to be 
cautious. 
In this way, collaboration can be both a channel for knowledge gain as well as a 
conduit through which VC firms and portfolio companies can lose proprietary 
knowledge and know-how (see Chapter 2).  Another interviewee at a life science 
VC firm commented: 
I have another company where we have a corporate venture group alongside 
us, well we came in on the B round, they were in on the A round, and we 
were nervous – how do you keep things confidential? So in that 
circumstance, we made it very clear to that corporate partner and that they 
did not have a preferential access from a deal perspective. And in fact, we 
are in the process with that company, in working on a corporate 
relationship, and we have a number of players; and the individual who 
represents the actual corporate on the board is not allowed to be part of the 
board discussions on anything to do with partnering. So, you can handle it, 
but it does cause issues. 
Besides issues of confidentiality, the quote above raises challenges in dealing with 
propensities for competitive confusion. The majority of VC firms interviewed 
engaged in collaboration with multiple corporate partners, generally the leading 
industry players in their respective industries. Competitive confusion may arise 
when one corporate partner is viewed by other corporate partners or potential 
partners as having gained preferential access to a portfolio company and the 
technology or product it holds. A result may be the erosion of trust between a VC 
firm and its current and potential corporate partners – partners they very much 
want available for future collaboration and as bidding suitors for an exit by 
acquisition. A venture capitalist at a life science-focused VC firm elaborated: 
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It can also be a quite tricky thing. The problem is that there are different 
forms of corporate venturing groups. There are some that are embedded in 
the pharma company, and their role is really to be out scouting for 
opportunities and making their investments. They keep their network open 
and linked into interesting companies. That is actually quite tricky for us to 
deal with because we don’t want to be constrained with pharma companies 
that we might want to sell to. Another pharma company would be very 
nervous if there was a pharma corporate investor on the board who knows 
everything about the company and the negotiations. 
This issue of competitive confusion is probably most apparent in the life science 
sector, where to develop a new life science company VC firms need relationships 
or even formal partnerships with a select number of large pharmaceutical 
companies. Due to consolidation in the pharmaceutical industry, however, the 
number of pharmaceutical companies with which a VC firm can partner is actually 
quite small (see Chapter 3), making it increasingly likely that such corporate 
partners will be competitors for the same products and technologies, thus 
increasing the potential for  competitive confusion.  
7.4.2. Exit Complications and Other Challenges 
This notion of potential competitive confusion appears again during the later 
stages of the venture capital cycle, when portfolio companies are being positioned 
for an investment exit through a corporate acquisition or merger. In such an exit 
the objective of the VC firm is to sell the portfolio company at the highest possible 
price. This generally requires having multiple bidders for acquisition. The potential 
problem is that strong ties to a strategic corporate partner or corporate co-investor 
can lead that corporate partner to believe it has preferential access to a particular 
portfolio company and that it is the preferred or expected acquirer of that firm on 
exit. Such a situation can dissuade other potential bidders from becoming involved 
in the exit (thus lowering the bidding price) or lead to friction between the VC firm 
and the corporate partner, potentially causing damage to the collaborative 
relationship. An interviewee at an ICT focused VC firm commented: 
In terms of collaboration, too much collaboration can be damaging to exit. 
You need some optimal number [of bidders for acquisition]. Getting that 
optimal number to get that deal tension in an acquisition where they all 
understand what the value drivers and capabilities are, but where there are 
not so much that it becomes too complicated — we spend a lot of time 
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debating this issue. So in some ways it creates an encumbrance, making exit 
more difficult. We do have lots of discussions with corporations about our 
businesses, but they just have to be done carefully. 
The potential for complications surrounding exits involving a corporate partner 
highlights the obvious tension in the interests of the two investment actors. The 
VC firm wants the highest possible bid, whereas the corporate partner wants to buy 
a portfolio company at the lowest possible price. These opposing interests can 
result in different investment expectations and objectives, as well as outcomes. An 
interviewee at a life science-focused VC firm elaborated: 
I was involved in a situation where a pharmaceutical fund [venture capital 
fund investing in life science] had pharma people [corporate representatives] 
on the board. These board members were very much beholden to their 
parent company and thus were constrained in raising additional funds for a 
particular company [portfolio company]. Pharma [parent company] ended 
up buying the company [portfolio company] when the negotiating level was 
very low and the venture capital fund lost out. So you have to be very 
careful. They [corporate partner] can just sort of get in the way. They can 
stall you, and then pick you up on the cheap. You want to avoid this kind of 
situation. 
Another related challenge in aligning interests for portfolio company firm selection 
and exit, particularly in more formal co-investing situations, is reconciling the VC 
firm’s long investment horizon (5 to 10 years) to the pipeline needs of a corporate 
partner, which are  often more immediate. As an interviewee venture capitalist 
commented:  
The challenge is to get them to think about whether they might be interested 
in a particular company 5 years from now. They want technologies and 
products now! This is the tricky part. 
Exactly how VC firms better align the expectations of corporate partners to the 
long-term emphasis of the venture capital investment process is not entirely clear 
from the findings, but the process of repeat interaction seems to build trust that 
facilitates mutually recognized benefits between the parties, with some degree of 
organizational learning occurring on both sides. In many ways, collaboration itself 
can be seen as a mechanism for learning and for better aligning complementary 
interests. The overarching objective of the VC firm is to achieve a profitable exit; 
the overarching objective of the large corporation is to acquire new technology that 
249 
 
 
matches its R&D and strategic objectives. Through sustained collaboration with 
each other, both objectives can be met.  
That being said, in approaching these challenges a common sentiment among the 
VC firms interviewed that engaged in syndication or co-investment with large 
corporations was that it was preferable to collaborate with those corporations that 
operated external corporate venturing or corporate venture capital divisions. Such 
operations align more closely with the objectives of independent venture capital, 
where the emphasis is on investment return through the development of portfolio 
companies and not access to technology or products that can then be brought back 
to the parent company. An interviewee at a large ICT focused VC firm that had 
engaged in several syndications involving a large corporation, explained: 
There is another group of corporate investors who are linked to a corporate 
parent but who actually sit separate from it. Of course, it has links back to 
the parent company, but it is generally very loose, and the goal is to make 
returns for the parent. So they look much more like a regular venture capital 
partnership, and we prefer this. They are return focused, unlike most internal 
corporate venturing arms. 
An interviewee at a life science-focused VC firm commented: 
With those companies that have specific venture capital arms, it is very 
straightforward, they know the process. I think it would be almost 
impossible to bring in a pharma company that didn’t have a venture capital 
arm. I don’t really see how they could invest; the complexities are too 
complicated. If you have a pharma just come in, it could potentially look 
like they were trying to buy a specific portfolio firm. This is not what would 
happen with a corporate venture arm. So bringing in a pharma on its own 
could frighten off other pharma companies, or it could panic them into 
buying it. It could work both ways. 
From the venture capital perspective, collaboration with large corporations offers 
considerable opportunities for knowledge exchange that, if appropriately accessed 
and used, can be applied to the development and capacity building of 
entrepreneurial firms, for example, as the majority of life science-focused VC firms 
interviewed for this study suggest. However, outside of life science, it may be that 
the full use of this value-adding opportunity is curtailed somewhat by the less 
intensive input needs of portfolio companies and the return-driven imperative of 
most VC firms, which results in collaborative relationships with large corporations 
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that emphasise flexibility over deep knowledge exchange. As a result, the focus of 
collaboration for most VCs interviewed is placed on the selection phase and the 
exit phase of the venture capital investment process, rather than on the post-
selection monitoring phase. 
Finally, another challenge to making collaboration between VC firms and large 
corporations work is in the actual process of developing the relationships, 
particularly from an individual VC perspective. For VCs, engaging in repeat 
interaction with corporate contacts and partners to build substantive relationships 
takes time at the expense of other functions and activities (e.g. monitoring of 
portfolio companies). An interviewee at an ICT focused VC firm commented at 
length: 
I’ve struggled a bit on the actual value of corporate relationships and the 
struggle involved in maintaining them. I meet corporate people at 
networking events, they might be good connections for my businesses, but 
going out and making these connections work is very time-consuming. It 
would have to be an extremely thorough job on my part for that to pay off. I 
think there are better ways in which we can add value. Many times the kind 
of companies that we get involved with have experienced management that 
already have those connections (they are going from company to company 
selling those businesses, it already is a more equal relationship). The other 
thing is that I am relatively new to this (investing in the sector for only 2 
years), so over time these relationships might grow.  
The interviewee continued:  
In general, I think the collaborative process is very time-consuming. It is 
non-structured and is network based. It is inherently inefficient, so I 
wouldn’t want to have to devote any more time to it. Would I like a better 
quality of collaboration? Yes. We are about to raise money for a new 
business, and we are about to go around and talk to all the funds that invest 
in businesses like that. The process of finding those funds, finding the right 
person at those funds, and bringing the company in for a good hearing is a 
long, involved, and detailed process, and there is a whole industry built up 
around it, lots of intermediaries who handle that process, make money out 
of that process.  
Comments such as this, although not pervasive, were expressed by several 
interviewees. Two points in particular should be made. First, although this research 
points to growing collaboration between VC firms and large corporations, such 
collaboration is not automatic. As in most collaborative relationships, there is a 
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cumulative learning process in which experience and familiarity weighs heavily in 
the substance of the exchange and the benefits of the outcome. Furthermore, 
although collaboration between VC firms and large corporations plays a significant 
role in the venture capital investment process, it is still an activity that is evolving. 
Finally, the above comments, similar to those made by interviewees, identify 
collaborative relationships between large corporations and portfolio companies 
that are established without the assistance of the VC firm as an intermediary. 
Again, what this may imply is that collaboration between VCs and large 
corporations is in fact a significant source of value added for venture capital 
backed portfolio companies, but that the value adding comes about through 
subsequent partnerships and direct interaction between large corporations and 
portfolio companies. 
7.5. Discussion and Conclusions 
When looking at the various stages that comprise the venture capital investment 
cycle, it is clear the collaboration with large corporations holds tremendous 
benefits for VC firms in that it enhances investment selection, has value for 
investment monitoring activities, and improves investment exit options. As shown 
in Figure 20, however, the benefits of this collaboration are felt most prominently 
and are thus pursued during (a) the investment selection phase, aligning with the 
selection motive, and (b) the later stages of the investment process culminating in 
the investment exit, corresponding to the exit motive as established in Chapter 6. 
Collaboration during the post-selection monitoring phase, from the early stages of 
investment up through the expansion stage, was surprisingly less significant. For 
most VC firms interviewed, the investment monitoring phase was characterised by 
informal and periodic interaction aimed at obtaining a variety of  corporate 
knowledge and expertise, particularly industry and market knowledge for  
evaluating the developing market potential of portfolio companies so as to better 
position them  for an exit by corporate acquisition or merger. 
Using this collaboration for enhancing investment selection and improving 
investment exit options may be driven, in part, by a significant contraction in the 
IPO market during the most recent economic downturn, which is pushing VC 
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firms away from early stage investments that require substantial value added 
inputs and moving them toward investing in more established companies. At the 
same time, VC firms are placing more emphasis on investing in companies that 
align with the commercial and strategic interests of their corporate partners, thus 
facilitating exits by corporate acquisition and merger. The exception to this 
investment approach appears to be those VC firms investing heavily in life science 
and biotech. In these industries early stage investment is somewhat more 
prominent and the factor inputs required by portfolio companies and high barriers 
to market necessitate close collaboration with large pharmaceutical companies. 
These circumstances lead to the use of value-adding opportunities to build the 
capacity of portfolio companies and thus an emphasis on collaboration during the 
investment monitoring phase. That being said, the exit by acquisition and merger 
objective still holds for many of the life science-focused VC firms interviewed. 
More specifically, however, the findings speak to collaborative relationships 
between VC firms and large corporations where less formal collaboration provides 
a more flexible and advantageous relationship in which the complementarities of 
the parties are potentially offset by different strategic interests and organisational 
constraints. Such a relationship is particularly advantageous for the selection of 
portfolio companies and for profitably exiting those investments. Yet this 
flexibility may lessen opportunities for value-adding during the investment 
monitoring phase. 
Prominent among the challenges to collaboration is aligning organisational 
interests: aligning venture capital’s long-term investment approach, which is based 
on investment return, with the short-term corporate objectives that emphasise more 
immediate technology and product pipeline needs. Furthermore, corporate 
partnerships, if not structured and approached carefully, can lead to complications 
during the investment exit stage involving competitive confusion, which can drive 
down the bidding price for an acquisition or merger. Additionally, developing 
collaborative relationships with large corporation takes time and resources, placing 
less experienced VC firms at a distinct disadvantage when compared to larger, 
more experienced VC firms. 
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Figure 20: Propensities for Collaboration & the Role of Geographic Proximity 
EARLY STAGE EXPANSION STAGE LATER STAGES 3. Exit
2. Active Investment Monitoring
1. Investment
Selection
Collaboration enhances 
the selection process:  
validates market viability 
and corporate interest. 
Interaction is frequent and 
substantive.
Geographic proximity 
facilitates knowledge exchange, 
with co-location providing
some advantages.
Collaboration provides some 
value added benefits during 
the monitoring phase, 
though interaction is less 
frequent and more periodic.
Geographic proximity
provides some advantages, but 
is not considered essential.
Collaboration solidifies
exits by corporate acquisition 
or merger, and facilitates
later stage fundraising
Geographic proximity 
holds some importance, 
associated with the 
investment banking and 
legal capacities of the LMR. 
Source: Own interpretation 
Also shown in Figure 20, the importance of geographic proximity for this 
collaboration seems to follow the propensities for collaboration as they relate to 
the venture capital investment cycle, with geographic proximity greatly facilitating 
collaboration at the investment selection phase and to some extent collaboration at 
the investment exit phase. For the selection phase, geographic proximity allows 
VC firms to regularly meet face-to-face with corporate contacts and partners to 
discuss how potential portfolio firms might align with corporate pipeline needs. 
This exchange of industry and market knowledge as well as specialised and 
possibly proprietary information may well be facilitated by the co-location of the 
actors. Interviews with several London based corporate venturing divisions 
supported this co-location significance; the interviewees stated that their scouting 
of new technology brought them into frequent contact with London based VC 
firms. 
For collaboration during the post-selection monitoring phase, the significance of 
geographic proximity appears to decrease from that of the selection phase. 
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Although substantive knowledge exchange involving science and technology and 
business and commercial development between VC firms and corporate partners 
occurred across sectors, it was described prominently only by those VC firms 
investing in life science and biotech. For the investment monitoring phase, most 
VC firms emphasised the access to industry and market knowledge that their 
corporate contacts and partners could provide – information that can be easily 
communicated by phone. Therefore, the need for close geographic proximity and 
the co-location of VC firms and their corporate partners during the monitoring 
phase was downplayed by the majority of VC firms interviewed. The significance 
of geographic proximity for collaboration during the exit phase is a bit less clear. 
Collaboration building up to an exit by acquisition or merger probably involves 
considerable face-to-face contact between VC firms and corporate partners, but 
there may be more of an emphasis on interactions with investment banks and legal 
services based in London for facilitating the acquisition or merger. 
In considering the overall findings, it can be argued that geographic proximity 
plays a more significant role in facilitating collaboration between London based 
VC firms and large corporations than most interviewees admit or realise. Although 
much of the investment by London based VC firms may well go to portfolio 
companies abroad, a still significant number of investments are local. In selecting, 
monitoring, and exiting investments in local portfolio companies, London based 
VC firms collaborate with large corporations, many of whom have strong local 
presences in the LMR. This includes corporate HQs, R&D centres, and corporate 
venturing divisions – many of these described by interviewees as scouting London 
based portfolio companies for new technology and potential acquisitions, placing 
them in substantive contact with local VC firms. Furthermore, for initiating and 
building relationships with corporate contacts and partners and for exchanging 
complementary information, much of it specialised, tacit, and proprietary, some 
degree of face-to-face interaction is essential, even in the supposed absence of 
significant co-location. Therefore, geographic proximity is still important, with the 
LMR facilitating opportunities for profitable interactions between VC firms and 
large corporations through an abundance of social and professional network 
activities and tremendous capacity for international knowledge exchange. 
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8. Conclusion: Venture Capital and Corporate Partnering: 
Opportunities, Constraints, and Implications  
Venture capital investment is one of the most effective funding mechanisms for 
developing NHTCs, thus playing a significant role in the support and facilitation of 
both entrepreneurship, and the commercialisation of new innovations. In doing so, 
VC firms contribute not only finance, but also considerable value added in the 
form of specialised knowledge, expertise, and connections to external funding, 
knowledge, and enabling infrastructure (De Clercq & Fried, 2005; Auerswald & 
Branscomb, 2003). Furthermore, the highly tacit information and asymmetric 
knowledge flows that characterise the innovation process, and NHTCs more 
generally, require VC firms to meet regularly, face-to-face with potential and 
current portfolio companies, both for investment selection purposes and ongoing 
investment evaluation and monitoring (Zook, 2004). For VC firms, this active 
monitoring is crucial for both managing asymmetric knowledge and related agency 
costs, and for developing the technological and commercial capacities of their 
portfolio companies (Gompers & Lerner, 2004).  In order to lessen the selection 
and monitoring costs, VC firms will invest predominately in local companies, and 
rely on the knowledge and resource capacities of their local investment networks 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2001). 
This study has proposed that a significant source of value adding inputs for venture 
capital backed companies are large corporations and their corporate venturing 
divisions and that these potential corporate partners hold central positions within 
local venture capital networks; leading to substantive interaction and collaboration 
between these large corporations and VC firms (Maula, Autio, & Murray, 2005).  
That being said, how this collaboration is coordinated and the various motivations 
for doing so have not been well substantiated empirically.  
This study, therefore, has sought to capture and understand how, why and under 
what circumstances do independent venture capital firms collaborate with large 
corporations and their corporate venturing divisions. In doing so, this study has 
inquired to the frequency of collaboration, the structures and mechanisms through 
which this collaboration occurs, and the primary motivations for which this 
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collaboration is pursued. Furthermore, this study aimed to identify when 
collaboration is most beneficial in regard to the venture capital investment process, 
and to understand the challenges to bringing together these two complementary 
actors with often conflicting organisational cultures and different strategic 
interests. Furthermore, this study has sought to understand not only how venture 
capital, as active investors, provide substantial value added to their portfolio 
companies, but to also illuminate VC firms as important network intermediaries 
and knowledge brokers — bringing together complementary actors, competencies, 
and resources for bringing new innovations to market (see Chapter 2). 
Because geographic proximity is viewed as facilitating much of the venture capital 
investment process (Mason, 2007), particularly venture capital’s reliance on local 
networks and knowledge capacities for investment selection and investment 
monitoring — contributing to the concentration of venture capital activity in a 
select number of large metropolitan regions — the secondary objective of this 
study has been to explore and assess the role that geographic proximity plays in 
facilitating collaboration between venture capital firms and large corporations. 
For this reason, this study has focused on potential collaboration between VC 
firms and large corporations occurring in the London metropolitan region (LMR). 
The LMR being home to the largest concentration of UK based VC firms and the 
majority of venture capital investment in the UK, as well as growing number of 
corporate venturing offices and activities (BVCA, 2010). 
8.1. Main Theoretical Constructs and Hypotheses 
In answering these questions, Chapter 2 laid out the main theoretical constructs for 
which this study is based. First, while innovation offers opportunities for great 
profit to motivated individuals and firms, innovation’s inherent uncertainty makes 
it significantly challenging for entrepreneurs and NHTCs, lacking sufficient 
experience and resources, to commercialise their new ideas (Auerswald & 
Branscomb, 2003). As such, this study is based on the notion that innovation 
requires both the motivation and flexibility to generate new ideas, as embodied by 
entrepreneurs and NHTCs, and the experience and resources to pursue them, as 
offered by large established companies. Such a perspective is based on a 
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complementary asset model of firm-based innovation developed through the work 
of Teece (1992), Christensen (1996), Rothwell and Dodgson (1991), Chesbrough, 
Vanhaverbeke, and West (2008), and others. As these and other studies 
demonstrate, innovation, in most high tech sectors, comes about through a variety 
of inter-firm relationships between NHTCs and large established companies, 
ranging from producer-customer partnerships and spin-out/offs, to strategic 
alliances and joint R&D ventures (Rothwell, 1991). 
Second, although such inter-firm relationships offer tremendous complementary 
benefits, obstacles to such collaboration include organisational and cultural 
barriers, and different strategic interests and objectives. In such instances, Lee and 
colleagues (2010) suggest that bringing together appropriate firms for 
collaboration often requires an intermediary actor whose network position and 
expertise can effectively recognise complementarities between firms. Therefore, 
this study views VC firms as investment and knowledge intermediaries that are 
uniquely positioned, within local investment networks, to identify and facilitate 
complementary partnerships between their portfolio companies (i.e. NHTCs) and 
their corporate partners. 
Finally, the local emphasis of venture capital investment and related networks 
corresponds to the geographic concentration of entrepreneurial activity and 
innovation more generally within a select number of large metropolitan regions 
such as London. Viewed as regional innovation system, the LMR, and other 
regions like it, offer individuals and firms a seemingly unlimited number of 
opportunities for collaboration and profitable knowledge exchange (see Gordon & 
McCann, 2000), often between system incumbents (e.g. large corporations) and 
new system entrants (e.g. entrepreneurs, NHTCs). This interaction and subsequent 
collaboration is coordinated through networks which promote norms of interaction 
and embedded behaviour and processes (e.g. business and professional networks, 
venture capital syndication networks) (see Lawton Smith and Waters, 2011). In 
doing so, these networks develop and contribute to regional institutional capacities 
which support and govern the selection, development and diffusion of new ideas 
and technologies in the region (Cooke, 2005). This process is facilitated and 
sustained through interactions between the region and global knowledge flows, 
258 
 
 
often facilitated by knowledge brokers (e.g. VC firms) who can collect and 
effectively match and integrate external ideas with regional competencies and 
needs (see Amin & Thrift, 1992 & Zook, 2004). Such interaction infuses regions 
with new ideas, enhances capacities, and prevents lock-in (Maskell, Bathelt & 
Malmberg, 2005). 
Chapter 3 looked more closely at how and why VC firms leverage local networks 
to more effectively manage tacit and asymmetric information and related agency 
costs, and to add value at each phase of the venture capital cycle, particularly the 
investment selection phase, and the post-selection monitoring phase (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2004). The investment selection phase is characterised by frequent face-to-
face interaction between VC firms and entrepreneurs. This intense screening and 
due diligence is aided by a VC firm’s relationships to other local VC firms and 
connections to local actors such as universities, successful entrepreneurs, and large 
corporations, all of whom can assist the VC firms in determining the managerial, 
technical, and market viability of a proposed technology or product (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2004; Zook, 2004).  
A VC firm’s reliance on local networks is thought to increase during the post-
selection monitoring phase (Mason, 2007). VC firms limit agency costs and 
effectively develop portfolio companies by employing a staged investment 
structure involving multiple funding rounds and investment syndication with other 
VC firms and partners, many of these from a VC firm’s local network (Sorenson, 
& Stuart, 2008). These co-investors and strategic partners participate in the 
monitoring of portfolio companies (e.g. sitting on the board of directors) and bring 
with them diverse and complementary expertise which can be used for better 
developing a portfolio company’s technical and commercial capacities (Gompers 
& Lerner, 2001). During the exit phase, the importance of local networks is less 
clear, although VC firms may rely on local investment banks and legal services, as 
well as local corporate partners in instances when an exit is by acquisition or 
merger.  
Three high-tech sectors were then considered from a venture capital investment 
perspective: ICT, life science, and clean tech. In comparing these three sectors, life 
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science was characterised by higher capital costs, longer investment timeframes, 
more specialised input requirements, and higher barriers to market. Therefore, it 
was thought that investing in life science companies would require significant 
value adding activities involving inputs of science and technology, and more 
formal and substantive collaborative relationships with large pharmaceutical 
companies (see Chapter 3, Sect. 3.4). 
Based on these constructs, two sets of hypotheses were considered (see Chapter 3, 
Sect. 3.5). The first set was premised on the differing input requirements of 
portfolio companies, differences that were thought to be sector specific: the 
greater the science and technology inputs required by portfolio companies, (H1) 
the more important and formal collaboration between VC firms and large 
corporations becomes; (H2) the more important collaboration between VC firms 
and large corporations becomes for value adding purposes; (H3) the more 
important collaboration between VC firms and large corporations becomes for 
investment monitoring and evaluation.  The second set of hypotheses considered 
collaboration between VC firms and large corporations and assesses the role of 
geographic proximity, proposing that (H4) collaboration between VC firms and 
large corporations will be facilitated through both geographic proximity and the 
capacities of the LMR, with (H5) the importance of geographic proximity is most 
prominent during the post-selection monitoring phase. 
8.2. Research Approach 
In capturing the existence of organisational constructs and to describe the 
processes and procedures for collaboration, this study employed a mainly 
qualitative approach based on in-depth semi-structured interviews with 30 
technology oriented VC firms. All firms were engaged in some degree of early 
stage investing, and all were located in the LMR (see Chapter 4). The selection 
process for the interviewee firms was informative. The number of U.K. VC firms 
engaged in early stage technology investment is relatively small (60–80 firms 
total). Therefore, the 30 firms interviewed formed a representative sample. 
However, a number of interviewees spoke of their firms’ declining early stage 
investments. To conduct a cross-sector comparison, interviewee firms were 
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identified as investing in one or a combination of three high-tech sectors: ICT, life 
science, and clean tech. This cross-sector comparison was used to explore how 
these three high-tech sectors, necessitating different factor input requirements and 
exhibiting varying barriers to market, would show different propensities for 
collaboration between VC firms and large corporations. 
The interview questions were split into three sets of inquiry. The first set focused 
on the structures used and the various arrangements that VC firms engage in for 
collaborating with large corporations. The second set of questions inquired as to 
the motivations behind VC firms’ collaboration with large corporations. A third set 
of questions examined the circumstances under which collaboration with large 
corporations is pursued, as well as the challenges and limitations toward more 
substantive relationships. A line of inquiry running through these question sets, 
particularly those regarding the structures and circumstances for collaboration, was 
the extent to which geographic proximity plays a role in the facilitation of this 
collaboration, looking particularly at co-location and the capacities of the LMR. 
Additional interviews were conducted with several corporate venturing divisions 
operating from offices in London. Their inclusion provided an important 
triangulation of sources to clarify and further validate the core empirical findings. 
8.3. Findings: Summary and Analysis 
The summation of the empirical findings (Chapters 5 and 6) suggests that 
collaboration between VC firms and large corporations is increasingly common, 
but that more formal collaborative structures, particularly syndication partnerships, 
are the exception. The primary mechanisms for establishing and maintaining these 
relationships are venture capitalists’ past industry ties and subsequent corporate 
contacts. Driving this collaboration is the exchange of complementary knowledge, 
particularly industry and market knowledge, for purposes of better investment 
selection (the selection motive) and the positioning of portfolio companies for 
more optimal investment exits through corporate acquisition or merger (the exit 
motive). Such exits are the only viable outcome during a severely weakened IPO 
market as a result of the economic downturn and resulting credit crunch. Access to 
and use of specialised expertise for the development of portfolio companies (value 
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adding motive) was a somewhat secondary motivation for interviewee firms, with 
collaboration focused on investments in life science being the exception. When 
significant value-adding relationships exist, they are often established and 
maintained independently of an intermediary VC firm.  
In further comparing the different sectors, life science focused VC firms showed 
stronger propensities for more formal collaborative structures and placed more 
importance on the value adding motive than did those investing in ICT and clean 
tech. This appears to confirm the expectations that the higher resource intensities 
necessary in the life science sector, including inputs of science and technology, are 
probably driving them to more formal and substantive collaboration with large 
pharmaceutical companies. Therefore, the findings lend support to hypotheses 
(H1) and (H2). More than just the need for specialised knowledge and expertise 
(i.e. value adding), however, is probably at play here. Due to consolidation in the 
pharmaceutical industry, positioning portfolio companies to successfully enter the 
market necessitates that VC firms closely collaborate with Big Pharma. 
Combining the findings from Chapters 5 and 6 offered further insight concerning 
when collaboration between VC firms and large corporations is regarded as most 
beneficial, and illuminates this collaboration’s opportunities, limitations, and 
challenges (see Chapter 7).  
The investment selection phase of the venture capital process is characterised by 
high propensities for collaboration between VC firms and large corporations. 
Aligned with the selection motive, this phase is characterised by mutual and 
recursive exchanges of information that can lead to a decision to invest in a 
particular company. This involves the sharing of information regarding the R&D 
or product pipeline needs of a large corporation and the potential matches either 
residing in a VC firm’s current portfolio or among those companies up for 
selection. For investment selection purposes, the information gained through this 
interaction is used by VC firms to validate the technical and market viability of a 
potential portfolio company, and to establish a large corporation’s interest in it. 
Many interviewees claimed that they would not select a company for investment 
without some degree of corporate validation or interest. This interpretation was 
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verified by the corporate venturing divisions interviewed. For large corporations, 
collaborating with VC firms is particularly valuable in scouting for new 
technology and selecting small firms for partnerships and acquisition — making 
this collaboration highly complementary for both parties. 
Collaboration during the post-selection monitoring phase was less prominent than 
in the investment selection phase.  Aligned with the value-adding motive, 
motivations for accessing and using knowledge and expertise for value-adding 
purposes, while evident, were not identified as a primary motivation for 
collaboration by the majority of VC firms interviewed. Motivations for value-
adding were secondary to both motivations for investment selection and 
investment exit. The findings suggest that for the majority of VC firms 
collaboration with large corporations during the post-investment selection phase is 
more a continuation of the collaboration that occurs during the selection phase, 
albeit less intense. On-going collaboration during the monitoring phase is used to 
enhance the monitoring and evaluation of portfolio companies (i.e. evaluate the 
continued market viability of a portfolio company) while maintaining the 
acquisition or merger interest of a large corporation. Therefore, the majority of VC 
firms are using collaboration with large corporations during the post-selection 
monitoring phase to access additional industry and market knowledge to reduce 
market uncertainty. 
This collaboration culminates in the later stages of the investment cycle, as 
collaboration between VC firms and large corporations re-intensifies during the 
investment exit phase: VC firms reengage their corporate contacts and strategic 
partners to facilitate an investment exit, most likely in the form of an acquisition or 
merger; although an IPO may be sought under more robust market conditions. This 
facilitation takes on two forms. First, VC firms may seek out large corporations to 
obtain additional investment funding, which may be crucial in getting a portfolio 
company to the exit stage and may also raise investment awareness about a 
particular portfolio company. This can drive funding for the portfolio company 
while attracting additional corporate interest, setting up a potentially lucrative 
bidding race for an exit by acquisition or merger. Where corporate funding is not 
the primary aim, long standing corporate partners will likely be approached by the 
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VC firm to assess their interest in the acquisition or merger with a particular 
portfolio company. Importantly though, this interest will probably have been 
established long before the exit phase. The challenge for VC firms, therefore, is to 
encourage the interests of multiple bidders in a portfolio company — driving up 
the acquisition price — while avoiding a perception of preference for any one 
potential buyer (i.e. competitive confusion).  
Besides exit challenges, another obstacle toward successful collaboration between 
VC firms and large corporations is the organisational constraints and the often 
divergent strategic interests of these two risk capital actors. Interviewees, whether 
VC firms or large corporations, spoke of the challenges of aligning interests, 
particularly the short-term technology interests of the large corporations and the 
long-term investment objectives embodied in the venture capital cycle, in which 
investment in a particular portfolio company can range from 5 to 10 years 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2004). These potential differences likely contribute to the 
relative lack of formal syndication and co-investing arrangement between these 
two parties.  
This corresponds to the preference articulated by interviewee VC firms to 
collaborate with corporate venturing divisions that are more autonomous in their 
relationships with parent companies (i.e. true corporate venture capital operations). 
Such operations are usually set up to operate like a traditional VC firm, with a 
focus on investment return and long-term strategic objectives (see Dushnitsky, 
2006). In either case, interviews with the VC firms and large corporations both 
emphasised that less formal collaboration provides a more flexible and 
advantageous collaborative arrangement for working with and investing in either 
NHTCs or more established firms, all of which are engaged in significantly 
uncertain enterprises. 
8.3.1. The role of geographic proximity 
In assessing (H4) and (H5), the findings presented in Chapters 5 and 7 demonstrate 
that collaboration between VC firms and large corporations is facilitated by 
geographic proximity, although most interviewees downplayed the importance of 
co-location. In this way, the role of geographic proximity is that of facilitating 
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face-to-face interaction between VCs and corporate representatives, with such 
interaction described as necessary for initiating relationships, and for exchanging 
specialised and often proprietary information, particularly during the investment 
selection phase. Surprisingly though, the importance of face-to-face interaction 
appears to decrease during the post-selection monitoring phase where interaction is 
described as less frequent and the knowledge exchanged less specialised. The 
exception again were those VC firms investing in life science who described 
frequent access to contacts at local corporate R&D centres as important for both 
investment selection purposes, and for value adding during the post-investment 
monitoring phase — lending some support to both (H5) and to the notion that co-
location may play a more significant role in this collaboration than most 
interviewees realise.   
When asked about the importance of co-location, most interviewees stressed the 
global focus of their investment activities, stating that “the local presence” of large 
corporations did not drive collaboration as such. That being said, the importance 
that interviewees placed in industry led meetings and conferences held in the 
LMR, coupled with both the importance assigned to the selection motive by most 
interviewees, along with the growing number of corporate venturing divisions 
operating in the LMR, would seem to counter such claims.  
For the majority of interviewees, the LMR itself played a more significant, if not 
direct, role in facilitating collaboration between venture capital firms and large 
corporations. Interviewees described the LMR as having tremendous capacities for 
innovation (e.g. high tech industries, research universities, entrepreneurs, highly 
skilled labour) and both the network and transport infrastructure for facilitating 
international knowledge exchange (e.g. rich professional networks and robust 
international transport links), all of  which create opportunities for face-to-face 
meetings,  and networking, allowing VC firms to initiate and build collaborative 
partnerships with large corporations. Furthermore, the LMR is home to 
considerable international finance and legal capacities including investment banks, 
corporate law firms and patent attorneys. All of which are essential for facilitating 
substantive interaction between VC firms and large corporations, particular during 
265 
 
 
the investment exit phase when executing investment exits by corporate 
acquisition or merger. In this way, the findings lend substantial support to (H4). 
8.4. Discussion and conclusion 
Although collaboration between VC firms and large corporations appears to hold 
complementary benefits to both parties, questions remain as to the effect of this 
collaboration on portfolio companies and innovation more generally. The findings 
here support the idea that the goal of most VC firms is to invest and develop 
portfolio companies that will successfully fill a niche position within broader 
industries, becoming complementary partners or assets to the large corporations 
that typically dominate many of these high-tech sectors. The increasing frequency 
of collaboration between VC firms and large corporations in the high-tech 
industries of ICT, life science and clean tech — collaboration being advocated by 
both parties — speaks of a venture capital industry and market that may be 
tailoring both entrepreneurial ideas and motivations to the needs and interests of 
large established companies. This at the expense of investing and developing more 
radical ideas that might go counter to industry interests, thus leading to industries 
with less innovation and perhaps limiting the emergence of new industries.  
The suggestions of potentially diminished innovative output coincides with the 
prominent trend of VC firms investing more in already established portfolio 
companies and devoting less of their funds to early stage companies, indicating 
that the capacity building potential of this collaboration is not being sufficiently 
leveraged. Such potential, however, might still be realised, as evidenced by the 
number of VC firms investing heavily in life science, particularly by public 
venture capital funds tasked with filling this persistent early stage equity gap 
(Nightingale et al., 2009). As alluded to in Chapter 1, some public venture capital 
programmes in the United Kingdom include large corporations in an advisory roll 
aimed at helping these programmes build the investee readiness and capacities of 
their early stage portfolio companies. On the one hand, although they may enhance 
the capacities and business development of participating portfolio companies, they 
may also succumb to investment selection and strategy that aligns closely with 
corporate interests and objectives, at the expense of more radical and game-
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changing innovations. On the other hand, corporate involvement in early stage 
public venture funds may prove to be an effective means of organisational 
learning, both for the large corporations and the public venture funds, where both 
types of organisations learn how to be more effective early stage investors. This 
process also could create collaborative practices and ways of doing things that can 
be carried over to early stage investing both inside and outside the environs of the 
public venture capital fund. 
For public venture funds, this research is more instructive in showing the 
importance described by interviewee firms regarding the capacities of the London 
metropolitan region and the global transport links and knowledge flows that 
characterise it. In many ways the findings point to the inherent disadvantages of 
less innovative regions in attracting venture capital activity when compared to high 
capacity regions such as London. Going back to ideas of agglomeration and 
entrepreneurial ecosystems, VC firms will generally invest where opportunities for 
profit reside (Zacharakis, Shepard & Coombs, 2003). In other words, they will 
invest where there is demand for venture capital investment. That being said, 
engaging in uncertain enterprises also depends in part on access to information 
regarding opportunities and access to knowledge and resources to make pursuing 
such opportunities possible. For regions that lack demand for venture capital and 
the public venture funds pushing to create that demand, knowledge and resource 
networks that stretch across regional boundaries, with large corporations as 
possible network nodes connecting underperforming regions to high capacity 
agglomerations such as London, may offer a more effective strategy for 
developing these venture capital markets (see Nightingale, et al., 2009). 
The potential that collaboration between VC firms and large corporations has for 
both entrepreneurial and regional capacity building, coupled with the limitations of 
this study, offer considerable opportunities for future research. Such research 
should examine the value-adding implications of this collaboration for venture 
capital backed entrepreneurial firms. Although this study has captured the intent of 
VC firms concerning corporate collaboration — confirmed by the corporate 
venturing perspective — the outcome of this collaboration remains unexplored. To 
this end, broad-based survey work on U.K. based entrepreneurial firms regarding 
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the benefits and drawbacks of corporate investment participation, as well as 
quantitative studies that match corporate involvement in a venture capital 
investment with exit outcomes and post-exit performance, would go a long way 
towards establishing the effects of this collaboration and add considerably to our 
understanding of the value-adding ‘black box’ of venture capital behaviour.  
Furthermore, a wealth of knowledge might arise from in-depth case studies that 
focus more on the organisational learning aspects of this collaboration. Such case 
studies might look at how a particular collaborative relationship has developed 
over time. Finally, the lack of conclusiveness that can be derived from this study 
concerning the location dynamics of this collaboration warrant additional research. 
In particular, research that seeks to identify the location imperatives of corporate 
venturing divisions would certainly expand understanding on the geography of risk 
capital and the interplay of regional and global knowledge flows. 
This study presents a substantial  first step in positioning future research by 
establishing the existence and frequency of particular organisational structures and 
offering answers regarding the processes and mechanisms employed, as well as the 
motivations for and the organisational constraints toward collaboration between 
two complementary yet distinct risk capital actors. These are findings on which 
future research can build. 
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